1001
13
International Cooperation:
Agreements & Instruments
Coordinating Lead Authors:
Robert Stavins (USA), Zou Ji (China)
Lead Authors:
Thomas Brewer (USA), Mariana Conte Grand (Argentina), Michel den Elzen (Netherlands), Michael
Finus (Germany / UK), Joyeeta Gupta (Netherlands), Niklas Höhne (Germany), Myung-Kyoon Lee
(Republic of Korea), Axel Michaelowa (Germany / Switzerland), Matthew Paterson (Canada),
Kilaparti Ramakrishna (Republic of Korea / USA), Gang Wen (China), Jonathan Wiener (USA), Harald
Winkler (South Africa)
Contributing Authors:
Daniel Bodansky (USA), Gabriel Chan (USA), Anita Engels (Germany), Adam Jaffe (USA / New
Zealand), Michael Jakob (Germany), T. Jayaraman (India), Jorge Leiva (Chile), Kai Lessmann
(Germany), Richard Newell (USA), Sheila Olmstead (USA), William Pizer (USA), Robert Stowe
(USA), Marlene Vinluan (Philippines)
Review Editors:
Antonina Ivanova Boncheva (Mexico / Bulgaria), Jennifer Morgan (USA)
Chapter Science Assistant:
Gabriel Chan (USA)
This chapter should be cited as:
Stavins R., J. Zou, T. Brewer, M. Conte Grand, M. den Elzen, M. Finus, J. Gupta, N. Höhne, M.-K. Lee, A. Michaelowa, M. Pat-
erson, K. Ramakrishna, G. Wen, J. Wiener, and H. Winkler, 2014: International Cooperation: Agreements and Instruments.
In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K.
Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and
J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
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Contents
Executive Summary � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1005
13�1 Introduction � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1007
13�2 Framing concepts for an assessment of means for international cooperation � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1007
13�2�1 Framing concepts and principles
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1007
13.2.1.1 The global commons and international climate cooperation
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007
13.2.1.2 Principles
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008
13�2�2 Potential criteria for assessing means of international cooperation
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1009
13.2.2.1 Environmental effectiveness
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009
13.2.2.2 Aggregate economic performance
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009
13.2.2.3 Distributional and social impacts
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009
13.2.2.4 Institutional feasibility
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010
13.2.2.5 Conflicts and complementarities
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
13�3 International agreements: Lessons for climate policy � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1012
13�3�1 The landscape of climate agreements and institutions
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1012
13�3�2 Insights from game theory for climate agreements
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1012
13�3�3 Participation in climate agreements
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1014
13�3�4 Compliance
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1015
13�4 Climate policy architectures � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1016
13�4�1 Degrees of centralized authority
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1016
13.4.1.1 Centralized architectures and strong multilateralism
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018
13.4.1.2 Harmonized national policies
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018
13.4.1.3 Decentralized approaches and coordinated policies
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018
13.4.1.4 Advantages and disadvantages of different degrees of centralization
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018
13�4�2 Current features, issues, and elements of international cooperation
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1019
13.4.2.1 Legal bindingness
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019
13.4.2.2 Goals and targets
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
13.4.2.3 Flexible mechanisms
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
13.4.2.4 Equitable methods for effort sharing
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
13�4�3 Recent proposals for future climate change policy architecture
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1022
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13�4�4 The special case of international cooperation regarding carbon dioxide removal and
solar radiation management
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1022
13�5 Multilateral and bilateral agreements and institutions across different scales � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1023
13�5�1 International cooperation among governments
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1024
13.5.1.1 Climate agreements under the UNFCCC
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
13.5.1.2 Other UN climate-related forums
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
13.5.1.3 Non-UN forums
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026
13�5�2 Non-state international cooperation
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1027
13.5.2.1 Transnational cooperation among sub-national public actors
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027
13.5.2.2 Cooperation around human rights and rights of nature
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027
13�5�3 Advantages and disadvantages of different forums
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1028
13�6 Linkages between international and regional cooperation � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1028
13�6�1 Linkages with the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1028
13�6�2 Linkages with other regional policies
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1029
13�7 Linkages between international and national policies � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1029
13�7�1 Influence of international climate policies on domestic action
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1029
13�7�2 Linkages between the Kyoto mechanisms and national policies
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1029
13�7�3 International linkage among regional, national, and sub-national policies
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1030
13�8 Interactions between climate change mitigation policy and trade � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1030
13�8�1 WTO-related issues
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1032
13�8�2 Other international venues
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1034
13�8�3 Implications for policy options
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1034
13�9 Mechanisms for technology and knowledge development, transfer, and diffusion � � � � � � � � � � � � 1035
13�9�1 Modes of international incentive schemes to encourage technology-investment flows
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1035
13�9�2 Intellectual property rights and technology development and transfer
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1036
13�9�3 International collaboration to encourage knowledge development
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1037
13.9.3.1 Knowledge sharing, R&D coordination, and joint collaboration
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
13.9.3.2 International cooperation on domestic climate technology R&D funding
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
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13�10 Capacity building � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1037
13�11 Investment and finance � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1038
13�11�1 Public finance flows
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1038
13.11.1.1 Public funding vehicles under the UNFCCC
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
13.11.1.2 Multilateral development banks
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
13�11�2 Mobilizing private investment and financial flows
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1039
13�12 The role of public and private sectors and public-private partnerships � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1040
13�12�1 Public-private partnerships
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1040
13�12�2 Private sector-led governance initiatives
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1040
13�12�3 Motivations for public-private sector collaboration and private sector governance
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1041
13�13 Performance assessment on policies and institutions including market mechanisms � � � � � � � � � 1041
13�13�1 Performance assessment of existing cooperation
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1041
13.13.1.1 Assessment of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and its flexible mechanisms
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
13.13.1.2 Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
13.13.1.3 Assessment of further agreements under the UNFCCC
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047
13.13.1.4 Assessment of envisioned international cooperation outside of the UNFCCC
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
13�13�2 Performance assessment of proposed international climate policy architectures
� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1051
13.13.2.1 Strong multilateralism
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
13.13.2.2 Harmonized national policies
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
13.13.2.3 Decentralized architectures and coordinated national policies
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
13�14 Gaps in knowledge and data � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1053
13�15 Frequently Asked Questions � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1053
References � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1055
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Executive Summary
This chapter critically examines and evaluates the ways in which agree-
ments and instruments for international cooperation to address global
climate change have been and can be organized and implemented,
drawing upon evidence and insights found in the scholarly literature.
The retrospective analysis of international cooperation in the chapter
discusses and quantifies what has been achieved to date and surveys
the literature on explanations of successes and failures.
International cooperation is necessary to significantly miti-
gate climate change impacts (robust evidence, high agreement).
