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Sustainable Development and Equity
4
Chapter 4
4�2�1�2 Links with climate change and climate policy
The literature on the complex relations between climate change, cli-
mate policies, and SD is large (Swart etal., 2003; Robinson etal., 2006;
Bizikova etal., 2007; Sathaye etal., 2007; Thuiller, 2007; Akimoto etal.,
2012; Janetos etal., 2012). The links between SD and climate issues
are examined in detail in WGII Chapter 20. Mapping out these links is
also important in this WGIII report, and is done in this section.
Three main linkages can be identified, each of which contains many
elements. First, the climate threat constrains possible development
paths, and sufficiently disruptive climate change could preclude any
prospect for sustainable future (WGII Chapter 19). In this perspective,
an effective climate response is necessarily an integral objective of an
SD strategy.
Second, there are tradeoffs between climate responses and broader SD
goals, because some climate responses can impose other environmen-
tal pressures, have adverse distributional effects, draw resources away
from other developmental priorities, or otherwise impose limitations
on growth and development (Sections 4.6, 7.11, 8.9, 9.9, 10.10, 11.9,
12.8). Section 4.4 examines how to avoid such tradeoffs by changing
behavioural patterns and decoupling emissions and growth, and / or
decoupling growth and well-being.
Third, there are multiple potential synergies between climate responses
and broader SD objectives. Climate responses may generate co-bene-
fits for human and economic development (Sections 3.6, 4.8, 6.6, 7.9,
8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7). At a more fundamental level, capacities underly-
ing an effective climate response overlap strongly with capacities for
SD (Sections 4.6, 5.3).
A key message of this report is that designing a successful climate pol-
icy may require going beyond a narrow focus on mitigation and adap-
tation, beyond the analysis of a few co-benefits of climate policy, and
may instead require ‘mainstreaming’ climate issues into the design of
comprehensive SD strategies, including at local and regional levels. Fig-
ure 4.1 illustrates the different perspectives from which climate policy
can be envisioned. In the broadest, boldest perspective, the choice of
the development path (see Sections 4.5, 6.1) is at stake.
A popular conceptualization of SD goes beyond securing needs
and preserving the environment and involves three ‘pillars’ or three
‘bottom-lines’ of sustainability: environmental, economic, and social
aspects (Dobson, 1991; Elkington, 1998; Flint and Danner, 2001; Pope
etal., 2004; Sneddon etal., 2006; Murdiyarso, 2010; Okereke, 2011).
There is some variation in the articulation of the three spheres, with
some scholars arguing for an equal appraisal of their co-evolution and
mutual interactions, and others positing a hierarchy with economic
activities embedded in the social matrix, which is itself grounded in the
ecosphere (Levin, 2000; Fischer etal., 2007). This broad SD framework
is equally relevant for rich countries concerned with growth, well-
being, human development, and lifestyles.
A well-known distinction opposes weak sustainability to strong sus-
tainability approaches (Neumayer, 2010). The former relies on the
assumption that human-made capital can replace natural resources
and ecosystem services with a high degree of substitutability. Strong
sustainability, in contrast, takes the view that certain critical natu-
ral stocks — such as the climate system and biodiversity — cannot
be replaced by human-made capital and must be maintained. Weak
sustainability is often believed to be inherent to economic modelling
that aggregates all forms of capital together (Dietz and Neumayer,
2007), but economic models and indicators can accommodate any
degree of substitutability between different forms of capital (Fleur-
baey and Blanchet, 2013). The linkage between strong sustainabil-
ity and IAMs is discussed in Sathaye etal. (2011). A different but
related issue is whether one should evaluate development paths only
in terms of human well-being, which depends on the environment
services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005), or also account
for natural systems as intrinsically valuable (McShane, 2007; Attfield,
2008).
Sustainability is closely related to resilience (WII AR5 2.5 and
20.2 – 20.6; Folke etal., 2010; Gallopin, 2006; Goerner etal., 2009) and
vulnerability (Kates, 2001; Clark and Dickson, 2003; IPCC, 2012a). A
key premise of this direction of research is that social and biophysi-
cal processes are interdependent and co-evolving (Polsky and Eakin,
2011). The biosphere itself is a complex adaptive system, the monitor-
ing of which is still perfectible (Levin, 2000; Thuiller, 2007). Critical per-
spectives on these concepts, when applied to SD analysis, can be found
in Turner (2010) and Cannon and Müller-Mahn (2010).
Although there are various conceptions of sustainability in the litera-
ture, there are internationally agreed principles of SD adopted by
heads of states and governments at the 1992 UN Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development (UNCED) and reaffirmed at subsequent
review and implementation conferences (United Nations, 1992a, 1997,
2002, 2012a). A key guiding principle is: “The right to development
must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environ-
mental needs of present and future generations” (1992 Rio Declara-
tion Principle 3). The Rio principles were reaffirmed at the June 2012
summit level UN Conference on SD.
Box 4�2 | Sustainable development indicators (SDI)
When SD became a prominent consideration in policymaking in
the early 1990s, SDI initiatives flourished. Pressure-state-response
(PSR) and capital accounting-based (CAB) frameworks, in particu-
lar, were widely used to assess sustainability. The PSR approach
was further modified as driving force-state-response (DSR) by the
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD)
(2001) and driving force-pressure-state-impact-response (DPSIR)
by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (UNEP,
1997, 2000, 2002). The System of Integrated Environmental-Eco-
nomic Accounting (SEEA) of the United Nations offers a wealth of
information about the state of ecosystems and is currently under
revision and expansion.
1
The CAB approach is embodied in the
Adjusted Net Savings indicator of the World Bank (2003, 2011),
which is mentioned in Section 4.3 and 14.1 of this report. It is
based on the economic theory of ‘genuine savings’ (understood as
the variation of all natural and man-made capital stocks, evaluated
at certain specific accounting prices), which shows that on a path
that maximizes the discounted utilitarian sum, a negative value for
genuine savings implies that the current level of well-being is not
sustainable (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999; Pezzey, 2004).
General presentations and critical assessments of SDIs can be
found in a large literature (Daly, 1996; Aronsson etal., 1997;
1
Documentation is available at http: / / unstats.un.org / unsd / envaccounting /
seea.asp.
Pezzey and Toman, 2002; Lawn, 2003; Hamilton and Atkinson,
2006; Asheim, 2007; Dietz and Neumayer, 2007; Neumayer,
2010; Martinet, 2012; Mori and Christodoulou, 2012; Fleurbaey
and Blanchet, 2013). This literature is pervaded by a concern
for comprehensiveness — i. e., recording all important aspects of
well-being, equity, and nature preservation for current and future
generations — and accuracy — i. e., avoiding arbitrary or unreliable
weighting of the relevant dimensions when synthesizing multidi-
mensional information. The general conclusion of this literature
is that there is currently no satisfactory empirical indicator of
sustainability.
A limitation of the PSR model is that it fails to identify causal
relations, and it oversimplifies the links between dimensions.
It is moreover based upon aggregate indices, which lose much
information contained in the underlying indicators. An important
limitation of the SEEA is that social and institutional issues are
essentially left out, and its stock-and-flow approach is problematic
with respect to environmental and social aspects that do not have
a market price. Similarly, computing CAB indicators compounds
the difficulty of comprehensively estimating the evolution of capi-
tal stocks with the difficulty of computing the accounting prices.
Market prices do provide relevant information for valuing capital
stocks in a perfectly managed economy (as shown by Weitzman,
1976), but may be very misleading in actual conditions (Dasgupta
and Mäler, 2000; Arrow etal., 2012).