This is principally due to the fact that greenhouse gases (GHGs) mix
globally in the atmosphere, making anthropogenic climate change a
global commons problem. International cooperation has the potential
to address several challenges: multiple actors that are diverse in their
perceptions of the costs and benefits of collective action, emissions
sources that are unevenly distributed, heterogeneous climate impacts
that are uncertain and distant in space and time, and mitigation costs
that vary. [Section 13.2.1.1, 13.15]
International cooperation on climate change has become more
institutionally diverse over the past decade (robust evidence, high
agreement). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) remains a primary international forum for climate
negotiations, but other institutions have emerged at multiple scales:
global, regional, national, and local, as well as public-private initiatives
and transnational networks. [13.3.1, 13.4.14, 13.5, 13.12] This insti-
tutional diversity arises in part from the growing inclusion of climate
change issues in other policy arenas (e. g., sustainable development,
international trade, and human rights). These and other linkages cre-
ate opportunities, potential co-benefits, or harms that have not yet
been thoroughly examined. Issue linkage also creates the possibility of
forum shopping and increased negotiation costs, which could distract
from or dilute the performance of international cooperation toward cli-
mate goals. [13.3, 13.4, 13.5]
Existing and proposed international climate agreements vary
in the degree to which their authority is centralized (robust
evidence, high agreement). The range of centralized formalization
spans: strong multilateral agreements (such as the Kyoto Protocol tar-
gets), harmonized national policies (such as the Copenhagen / Cancún
pledges), and decentralized but coordinated national policies (such
as planned linkages of national and sub-national emissions trading
schemes). [13.4.1, 13.4.3] Additionally, potential agreements vary in
their degree of legal bindingness [13.4.2.1]. Three other design ele-
ments of international agreements have particular relevance: goals
and targets, flexible mechanisms, and equitable methods for effort
sharing. [13.4.2]
The UNFCCC is currently the only international climate policy
venue with broad legitimacy, due in part to its virtually univer-
sal membership (robust evidence, medium agreement). The UNFCCC
continues to develop institutions and systems for governance of cli-
mate change. [13.2.2.4, 13.3.1, 13.4.1.4, 13.5]
Non-UN forums and coalitions of non-state actors, such as pri-
vate businesses and city-level governments, are also contrib-
uting to international cooperation on climate change (medium
evidence, medium agreement). These forums and coalitions address
issues including deforestation, technology transfer, adaptation, and
fossil fuel subsidies. However, their actual mitigation performance is
unclear. [13.5.1.3, 13.13.1.4]
International cooperation may have a role in stimulating pub-
lic investment, financial incentives, and regulations to promote
technological innovation, thereby more actively engaging the
private sector with the climate regime (medium evidence, medium
agreement). Technology policy can help lower mitigation costs, thereby
increasing incentives for participation and compliance with interna-
tional cooperative efforts, particularly in the long run. Equity issues can
be affected by domestic intellectual property rights regimes, which can
alter the rate of both technology transfer and the development of new
technologies. [13.3, 13.9, 13.12]
In the absence of — or as a complement to — a binding, inter-
national agreement on climate change, policy linkages among
existing and nascent regional, national, and sub-national cli-
mate policies offer potential climate change mitigation and
adaptation benefits (medium evidence, medium agreement) [13.3.1,
13.5.1.3]. Direct and indirect linkages between and among sub-
national, national, and regional carbon markets are being pursued
to improve market efficiency. Yet integrating climate policies raises a
number of concerns about the performance of a system of linked legal
rules and economic activities. Linkage between carbon markets can
be stimulated by competition between and among public and private
governance regimes, accountability measures, and the desire to learn
from policy experiments. [13.3.1, 13.5.3, 13.6, 13.7, 13.13.2.3, Figure
13.4]
While a number of new institutions are focused on adaptation
funding and coordination, adaptation has historically received
less attention than mitigation in international climate policy,
but inclusion of adaptation is increasingly important to reduce
damages and may engage a greater number of countries (robust
evidence, medium agreement). Other possible complementarities and
tradeoffs between mitigation and adaptation, particularly the temporal
distribution of actions, are not well-understood. [13.2, 13.3.3, 13.5.1.1,
13.14]
Participation in international cooperation on climate change
can be enhanced by monetary transfers, market-based mecha-
nisms, technology transfer, and trade-related measures (robust
evidence, medium agreement). These mechanisms to enhance partici-
pation, along with compliance, legitimacy, and flexibility, affect the
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International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
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Chapter 13
institutional feasibility of international climate policy. [13.2.2.4, 13.3.3,
13.8.1, 13.9.2]
International trade can offer a range of positive and negative
incentives to promote international cooperation on climate
change (robust evidence, medium agreement). Three issues are key to
developing constructive relationships between international trade and
climate agreements: how existing trade policies and rules can be modi-
fied to be more climate friendly; whether border adjustment measures
(BAMs) or other trade measures can be effective in meeting the goals
of international climate agreements; whether the UNFCCC, World
Trade Organization (WTO), hybrid of the two, or a new institution is the
best forum for a trade-and-climate architecture. [13.8]
Climate change policies can be evaluated using four criteria:
environmental effectiveness, aggregate economic performance,
distributional impacts, and institutional feasibility. These criteria
are grounded in several principles: maximizing global net benefits;
equity and the related principles of distributive justice and common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC);
precaution and the related principles of anticipation, and prevention of
future risks; and sustainable development. These criteria may at times
conflict, forcing tradeoffs among them. [13.2.1, 13.2.2]
International cooperation has produced political agreement
regarding a long-term goal of limiting global temperature
increase to no more than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, but
the overall level of mitigation achieved to date by cooperation
appears inadequate to achieve this goal (robust evidence, medium
agreement). Mitigation pledges by individual countries in the Copen-
hagen-Cancún regime, if fully implemented, will help reduce emissions
in 2020 to below the projected business-as-usual level, but are unlikely
to attain an emission level in 2020 consistent with cost-effective path-
ways, based on the immediate onset of mitigation, that achieve the
long-term 2 °C goal with a greater than 50 % probability. The contribu-
tion of international cooperation outside of the UNFCCC is largely not
quantified. [13.2.2.1, 13.13.1]
The Kyoto Protocol was the first binding step toward imple-
menting the principles and goals provided by the UNFCCC, but
it has had limited effects on global emissions because some
countries did not ratify the Protocol, some Parties did not meet
their commitments, and its commitments applied to only a por-
tion of the global economy (medium evidence, low agreement).
The Parties collectively surpassed their collective emission reduc-
tion target in the first commitment period, but the Protocol credited
emissions reductions that would have occurred even in its absence.
The Kyoto Protocol does not directly influence the emissions of non-
AnnexI countries, which have grown rapidly over the past decade.
[13.13.1.1]
The flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol have gener-
ally helped to improve its economic performance, but their envi-
ronmental effectiveness is less clear (medium evidence, medium
agreement). The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) created a mar-
ket for emissions offsets from developing countries, generating credits
equivalent to nearly 1.4billion tCO
2
eq as of October 2013, many of
which have been generated by low-cost mitigation technologies. The
CDM showed institutional feasibility of a project-based market mecha-
nism under widely varying circumstances. The CDM’s environmental
effectiveness has been mixed due to concerns about the additionality
of projects, the validity of baselines, the possibility of emissions leak-
age, and recent price decreases. Its distributional impacts were limited
due to the concentration of projects in a limited number of countries.
The Protocol’s other flexible mechanisms, Joint Implementation and
International Emissions Trading, have been undertaken both by gov-
ernments and private market participants, but have raised concerns
related to government sales of emission units. [13.7.2, 13.13.1.2]
Recent UNFCCC negotiations have sought to include more
ambitious mitigation commitments from countries with com-
mitmments under the Kyoto Protocol, mitigation contributions
from a broader set of countries, and new finance and technol-
ogy mechanisms (medium evidence, low agreement). Under the
2010 Cancún Agreement, developed countries formalized voluntary
pledges of quantified, economy-wide emission reduction targets and
some developing countries formalized voluntary pledges to mitigation
actions. The distributional impact of the Agreement will depend in part
on the magnitude and sources of financing, including the successful
fulfilment by developed countries of their expressed joint commit-
ment to mobilize 100 billion USD per year by 2020 for climate action
in developing countries. Under the 2011 Durban Platform for Enhanced
Action, delegates agreed to craft a future legal regime that would be
‘applicable to all Parties … under the Convention’ and would include
substantial new financial support and technology arrangements to
benefit developing countries, but the delegates did not specify means
for achieving those ends. [13.5.1.1, 13.11, 13.13.1.3]
The Montreal Protocol, aimed at protecting the stratospheric
ozone layer, has also achieved significant reductions in global
GHG emissions (robust evidence, high agreement). The Montreal Pro-
tocol set limits on emissions of ozone-depleting gases that are also
potent GHGs, such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluo-
rocarbons (HCFCs). Substitutes for those ozone-depleting gases (such
as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are not ozone-depleting) may
also be potent GHGs. Lessons learned from the Montreal Protocol, for
example, about the effect of financial and technological transfers on
broadening participation in an international environmental agreement,
could be of value to the design of future international climate change
agreements. [13.3.3, 13.3.4, 13.13.1.4]
Assessment of proposed cooperation structures reinforces the
finding that there will likely be tradeoffs between the four cri-
teria, as they will inevitably conflict in some elements of any
agreement (medium evidence, high agreement). Assessment of pro-
posed climate policy architectures reveals important tradeoffs that
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International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
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depend on the specific design elements and regulatory mechanisms
of a proposal. For example, there is a potential tradeoff between broad
participation and the institutional feasibility of an ambitious environ-
mental performance goal. The extent of this tradeoff may depend on
financial transfers, national enforcement mechanisms, and the distri-
bution and sharing of mitigation efforts. [13.2.2.5, 13.3.3, 13.13.1.4,
13.13.2]
Increasing interest in solar radiation management (SRM) and
carbon dioxide removal (CDR) as strategies to mitigate the
harms of climate change, pose new challenges for international
cooperation (medium evidence, high agreement). Whereas emissions
abatement poses challenges of engaging multilateral action to cooper-
ate, SRM may pose challenges of coordinating research and restrain-
ing unilateral deployment of measures with potentially adverse side-
effects. [13.4.4]
Gaps in knowledge and data: (1) comparisons among proposals in
terms of aggregate and country-level costs and benefits per year, with
incorporation of uncertainty; (2) assessment of the overall effect of
emerging intergovernmental and transnational arrangements, includ-
ing ‘hybrid’ approaches; (3) understanding of complementarities and
tradeoffs between policies affecting mitigation and adaptation; (4)
understanding how international cooperation on climate change can
help achieve co-benefits and development goals, including capacity
building approaches; (5)understanding the factors that affect national
decisions to join and form agreements.
13.1 Introduction
Due to global mixing of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere,
anthropogenic climate change is a global commons problem. For this
reason, international cooperation is necessary to achieve significant
progress in mitigating climate change. Drawing on published research,
this chapter critically examines and evaluates the ways in which agree-
ments and instruments for international cooperation have been and
can be organized and implemented. The retrospective analysis of inter-
national cooperation in the chapter quantifies and discusses what has
been achieved to date, and surveys the literature on explanations of
successes and failures.
The scope of the chapter is defined by the range of feasible interna-
tional agreements and other policy instruments for cooperation on cli-
mate-change mitigation and adaptation. The disciplinary scope spans
the social sciences of economics, political science, international rela-
tions, law, public policy, psychology, and sociology; relevant humani-
ties, including history and philosophy; and — where relevant to the
discussion — the natural sciences. Where appropriate, the chapter
synthesizes literature that utilizes econometric modelling, integrated
modelling, game theory, comparative case studies, legal analysis, and
political analysis. This chapter focuses on research and policy develop-
ments since the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007).
13.2 Framing concepts for an
assessment of means for
international cooperation
This section introduces the concept of a global commons problem to
frame the challenge of international cooperation on climate change,
principles for designing effective international climate policy, and crite-
ria for evaluating these policies.
13�2�1 Framing concepts and principles
13�2�1�1 The global commons and international climate
cooperation
Climate change is a global commons problem, meaning reduction in
emissions by any jurisdiction carries an economic cost, but the ben-
efits (in the form of reduced damages from climate change) are spread
around the world — although unevenly — due to GHG emissions mix-
ing globally in the atmosphere. Mitigation of climate change is non-
excludable, meaning it is difficult to exclude any individual or institu-
tion from the shared global benefits of emissions reduction undertaken
by any localized actor. Also, these benefits are non-rival, meaning they
may be enjoyed by any number of individuals or institutions at the
same time, without reducing the extent of the benefit any one of them
receives. These public good characteristics of climate protection (non-
excludability and non-rivalry) create incentives for actors to ‘free ride’
on other actors’ investments in mitigation. Therefore, lack of ambition
in mitigation and overuse of the atmosphere as a receptor of GHGs are
likely.
Incentives to free ride on climate protection have been analyzed exten-
sively and are well-understood (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968; Stavins,
2011). The literature suggests that in some cases, effective common
property management of local open-access resources can limit or even
eliminate overuse (Ostrom, 2001; Wiener, 2009). Effective common
property management of the atmosphere would require applying such
management at a global level, by allocating rights to emit and provid-
ing disincentives for overuse through sanctions or pricing emissions
(Byrne and Glover, 2002; Wiener, 2009).
Enhancing production of public goods may be achieved by internaliz-
ing external costs (i. e., those costs not incorporated into market prices)
or through legal remedies. Economic instruments can incorporate
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International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
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external costs and benefits into prices, providing incentives for private
actors to more optimally reduce external costs and increase external
benefits (Baumol and Oates, 1988; Nordhaus, 2006; Buchholz etal.,
2012). Legal remedies may include seeking injunctive relief or com-
pensatory payments (IPCC, 2007, Chapter 13; Faure and Peeters, 2011;
Haritz, 2011)
International cooperation is necessary to significantly mitigate climate
change because of the global nature of the problem (WCED, 1987;
Kaul etal., 1999, 2003; Byrne and Glover, 2002; Barrett, 2003; Stew-
art and Wiener, 2003; Sandler, 2004) Cooperation has the potential
to address several challenges: multiple actors that are diverse in their
perceptions of the costs and benefits of collective action; emissions
sources that are unevenly distributed; heterogeneous climate impacts
that are uncertain and distant in space and time; and mitigation costs
that vary (IPCC, 2001, pp. 607 – 608).
In the absence of universal collective action, smaller groups of indi-
vidual actors may be able to organize schemes to supply public goods,
particularly if actors know each other well, expect repeated interac-
tions, can exclude non-members, and can monitor and sanction non-
compliance in the form of either overconsumption or underproduction
(Eckersley, 2012; McGee, 2011; Nairn, 2009; Ostrom, 1990, 2010a;
b, 2011; Weischer etal., 2012). Some authors are optimistic regard-
ing such ‘minilateralism’ (e. g., Keohane and Victor, 2011; on the term,
see Eckersley, 2012) and others are more sceptical (e. g., Depledge and
Yamin, 2009; Winkler and Beaumont, 2010) . Section13.3 discusses
the literature on coalitions in more detail.
Because there is no world government, each country must volun-
tarily consent to be bound by any international agreement. If these
are to be effective, the agreements must be attractive enough to gain
broad participation (Barrett, 2003, 2007; Stewart and Wiener, 2003;
Schmalensee, 2010; Brousseau etal., 2012). Considering the relation-
ship between mitigation costs and climate benefits discussed above,
there is insufficient incentive for actors at any level to reduce emissions
significantly in the absence of international cooperation. Behavioural
research, however, indicates that individuals are sometimes motivated
to cooperate (and to punish those who do not) to a degree greater
than strict rational choice models predict (Camerer, 2003; Andreoni
and Samuelson, 2006). This may explain some of the observed policies
being adopted to reduce GHG emissions at the national, subnational,
firm, and individual level. Moreover, even under the assumption of
rational action, some emission reductions can occur without coopera-
tion due to positive externalities of otherwise self-beneficial actions,
or co-benefits, such as actions to reduce energy expenditures, enhance
the security of energy supply, reduce local air pollution, improve land
use, and protect biodiversity (Seto etal., 2012). Co-benefits of climate
protection are receiving increasing attention in the literature (Rayner,
2010; Dubash, 2009; UNEP, 2013b). However, policies designed to
address climate change mitigation may also have adverse side-effects.
See Section 4.8 and 6.6 for an overview of the discussion of co-bene-
fits and adverse side-effects throughout this report.
13�2�1�2 Principles
Several principles have been advanced to shape international climate
change policies. The IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) (IPCC, 2001)
discusses principles and mentions some criteria for evaluation of poli-
cies, whereas the AR4 (IPCC, 2007), clearly differentiates principles
from criteria. Principles serve as guides to design climate policies,
while criteria are specific standards by which to evaluate them. The
roles and applications of principles and criteria are further elaborated
in Chapter 3 of this report.
Sets of principles are enumerated and explained in multiple interna-
tional climate change fora, including the Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development (UNEP, 1992) and the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (UNFCCC, 1992). In the
latter, the principles listed explicitly include: ‘equity’ and ‘common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (CBDRRC)
(Article 3(1)), relative needs, vulnerability, burdens in countries of dif-
fering wealth (Article 3(2)), precaution and ‘cost-effective[ness] so as
to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost’ (Article 3(3)),
‘sustainable development’ (Article 3(4)), and cooperation (Article 3(5)).
Principles of climate change policy relevant for international coopera-
tion can be grouped into several broad categories. First, the principle
of maximizing global net benefits makes the tradeoff between aggre-
gate compliance costs and aggregate performance benefits explicit.
The principle also incorporates the notion of maximizing co-benefits
of climate action (Stern, 2007; Nordhaus, 2008; Bosetti et al., 2010;
Rayner, 2010; Dubash, 2009) (see also Section 3.6.3). A related concept
is that of cost-effectiveness, which allows for policies with the same
level of performance in terms of aggregate benefits to be compared on
the dimension of aggregate cost (IPCC, 2001, 2007, Chapter 13). See
Section 6.6 for applied scenario studies.
Second, equity is a principle that emphasizes distributive justice across
and within countries and across and within generations (Vanderheiden,
2008; Baer etal., 2009; Okereke, 2010; Posner and Sunstein, 2010; Pos-
ner and Weisbach, 2010; Somanathan, 2010; Cao, 2010c). It includes
evaluating the procedures used to reach an agreement as well as the
achieved outcomes. This principle may also apply in a broader assess-
ment of well-being (Sen, 2009; Cao, 2010a). The principle of CBDRRC
has been central in international climate negotiations (Rajamani, 2006,
2011a; Gupta and Sanchez, 2013). The literature refers to the varied
historic responsibility — and current capability and capacity — of coun-
tries with regard to impacts of and action to address climate change
(Jacoby etal., 2010; Rajamani, 2006, 2012b; Höhne etal., 2008; Del-
link etal., 2009; den Elzen etal., 2013b). Some literature assesses how
the principle might be applied to actors’ diverse needs (Jonas, 1984;
Dellink etal., 2009), including the specific needs and vulnerabilities
of developing countries (Rong, 2010; Smith etal., 2011; Bukovansky
etal., 2012). Recent literature suggests that this principle’s applica-
tion may be more nuanced as patterns of development, emissions,
and impacts evolve (Bukovansky etal., 2012; Deleuil, 2012; Müller and
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International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
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Mahadev, 2013; Winkler and Rajamani, 2013). The literature describes
competing views regarding the meaning of this principle in terms of its
legal status, operational significance, and the obligations it may entail
(Höhne etal., 2006; Halvorssen, 2007; O’Brien, 2009; Winkler etal.,
2009; Winkler, 2010; Hertel, 2011). The principle of CBDRRC is further
analyzed in Sections 3.3 and 4.6.
Third, the principle of precaution emphasizes anticipation and preven-
tion of future risks, even in the absence of full scientific certainty about
the impacts of climate change (Bodansky, 2004; Wiener, 2007; Urueña,
2008). Some see precaution as a strategy for effective action across
diverse uncertain scenarios (Barrieu and Sinclair-Desgagné, 2006; World
Bank, 2010), although the application of precaution varies across risks
and countries (Hammitt, 2010). A key ongoing debate concerns whether
or not this principle implies the need for stringent climate change poli-
cies as an insurance against potentially catastrophic outcomes, even
if they may have very low probability (Weitzman, 2007, 2009, 2011;
Pindyck, 2011; Nordhaus, 2011). The application of the precautionary
principle to climate risk is further discussed in Section 2.5.5.
Fourth, the principle of sustainable development, broadly defined,
emphasizes consideration of the socioeconomic needs of future gen-
erations in making decisions about current resource use (IPCC, 2007,
Chapter 12; World Bank, 2010). For a detailed discussion of the litera-
ture on sustainable development, see Section 4.2.1.
13�2�2 Potential criteria for assessing means of
international cooperation
The principles elaborated above can be translated into criteria to eval-
uate forms of international cooperation, thereby assisting in the design
of a distribution of efforts intended to solve the collective action prob-
lem of climate protection. The AR4 put forth one set of criteria: environ-
mental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, distributional considerations,
and institutional feasibility (IPCC, 2007, pp. 751 – 752). As ‘metrics of
success’, these evaluation criteria can be applied in the context of
both ex-post evaluations of actual performance and ex-ante assess-
ments of proposed cooperation (Hammitt, 1999; Fischer and Morgen-
stern, 2010). Below, this section describes four evaluation criteria that
are applied in Section 13.13 to assess existing and proposed forms of
international cooperation to address climate change mitigation. These
criteria are subject to caveats, which are detailed in Section 13.13.
13�2�2�1 Environmental effectiveness
The environmental effectiveness of a climate change mitigation policy
is the extent to which it achieves its objective to reduce the causes
and impacts of climate change. Environmental effectiveness can be
achieved by reducing anthropogenic sources of GHG emissions, remov-
ing GHGs from the atmosphere, or reducing the impacts of climate
change directly through increased resilience. A primary objective of
international cooperation has been to stabilize GHG concentrations
at levels sufficient to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system,” in the words of the UNFCCC Article
2 (1992). This would require action within a time-frame sufficient to
“allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that
food production is not threatened and to enable economic develop-
ment to proceed in a sustainable manner” (UNFCCC, 1992), Article 2).
The Kyoto Protocol established specific emission-reduction targets for
developed countries, while the Copenhagen Accord and Cancún Agree-
ments expressed the environmental objective in terms of global aver-
age temperature increase. In addition to endorsing mitigation targets
by developed countries and mitigation actions by developing countries,
the Copenhagen and Cancún agreements recognized a goal of limiting
increases in average global temperature to 2 °C above pre-industrial
levels (UNFCCC, 2009a, 2010, 2011a).
13�2�2�2 Aggregate economic performance
Measuring the aggregate economic performance of a climate policy
requires considering both its economic efficiency and its cost-effec-
tiveness. Economic efficiency refers to the maximization of net ben-
efits, the difference between total social benefits and total social costs
(Stern, 2007; Nordhaus, 2008; Bosetti etal., 2010).
Cost-effectiveness refers to the ability of a policy to attain a pre-
scribed level of environmental performance at least cost, taking
into account impacts on dynamic efficiency, notably technological
innovation (Jaffe and Stavins, 1995). Unlike net benefit assessment,
cost-effectiveness analysis takes the environmental performance of a
policy as given and seeks the least-cost strategy to attain it (Ham-
mitt, 1999). While analysis of a policy in terms of its cost-effectiveness
still requires environmental performance of the policy to be quanti-
fied, it does not require environmental performance benefits to be
monetized. Thus, analysis of a policy’s cost-effectiveness may be more
feasible than analysis of a policy’s economic efficiency in the case of
climate change, as some social benefits of climate-change mitigation
are difficult to monetize.
13�2�2�3 Distributional and social impacts
Distributional equity and fairness may be considered important attri-
butes of climate policy because of their impact on measures of well-
being (Posner and Weisbach, 2010) and political feasibility (Jacoby
etal., 2010; Gupta, 2012). Distributional equity relates to burden- and
benefit-sharing across countries and across time. Section 4.2.2 puts for-
ward three justifications for considering distributional equity — legal,
environmental effectiveness, and moral. The framing in Section 4.2 also
identifies a relatively small set of core equity principles: responsibil-
ity, capacity, the right to sustainable development, and equality. These
may be modelled with quantitative indicators, as discussed in Section
6.3.6.6. The moral justification draws on ethical principles, which are
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Chapter 13
reflected in the principles of the Convention (see Section 13.2.1.2; and
detailed treatment of the literature on ethics in Section 3.2).
Another dimension of distributional equity is the possibility for miti-
gation actions in one jurisdiction to have positive or negative conse-
quences in another jurisdiction. This phenomenon, sometimes referred
to as ‘response measures’ or as ‘spillover effects’ (see WGIII AR4 Glos-
sary), can lead to an unequal distribution of the impacts of climate
change mitigation actions themselves. A plausible example of a spill-
over effect is the impact of emissions reductions in developed countries
lowering the demand for fossil fuels and thus decreasing their prices,
leading to more use of such fuels and greater emissions in developing
nations, partially off-setting the original cuts (Bauer etal., 2013) This
dynamic can also be important for countries with large endowments
of conventional oil and gas that depend on export revenues. These
countries may lose energy export revenue as a result of climate poli-
cies enacted in other countries (Kalkuhl and Brecha, 2013; Bauer etal.,
2013). Additionally, climate policies could also reduce international coal
trading (Jewell etal., 2013). See also Sections6.3.6, 14.4.2, and 15.5.2
for further discussion of spillover effects.
13�2�2�4 Institutional feasibility
The institutional feasibility of international climate policy may depend
upon agreement among national governments and between govern-
ments and intergovernmental bodies (Wiener, 2009; Schmalensee,
2010). Institutional feasibility is closely linked to domestic political
feasibility, because domestic political conditions affect participation
in, and compliance with, international climate policies. This has been
addressed in the literature on ‘two-level’ games (Kroll and Shogren,
2009; Hafner-Burton etal., 2012). Four sub-criteria of institutional fea-
sibility can also be considered: participation, compliance, legitimacy,
and flexibility.
First, participation in an international climate agreement might refer
to the number of parties, geographical coverage, or the share of global
GHG emissions covered. Participating parties might vary with regard
to the nature and specificity of their commitments (e. g., actions ver-
sus quantitative emissions-reduction targets). Sovereign states are not
bound by an international treaty or other arrangement unless they
consent to participate. The literature has examined a broad array of
incentives to promote breadth of participation in international agree-
ments (Barrett, 2003; Barrett and Stavins, 2003; Stewart and Wiener,
2003; Hall etal., 2010; Victor, 2010; World Bank, 2010; Olmstead and
Stavins, 2012). These incentives can be positive (e. g., financial sup-
port or technology transfers) or negative (e. g., trade sanctions). Some
authors have suggested that participation limited to countries with the
highest emissions enhances institutional feasibility (Leal-Arcas, 2011)
and that incentive-based emissions-permit allocations, or rules requir-
ing participation of key players, may enable larger coalitions (Dellink
etal., 2008; Dellink, 2011).
Second, institutional feasibility is also partly determined by the com-
pliance of participating countries with an agreement’s provisions.
Mechanisms to ensure compliance, in turn, affect decisions to partici-
pate, as well as long-term performance (Barrett, 2003). Incentives for
encouraging compliance can be built into flexible mechanisms, such
as tradable permit systems (Wiener, 2009; Ismer and Neuhoff, 2009;
Keohane and Raustiala, 2010). Compliance is fundamentally prob-
lematic in international agreements, as it is difficult to establish an
authority that can legitimately and effectively impose sanctions upon
sovereign national governments. Despite that, indirect negative con-
sequences of non-compliance can arise within the regime established
by the agreement, or in other regimes, for example, adverse voting
behaviour in international forums or reduction in foreign aid (Heitzig
etal., 2011).
Third, legitimacy is a key component of institutional feasibility. Parties
to a cooperative agreement must have reason to accept and imple-
ment decisions made under the agreement, meaning they must believe
that the relevant regime represents them fairly. Legitimacy depends on
the shared understanding both that the substantive rules (outputs) and
decision-making procedures (inputs) are fair, equitable, and beneficial
(Scharpf, 1999), and thus that other regime members will continue to
cooperate (Ostrom, 1990, 2011). In practice, the legitimacy of substan-
tive rules is typically based on whether parties evaluate positively the
results of an authority’s policies, while procedural legitimacy is typi-
cally based on the existence of proper input mechanisms of partici-
pation and consultation for the parties participating in an agreement
(Stevenson and Dryzek, 2012).
Finally, the institutional feasibility of international climate policy
depends in part on whether the institutions relevant for a policy can
develop flexibility mechanisms — which typically require that the
institutions themselves are flexible or adjustable. It may be important
to be able to adapt to new information or to changes in economic
and political circumstances. The institutionalization of learning among
actors, which is referred to as ‘social learning’ in the literature of envi-
ronmental governance (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007), is an important
aspect of success, enabling adaptation to changing circumstances.
While institutional arrangements that incorporate a purposive pro-
cess of experimentation, evaluation, learning, and revision may be
costly, policies that do not incorporate these steps may be overly rigid
in the face of change and therefore potentially even more costly
(Greenstone, 2009; Libecap, 2011). Another area of current debate
and research is the question of whether increased flexibility in design-
ing obligations for states helps them align their international obliga-
tions more readily with domestic political constraints (von Stein,
2008; Hafner-Burton etal., 2012). This suggests that designing inter-
national climate policies involves a balance between the benefits of
flexibility and the costs of regulatory uncertainty (Goldstein and Mar-
tin, 2000; Brunner etal., 2012). Chapter 2, for example in Section
2.6.5.1, goes into more depth on problems related to regulatory
uncertainty.
Box 13�1 | International agreements and developing countries
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) is a statement of aspirations, principles, goals, and the
means to meet commitments. The Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC
included, for the first time, binding mitigation commitments — for
nations listed in its AnnexB. Other countries may assist Annex B
Parties in meeting their mitigation commitments via the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), under the Protocol’s Article 12.
AnnexI countries under the UNFCCC, which include all Annex
B countries under the Kyoto Protocol, are largely the wealthi-
est countries and largest historical emitters of GHGs. However,
AnnexI countries’ share of historical cumulative GHG emissions
in 2010 is close to the share of the non-AnnexI countries (Section
13.13.1.1). Thus, the Kyoto Protocol’s mitigation commitments
were initially consistent with the UNFCCC principle of ‘common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’
(CBDRRC). However, since the UNFCCC divided countries into two
categories in 1992, both income patterns and the distribution of
GHG emissions have changed significantly, even as variations in
income and per capita responsibility for emissions remain sub-
stantial both within and between countries. Between Conference
of Parties (COP)-13 (Bali) in 2007 and COP-16 (Cancún) in 2010,
many developing countries put forward quantifiable mitigation
actions (as contrasted with quantified, economy-wide emissions
reductions targets assumed by Annex B parties under the Kyoto
Protocol) and agreed to more frequent reporting and enhanced
transparency of those actions. Further pledges of actions have
been made since Cancún. (Section 13.13)
For many developing countries, adaptation can have comparable
priority to mitigation. This may be because countries are especially
vulnerable to climate change damages or they lack confidence in
progress with mitigation efforts. These countries are often the least
able to finance adaptation, leaving cooperative agreements to
attempt to identify sources of support. (See Chapter 16 for detail.)
International collaboration regarding public climate finance under
the UNFCCC dates back to 1991, when the Climate Change Pro-
gram of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established. The
literature reflects mixed evidence on the scale and environmental
effectiveness of such funding. Funding for reporting and mitigation
flows through four primary vehicles: the GEF, which focuses on
mitigation; the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) and Special
Climate Change Fund (SCCF), created in 2001 for adaptation
purposes and operated by the GEF; the Adaptation Fund set up in
2008; and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), established in 2010 for
mitigation and adaptation. (Section 13.11, see also Section 16.2)
The Copenhagen Accord set a goal to jointly mobilize 100 billion
USD / yr by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.
(Section 13.11) Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC also calls for technology
transfer from developed to developing countries. The Technology
Mechanism, with an Executive Committee and Climate Technology
Centre and Network, is seeking to fulfil this goal.
Research indicates that adaptation assistance, such as that pro-
vided by the Kyoto Protocol’s Adaptation Fund, can be crucial for
inclusion of developing countries in international climate agree-
ments. Further research into the distribution of adaptation finance
across countries from both UNFCCC and non-UNFCCC sources
is required to assess the equity, efficiency, effectiveness, and
environmental impacts of the Adaptation Fund and other funding
mechanisms. Many developing countries have created institutions
to coordinate adaptation finance from domestic and international
funding sources. (Sections 13.3, 13.5)
The literature identifies several models for equitable burden
sharing — among both developed and developing countries in
international cooperation for climate change mitigation. The prin-
ciples on which burden sharing arrangements may be based are
described in Section 4.6.2, and the implications of these arrange-
ments are discussed in Section 6.3.6.6. Distributional impacts from
agreements will depend on the approach taken, criteria applied
to operationalize equity, and the manner in which developing
countries’ emissions plans are financed; studies suggest potential
approaches (Section 13.4, UNFCCC Secretariat 2007b, 2008). A
major distributional issue is how to account for emissions from
goods produced in a developing country, but consumed in an
industrialized country. Such emissions have increased rapidly since
1990, as developed countries have typically been importers of
embodied emissions, while many developing countries have large
shares of emissions embodied in exports. (Sections 13.8, 14.3.4)
New and existing coalitions of countries have engaged in the
UNFCCC negotiations, each presenting coordinated positions.
Several distinct coalitions of developing countries have formed to
negotiate their divergent priorities. Examples include the Group of
77 (G-77) and China, which contains sub-groups such as the Afri-
can Group, the Least Developed Countries, and the Arab Group;
the Alliance of Independent Latin American and Caribbean states;
and a ‘like-minded developing country’ group that included China,
India, and Saudi Arabia. Other coalitions organized to influence
UNFCCC negotiations include the Alliance of Small Island States
(AOSIS); various groupings of industrialized countries, including
the Umbrella Group; the Environmental Integrity Group; the BASIC
countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China); the Coalition of
Rainforest Nations; and other active coalitions not limited to the
climate context, for example, the Comision Centroamericana de
Ambiente y Desarollo and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas.
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Second, institutional feasibility is also partly determined by the com-
pliance of participating countries with an agreement’s provisions.
Mechanisms to ensure compliance, in turn, affect decisions to partici-
pate, as well as long-term performance (Barrett, 2003). Incentives for
encouraging compliance can be built into flexible mechanisms, such
as tradable permit systems (Wiener, 2009; Ismer and Neuhoff, 2009;
Keohane and Raustiala, 2010). Compliance is fundamentally prob-
lematic in international agreements, as it is difficult to establish an
authority that can legitimately and effectively impose sanctions upon
sovereign national governments. Despite that, indirect negative con-
sequences of non-compliance can arise within the regime established
by the agreement, or in other regimes, for example, adverse voting
behaviour in international forums or reduction in foreign aid (Heitzig
etal., 2011).
Third, legitimacy is a key component of institutional feasibility. Parties
to a cooperative agreement must have reason to accept and imple-
ment decisions made under the agreement, meaning they must believe
that the relevant regime represents them fairly. Legitimacy depends on
the shared understanding both that the substantive rules (outputs) and
decision-making procedures (inputs) are fair, equitable, and beneficial
(Scharpf, 1999), and thus that other regime members will continue to
cooperate (Ostrom, 1990, 2011). In practice, the legitimacy of substan-
tive rules is typically based on whether parties evaluate positively the
results of an authority’s policies, while procedural legitimacy is typi-
cally based on the existence of proper input mechanisms of partici-
pation and consultation for the parties participating in an agreement
(Stevenson and Dryzek, 2012).
Finally, the institutional feasibility of international climate policy
depends in part on whether the institutions relevant for a policy can
develop flexibility mechanisms — which typically require that the
institutions themselves are flexible or adjustable. It may be important
to be able to adapt to new information or to changes in economic
and political circumstances. The institutionalization of learning among
actors, which is referred to as ‘social learning’ in the literature of envi-
ronmental governance (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007), is an important
aspect of success, enabling adaptation to changing circumstances.
While institutional arrangements that incorporate a purposive pro-
cess of experimentation, evaluation, learning, and revision may be
costly, policies that do not incorporate these steps may be overly rigid
in the face of change and therefore potentially even more costly
(Greenstone, 2009; Libecap, 2011). Another area of current debate
and research is the question of whether increased flexibility in design-
ing obligations for states helps them align their international obliga-
tions more readily with domestic political constraints (von Stein,
2008; Hafner-Burton etal., 2012). This suggests that designing inter-
national climate policies involves a balance between the benefits of
flexibility and the costs of regulatory uncertainty (Goldstein and Mar-
tin, 2000; Brunner etal., 2012). Chapter 2, for example in Section
2.6.5.1, goes into more depth on problems related to regulatory
uncertainty.
Box 13�1 | International agreements and developing countries
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) is a statement of aspirations, principles, goals, and the
means to meet commitments. The Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC
included, for the first time, binding mitigation commitments — for
nations listed in its AnnexB. Other countries may assist Annex B
Parties in meeting their mitigation commitments via the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), under the Protocol’s Article 12.
AnnexI countries under the UNFCCC, which include all Annex
B countries under the Kyoto Protocol, are largely the wealthi-
est countries and largest historical emitters of GHGs. However,
AnnexI countries’ share of historical cumulative GHG emissions
in 2010 is close to the share of the non-AnnexI countries (Section
13.13.1.1). Thus, the Kyoto Protocol’s mitigation commitments
were initially consistent with the UNFCCC principle of ‘common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’
(CBDRRC). However, since the UNFCCC divided countries into two
categories in 1992, both income patterns and the distribution of
GHG emissions have changed significantly, even as variations in
income and per capita responsibility for emissions remain sub-
stantial both within and between countries. Between Conference
of Parties (COP)-13 (Bali) in 2007 and COP-16 (Cancún) in 2010,
many developing countries put forward quantifiable mitigation
actions (as contrasted with quantified, economy-wide emissions
reductions targets assumed by Annex B parties under the Kyoto
Protocol) and agreed to more frequent reporting and enhanced
transparency of those actions. Further pledges of actions have
been made since Cancún. (Section 13.13)
For many developing countries, adaptation can have comparable
priority to mitigation. This may be because countries are especially
vulnerable to climate change damages or they lack confidence in
progress with mitigation efforts. These countries are often the least
able to finance adaptation, leaving cooperative agreements to
attempt to identify sources of support. (See Chapter 16 for detail.)
International collaboration regarding public climate finance under
the UNFCCC dates back to 1991, when the Climate Change Pro-
gram of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established. The
literature reflects mixed evidence on the scale and environmental
effectiveness of such funding. Funding for reporting and mitigation
flows through four primary vehicles: the GEF, which focuses on
mitigation; the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) and Special
Climate Change Fund (SCCF), created in 2001 for adaptation
purposes and operated by the GEF; the Adaptation Fund set up in
2008; and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), established in 2010 for
mitigation and adaptation. (Section 13.11, see also Section 16.2)
The Copenhagen Accord set a goal to jointly mobilize 100 billion
USD / yr by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.
(Section 13.11) Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC also calls for technology
transfer from developed to developing countries. The Technology
Mechanism, with an Executive Committee and Climate Technology
Centre and Network, is seeking to fulfil this goal.
Research indicates that adaptation assistance, such as that pro-
vided by the Kyoto Protocol’s Adaptation Fund, can be crucial for
inclusion of developing countries in international climate agree-
ments. Further research into the distribution of adaptation finance
across countries from both UNFCCC and non-UNFCCC sources
is required to assess the equity, efficiency, effectiveness, and
environmental impacts of the Adaptation Fund and other funding
mechanisms. Many developing countries have created institutions
to coordinate adaptation finance from domestic and international
funding sources. (Sections 13.3, 13.5)
The literature identifies several models for equitable burden
sharing — among both developed and developing countries in
international cooperation for climate change mitigation. The prin-
ciples on which burden sharing arrangements may be based are
described in Section 4.6.2, and the implications of these arrange-
ments are discussed in Section 6.3.6.6. Distributional impacts from
agreements will depend on the approach taken, criteria applied
to operationalize equity, and the manner in which developing
countries’ emissions plans are financed; studies suggest potential
approaches (Section 13.4, UNFCCC Secretariat 2007b, 2008). A
major distributional issue is how to account for emissions from
goods produced in a developing country, but consumed in an
industrialized country. Such emissions have increased rapidly since
1990, as developed countries have typically been importers of
embodied emissions, while many developing countries have large
shares of emissions embodied in exports. (Sections 13.8, 14.3.4)
New and existing coalitions of countries have engaged in the
UNFCCC negotiations, each presenting coordinated positions.
Several distinct coalitions of developing countries have formed to
negotiate their divergent priorities. Examples include the Group of
77 (G-77) and China, which contains sub-groups such as the Afri-
can Group, the Least Developed Countries, and the Arab Group;
the Alliance of Independent Latin American and Caribbean states;
and a ‘like-minded developing country’ group that included China,
India, and Saudi Arabia. Other coalitions organized to influence
UNFCCC negotiations include the Alliance of Small Island States
(AOSIS); various groupings of industrialized countries, including
the Umbrella Group; the Environmental Integrity Group; the BASIC
countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China); the Coalition of
Rainforest Nations; and other active coalitions not limited to the
climate context, for example, the Comision Centroamericana de
Ambiente y Desarollo and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas.
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13�2�2�5 Conflicts and complementarities
Criteria may be mutually reinforcing (Cao, 2010a; c), but there may
also be conflicts, forcing tradeoffs between and among them. For
example, maximizing global net benefits or attaining cost-effective-
ness may lead to actions that decrease distributional equity (van Asselt
and Gupta, 2009), which could lead to low participation. Posner and
Weisbach (2010) and Baer (2009) argue that efficiency and distribution
can be reconciled by either normatively adjusting the net benefit or
cost calculations to account for changes in relative utility, or by adopt-
ing redistributive policy in addition to cost-effective climate policy.
Different approaches to meet the same criteria (for example, equity)
may also conflict with each other when operationalized (Fischer and
Morgenstern, 2010) or lead to different results (Dellink etal., 2009).
Simultaneously, there are relations among sub-criteria: excessive
flexibility may undermine incentives to invest in long-term solutions,
and may also increase the likelihood of participation. Compromises
to enable institutional feasibility of an agreement may weaken per-
formance along other dimensions. The environmental performance of
an international agreement depends largely on tradeoffs among the
ambition of an agreement with regards to mitigation goals and par-
ticipation, and compliance (Barrett, 2003; Bodansky, 2011a; Rajamani,
2012a). For further discussion of potential tradeoffs between participa-
tion and environmental effectiveness, see Section 13.3.3.
13.3 International agreements:
Lessons for climate policy
Several lessons from research on existing international agreements, as
well as game-theoretic models of such agreements, can be applied to
climate change institutions. This section briefly summarizes some of
the key lessons, which are addressed in more detail in subsequent sec-
tions of this chapter.
13�3�1 The landscape of climate agreements
and institutions
Since the publication of IPCC AR4 in 2007, the landscape of interna-
tional institutions related to climate policy has become significantly
more complex. Climate change is addressed in a growing number of
fora and institutions and across a wider range of scales (Keohane and
Victor, 2011; Bulkeley etal., 2012; Biermann etal., 2009, 2010; Barrett,
2010; Abbott, 2011; Hoffmann, 2011; Zelli, 2011; Rayfuse and Scott,
2012).
Figure 13.1 illustrates the variety of international, transnational, regional,
national, sub-national, and non-state agreements and other forms of
cooperation, many of which have emerged since the mid-2000s. Some
regimes that previously focused on other issues, e. g., trade (see Sec-
tion 13.8), energy (see Chapter 7), biodiversity, and human rights have
begun to address climate change. For a more detailed discussion of
these initiatives, see also Section 13.5.
Future efforts for international cooperation on climate policy will need
to account for this wide variety of agreements and institutions. Careful
design of linkages and cooperative arrangements will be needed to
manage the increasingly fragmented regime complex to prevent con-
flicts among institutions (Biermann etal., 2010; Keohane and Victor,
2011; Zelli, 2011), avoid gaps or loopholes (Downs, 2007), and maxi-
mize potential institutional synergies (Hoffmann, 2011; Rayfuse and
Scott, 2012).
13�3�2 Insights from game theory for climate
agreements
Game theory provides insights into international cooperation on cli-
mate policy, from research communities in environmental economics
(Ward, 1993; Finus, 2001, 2003; Wagner, 2001; Barrett, 2003, 2007)
and in the rationalist school of political science (Sjostedt, 1992; Downs
etal., 1996; Underdal, 1998; Koremenos etal., 2001; Avenhaus and
Zartman, 2007; Hafner-Burton etal., 2012). These researchers analyze
the incentives and motivations of actors to join and comply with inter-
national environmental agreements (IEAs).
The game-theoretic literature on climate change agreements has
grown substantially in the last two decades (Barrett, 2007; Rubio
and Ulph, 2007; Chambers, 2008; Froyn and Hovi, 2008; Bosetti etal.,
2009a; Asheim and Holtsmark, 2009; Dutta and Radner, 2009; Muñoz
etal., 2009; Carbone etal., 2009; Weikard etal., 2010; Bréchet etal.,
2011; Wood, 2011; Heitzig etal., 2011; Dietz and Zhao, 2011; Bréchet
and Eyckmans, 2012; Pittel and Rübbelke, 2012). It is important, how-
ever, to treat with caution any general conclusions from recent game
theory literature on climate change agreements, as many have been
criticized for their simplicity. In this section, we refrain from listing
assumptions in detail, and restrict attention to the most general and
policy-relevant discussions. See Finus (2001, 2003) for a more detailed
review of the relevant game theory literature.
By and large, the game-theoretic literature assumes actors to be states
that are maximizing the welfare of their citizens (Ward, 1993; Carraro
and Siniscalco, 1998; Grundig, 2006). A central premise is that there
is currently no supranational institution that can impose an IEA on
governments and subsequently enforce it (see Section 13.2.1.1). Thus,
IEAs must be self-enforcing to engage and maintain participation
and compliance (Finus, 2001; Barrett, 2007; Dutta and Radner, 2009;
Rubio and Casino, 2005; Heitzig etal., 2011). Nevertheless, in theory
and practice, international institutions can help to promote, negotiate,
and administer an IEA. They can do so by serving to coordinate and
moderate negotiations and implementation, reducing transaction costs
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Chapter 13
UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, Clean Development Mechanism, International Emissions Trading
Other UN Intergovernmental
organizations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, UN Development Programme, UN Environment Programme, UN Global Compact, International Civil Aviation
Organization, International Maritime Organization, UN Fund for International Partnerships
Non-UN IOs World Bank, World Trade Organization
Other environmental treaties Montreal Protocol, UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Environmental Modification Treaty, Convention on Biological Diversity
Other multilateral ‘clubs’ Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, G20, REDD+ Partnerships
Bilateral arrangements e. g., US-India, Norway-Indonesia
Partnerships Global Methane Initiative, Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, Climate Group
Offset certification systems e. g., Gold Standard, Voluntary Carbon Standard
Investor governance initiatives Carbon Disclosure Project, Investor Network on Climate Risk
Regional governance e. g., EU climate change policy
Subnational regional initiatives Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, California emissions-trading system
City networks US Mayors’ Agreement, Transition Towns
Transnational city networks C40, Cities for Climate Protection, Climate Alliance, Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network
NAMAs, NAPAs Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) of developing countries; National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs)
Figure 13�1 | The landscape of agreements and institutions on climate change. Lines connecting different types of agreements and institutions indicate different types of links. In
some cases, lines represent a formal agreement of a division of labour (e. g. between the UNFCCC and ICAO concerning aviation emissions). In other cases, lines represent a more
simple mutual recognition (e. g. the accreditation of C40 cities by the UNFCCC). In others still, lines represent a functional linkage without any formal relationship (e. g. the relation-
ship between the CDM and the NGO certification of carbon offsets). This is a rapidly-changing landscape and not all links may be captured.
UNFCCC
Transnational City
Networks
Investor Governance
Initiatives
Offset Certification
Systems
Subnational
Regional Initiatives
Regional
Governance
NAMAs,
NAPAs
Non-
UN IOs
Other
UN IOs
City
Networks
Partnerships
Other
Multilateral
Clubs
Other
Environmental
Treaties
Bilateral
Arrangements
National/Regional
Subnational
International
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Chapter 13
of negotiations, and generating trust (Keohane, 1984, 1989; Finus and
Rundshagen, 2006); changing the interests of actors by providing new
information or building capacity (Haas etal., 1993); enlisting actors in
domestic politics within and across states (Abbott and Snidal, 2010;
Hafner-Burton etal., 2012); and inculcating norms (Bodansky, 2010a).
Alternative perspectives on game theory weaken the assumption of
rationality and emphasize the roles of legitimacy, norms, and accul-
turation in shaping behaviour under international law and institutions
(Goodman and Jinks, 2004; March and Olsen, 2008; Brunnée and
Toope, 2010; Bernauer et al., 2010; Hafner-Burton etal., 2012). See
Chapter 2 for a discussion of behavioural approaches in the literature.
13�3�3 Participation in climate agreements
Greater participation in climate change agreements, all else equal,
improves environmental effectiveness by covering a larger share of
global emissions and reducing potential leakage to non-participating
areas. Greater participation may also improve aggregate economic
performance by enabling lower-cost emissions abatement and reduc-
ing leakage. An international climate agreement regime might achieve
depth (ambition of emissions reduction) and breadth (of participation)
in different sequence. Schmalensee (1998) argues for breadth of par-
ticipation first, with less emphasis on ambition. He argues that this
approach allows time to develop correspondingly broad-based insti-
tutions that can potentially facilitate substantial aggregate emissions
reductions over time (Schelling, 1992; Barrett, 2003). Conversely, pur-
suing an arrangement with depth before breadth can be motivated
by the urgency of the climate-change problem. However, such an
approach may make broadening participation more difficult later on
(Schmalensee, 1998), and this type of agreement could induce emis-
sions leakage, undermining effectiveness (Babiker, 2005).
In the theoretical literature, the tradeoff between the level of abate-
ment by a sub-set of actors and participation in an IEA has been ana-
lyzed as a comparison between an ‘ambitious versus a modest treaty’
(Finus and Maus, 2008; Courtois and Haeringer, 2011) or between a
focal (deep and narrow) versus a consensus (broad but shallow) treaty
(Barrett, 2002; Hafner-Burton et al., 2012). Scholars conclude that,
overall, a consensus treaty may achieve more in terms of emission
reductions and global welfare than a focal treaty. Further analysis has
investigated the tradeoff between breadth and depth, and how broad
participation can increase environmental effectiveness (by covering
more emissions and reducing leakage), and reduce costs (by encom-
passing more low-cost abatement options in a larger market). Through
these plausible mechanisms, greater breadth enables greater ambition
(subject to the costs of attracting participants) (Battaglini and Harstad,
2012).
While most existing IEAs feature open membership, some theoretical
literature finds that exclusive membership can help to stabilize IEAs,
prevent defection, and lead to better environmental outcomes, even
in the context of a global public good such as climate protection (Car-
raro and Marchiori, 2003; Eyckmans and Finus, 2006; Finus, 2008a;
Finus and Rundshagen, 2009). In practice, exclusive membership may
reduce supply of a public good such as global emissions abatement,
may increase emissions leakage (unless non-members are covered by
their own coalition in a system of multiple agreements), and may con-
flict with norms of institutional legitimacy. Multiple agreements (i. e.,
multiple coalitions) may be a pragmatic, short- to mid-term strategy
for achieving more effective cooperation if a universal treaty of all
countries to limit emissions is not stable or attainable in the short-run
(Finus and Rundshagen, 2003; Stewart and Wiener, 2003; Asheim etal.,
2006; Eyckmans and Finus, 2006; Bosetti et al., 2009b; Bréchet and
Eyckmans, 2012). Multiple coalition agreements involving all major
emitters could potentially achieve better environmental effectiveness
than a partial coalition acting while other countries do not act at all.
However, for protecting a global public good, separate coalitions could
forego some of the cost-effectiveness gains of a broader regime, and
they could face questions of legitimacy (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and
McGee, 2013). It remains unclear whether partial coalitions for climate
policy will accelerate momentum for a more universal global agree-
ment in the future, or undermine such momentum (Brewster, 2010).
International transfers can also attract participation in climate agree-
ments, balancing the asymmetric gains from cooperation. These
transfers can either be direct monetary transfers (e. g., contributions
to a fund from which developing countries can draw), in-kind trans-
fers (e. g., technology transfer), or indirect transfers via market-based
mechanisms (e. g., through the initial allocation of tradable emission
permits) (Carraro etal., 2006; Barrett, 2007; Bosetti etal., 2009a; Fuen-
tes-Albero and Rubio, 2010; Bréchet and Eyckmans, 2012; Stewart and
Wiener, 2003). Historically, transfers have been important for building
participation in past international agreements (Hafner-Burton et al.,
2012; Bernauer etal., 2013). The experience of the Montreal Protocol
illustrates how transfers can engage participation by major develop-
ing countries through financial and technological assistance (Sandler,
2010; Kaniaru, 2007; Zhao, 2005, 2002; Andersen et al., 2007). The
role of technology transfer in international cooperation is discussed in
greater detail in Section 13.9, and the role of finance is discussed in
Section 13.11.
Linkages across issues may also help encourage participation. Many
linkages exist between climate change and other issues, such as
energy, water, agriculture, sustainable development, poverty allevia-
tion, public health, international trade, human rights, foreign direct
investment, biodiversity, and national security (see Sections 3.4, 5.7,
6.6, and Section 13.2.1.1). Such linkages may create opportunities, co-
benefits, or adverse side-effects, not all of which have been thoroughly
examined. However, the advantages of issue linkage may diminish as
the number of parties and issues increase, raising the transaction costs
of negotiations (Weischer etal., 2012).
A different instrument to encourage participation is trade sanctions
against non-parties to an IEA. The threat of trade sanctions can moti-
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vate participation (Barrett, 2003; Victor, 2011), as exemplified by the
Montreal Protocol. However, since participation in an international
treaty is voluntary, sanctions for non-participation may be difficult to
justify (see Section 13.3.4). Similar to trade sanctions are ‘offsetting
border adjustment measures’ (BAMs) (see Section 13.8 for further dis-
cussion).
Particularly vulnerable countries may be more likely to participate in
agreements that address and fund adaptation activities (Huq et al.,
2004; Mace, 2005; Ayers and Huq, 2009; Denton, 2010; Smith etal.,
2011). Benefits of adaptation are often local, and these local benefits
may be more effective incentives for countries vulnerable to climate
damages to participate in an IEA relative to the benefits of mitiga-
tion and support for technological development or deployment. Both
of these alternative possible incentive mechanisms are less-excludable
and are of potentially less value to lower-emitting countries, compared
with adaptation benefits. Recent game theoretic analyses suggest
that private co-benefits from mitigation actions may not substantially
increase participation in international climate agreements (Pittel and
Rübbelke, 2008; Finus and Rübbelke, 2012).
A final key issue related to participation is the role played by uncer-
tainty. Earlier research suggested that reducing uncertainty about
the benefits and costs of mitigation can render IEAs less effective,
showing that as parties learn of the actual costs and benefits of
mitigation, their incentive to participate may shrink (Na and Shin,
1998; Kolstad, 2005; Kolstad and Ulph, 2008). However, more recent
work (Finus and Pintassilgo, 2012, 2013; Dellink and Finus, 2012) has
qualified this conclusion by showing that removing uncertainty only
has a negative impact on cooperation in certain cases. Recent experi-
mental evidence suggests that if there is uncertainty in the likelihood
of tipping points of disastrous climate change impacts, this may
reduce the success of cooperation (Dannenberg etal., 2011); con-
versely, reducing uncertainty about the likelihood of tipping points
can increase prospects for collective action (Barrett and Dannenberg,
2012).
13�3�4 Compliance
As noted in Section 13.2.1.1, in the absence of a supranational author-
ity, compliance with international agreements must be verified by
parties to the agreement or through a related collaborative body they
perceive as legitimate. Barrett (2003) sees compliance as a dimension
of participation, in the sense that incentives to comply are incentives
to continue participating in the agreement. The reputational costs
of being a non-compliant party may differ from those of withdraw-
ing altogether, but the magnitude of the difference is not clear. For
example, there is only one case of withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol,
that of Canada in December 2011, but more than one case in which
countries have not met their agreed emission targets (see Section
13.13.1.1).
Compliance does not necessarily equate with success — because coun-
tries choose whether to become party to an agreement, compliance
may only reflect what countries would have done without the agree-
ment (Downs etal., 1996). One measure of effectiveness is the extent
to which the agreement changed countries’ behaviour, compared to
what they would have done in the absence of the agreement (the
counterfactual baseline scenario) (Hafner-Burton etal., 2012). Evaluat-
ing an agreement’s effectiveness is difficult because the counterfactual
is not observed (Simmons and Hopkins, 2005; Mitchell, 2008; Hafner-
Burton etal., 2012).
A necessary condition for successful compliance strategies is an inde-
pendent and effective regime of ‘measurement (or monitoring), report-
ing, and verification’ (MRV) with a high frequency of reporting (as
documented in the IPCC TAR; see also Section 2.6.4.3). Provisions for
greater transparency in MRV are being developed with regard to (1)
countries’ GHG emissions, and (2)international financial flows from
developed countries to developing countries for mitigation and adap-
tation measures (Winkler, 2008; Breidenich and Bodansky, 2009; Ellis
and Larsen, 2008; Ellis and Moarif, 2009; Clapp etal., 2012). Lessons
on MRV from other multilateral regimes — such as International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) consultations, Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) economic policy reviews, World Trade
Organization (WTO) trade policy reviews, and arms control agree-
ments — include attention to accuracy, evolution over time, combining
self-reporting with third-party verification, including independent tech-
nical assessment as well as some form of political or peer review, the
potential use of remote sensing or other technical means, and public
domain outputs (Cecys, 2010; Pew Center, 2010; Bell etal., 2012).
Technical capabilities for monitoring emissions now include remote
sensing from satellites which themselves pose new issues about the
availability, diffusion, and governance of MRV capabilities for greater
transparency. Greater transparency about financial flows requires
detailed analysis of donor government budgeting in their legislative
and administrative processes (Clapp etal., 2012; Falconer etal., 2012;
Brewer and Mehling, 2014).
Measurement, reporting, and verification may be beneficially comple-
mented by enforcement strategies, which are comprised of positive
inducements — such as international transfers, financing, capacity-
building, and technology transfer — and credible threats of sanctions
for violating emissions commitments or reporting requirements. From
a rationalist perspective, compliance will occur if the discounted net
benefits from cooperation (including direct climate benefits, co-bene-
fits, reputation, transfers, and other elements) exceed the discounted
net benefits of defection (including avoided mitigation costs, avoided
adverse side-effects, and expected sanctions). The institutional and
behavioural reality of ensuring compliance can be more complicated.
Moreover, the theoretical literature has stressed the difficulty of
designing credible sanctions that are renegotiation-proof (Finus, 2001,
2003; Barrett, 2002; Asheim etal., 2006; Froyn and Hovi, 2008).
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Some research suggests that the Kyoto Protocol is unusual among
IEAs in that it established an ‘elaborate and multifaceted’ compli-
ance system, which has been successful in assuring compliance with
MRV requirements (Finus, 2008b; Oberthür and Lefeber, 2010; Brunnée
etal., 2012), while many other IEAs rely on self-reporting of domes-
tic actions. Compliance with MRV requirements can in turn improve
detection of other forms of noncompliance. Even if the Kyoto Protocol
compliance regime has been imperfect, it can offer lessons for future
regimes, in particular with regard to MRV. The design of sanction mech-
anisms currently in place under the Kyoto Protocol, however, has also
been criticized for not being fully credible (Halvorssen and Hovi, 2006;
Barrett, 2009; Vezirgiannidou, 2009), though possibilities for improve-
ment through modification have been identified (Finus, 2008b). For
example, a sanction could take the form of a temporary suspension of
monetary and technological transfers if recipient countries are found in
non-compliance (Finus, 2008b). It has also been shown that a deposit
system can be effective to enforce compliance: treaty members lodge
a deposit into a fund from which they receive interest as long as they
comply. In case of non-compliance, parts of the deposit are forfeited to
compliant countries (Gerber and Wichardt, 2009, 2013).
Trade sanctions, such as those employed under the Montreal Protocol,
are frequently put forward as a possible compliance mechanism (Bar-
rett, 2003; Victor, 2011) (see Section 13.8 for institutional details and
further discussion). A general reservation about trade sanctions is that
they often not only affect the agreement-violator but also compliant
countries, and hence this threat is not credible. Barrett (2009), Victor
(2010), and others argue that trade sanctions are neither a feasible nor
a desirable option for enforcing compliance with a climate agreement
because trade sanctions may not be compatible with WTO rules. A WTO-
compatible design may be feasible in the case of border adjustments
with obligations to buy allowances (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007; Monjon
and Quirion, 2011). Meanwhile, imposition of trade sanctions would
pose some risks of reducing cooperation by undermining capacity for
compliance in targeted countries and could be burdensome to low-
income populations in targeted countries (Murase, 2011). Especially
if applied to embedded carbon (carbon from energy used to produce
traded goods), the number of goods affected by the sanctions could
be large, potentially fuelling a trade war that may negatively affect
even those countries that intend to be the punishers (McKibbin and
Wilcoxen, 2009) (see Sections 13.8 and 5.4.1 for further discussion).
Finally, there is a considerable literature on the potential use of legal
remedies (such as civil liability) to address climate damages (Penalver,
1998; Grossman, 2003; Allen, 2003; Gillespie, 2004; Hancock, 2004;
Burns, 2004; Verheyen, 2005; Jacobs, 2005; Smith and Shearman, 2006;
Lord et al., 2011; Farber, 2011; Faure and Peeters, 2011). There has
been little suggestion that such liability remedies be formally incorpo-
rated into climate agreements as compliance mechanisms, and there
would be significant obstacles to doing so (including the lack of a
robust international civil liability system). Nonetheless, this is a poten-
tial avenue for encouraging compliance, perhaps indirectly. The IPCC
AR4 (IPCC, 2007) reported on evidence from various legal actions and
potential actions that have been considered in the theoretical litera-
ture. Haritz (2011) has argued, based on an analysis of the literature
and court cases, that it is theoretically possible to link the IPCC scale
of likelihood with a scale based on legal standards of proof required
for various kinds of legal action. Liability for climate change damage
at the supranational level (de Larragán, 2011; Gouritin, 2011; Peeters,
2011), and at the national level in the United Kingdom (Kaminskaite-
Slaters, 2011), the United States (Kosolapova, 2011), and the Nether-
lands (van Dijk, 2011), has been explored. Climate litigation and legal
liability may put additional pressure on corporations and govern-
ments to be more accountable (Smith and Shearman, 2006; Faure and
Peeters, 2011). However, there are key analytical hurdles to establish-
ing important legal facts, such as causation and who is to be held liable
(Gupta, 2014). While not framed in terms of liability or compensation,
the UNFCCC negotiations in Doha decided to establish institutional
arrangements associated with Loss and Damage (UNFCCC, 2013a).
13.4 Climate policy
architectures
‘Policy architecture’ for global climate change refers to “the basic
nature and structure of an international agreement or other mul-
tilateral (or bilateral) climate regime” (Aldy and Stavins, 2010a).
The term includes the sense of durability, with regard to both policy
structure and the institutions to implement and support that struc-
ture (Schmalensee, 1998, 2010), which is appropriate to the long-term
nature of the climate-change problem.
13�4�1 Degrees of centralized authority
Absent the emergence of a global authority that has the capacity to
impose an allocation of emissions rights on countries, as advocated
by Tickell (2008), approaches to international cooperation all arise out
of negotiated agreements among independent participants. However,
they vary in the degree to which they confer authority on multilateral
institutions to manage the rules and processes agreed to. On one end
of the spectrum of possible approaches, referred to by some as ‘top-
down’ (Dubash and Rajamani, 2010), actors agree to a high degree of
mutual coordination of their actions with, for example, fixed targets
and a common set of rules for specific mechanisms, such as emissions
trading. On the other end of the spectrum, sometimes known as ‘bot-
tom-up’ (Victor etal., 2005; Dubash and Rajamani, 2010), national pol-
icies are established that may or may not be linked with one another.
Figure 13.2 illustrates how existing and proposed international agree-
ments can be placed on this spectrum (see IPCC, 2007, pp. 770 – 773 for
a detailed list of many proposals that could be placed in this grid). The
level of centralization refers to the authority an agreement confers on
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an international institution, not the process of negotiating the agree-
ment. It shows that many proposals can be more or less centralized
depending on the specific design. It also shows that the three idealized
types discussed in the following sections have more blurred boundar-
ies than their titles suggest. The figure also divides them into agree-
ments focused on specific ends (emissions targets, for example) — and
those that focus on means (specific policies, or technologies, for exam-
ple). Finally, it should be understood that these are idealized types, and
in practice there will be considerable additional complexity in how the
basic design of agreements connect the actions of the various actors
that make them up. There are distinct limits to what can be gleaned
from the ‘top-down vs bottom-up’ metaphor or the degrees-of-central-
ization notion employed here (Dai, 2010) as, for example, emphasized
in Ostrom’s (2012) accounts of ‘polycentric governance’.
As one prominent example, the Cancún Agreements are a ‘hybrid’ of
top-down and bottom-up. They include voluntary mitigation pledges
from many (but not all) UNFCCC parties, together with additional or
elaborated common goals and centralized UNFCCC functions (e. g.,
with regard to adaptation, see Part II of the Cancún Agreements
(UNFCCC, 2010)). It is quite possible that the agreement mandated by
the Durban Platform on Enhanced Action, to be completed by 2015,
will also be such a hybrid.
Figure 13�2 | Alternative forms of international cooperation. The figure represents a compilation of existing and possible forms of international cooperation, based upon a survey
of published research, but is not intended to be exhaustive of existing or potential policy architectures, nor is it intended to be prescriptive. Examples in orange are existing agree-
ments. Examples in blue are structures for agreements proposed in the literature. The width of individual boxes indicates the range of possible degrees of centralization for a particu-
lar agreement. The degree of centralization indicates the authority an agreement confers on an international institution, not the process of negotiating the agreement.
UNFCCC Objective
Other IO GHG Regulation
Linked Cap-and-Trade Systems
and Harmonized Carbon Taxes
Multilateral Clubs
Green Climate
Fund
Bilateral Financial/
Technology Transfers
International Cooperation
for Supporting Adaptation Planning
Kyoto
Targets
Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms
Loose Coordination of Policies
Offset Certification Systems
UNFCCC/Kyoto/Copenhagen MRV Rules
R&D Technology Cooperation
Regional ETS
Pledge and Review
Copenhagen/
Cancún Pledges
Centralized AuthorityDecentralized Authority
Cooperation
over Means
Cooperation
over Ends
Loose coordination of policies: examples include transnational city networks and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs);
R&D technology cooperation: examples include the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), Global Methane Initiative (GMI),
or Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP); Other international organization (IO) GHG regulation:
examples include the Montreal Protocol, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Maritime Organization (IMO).
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13�4�1�1 Centralized architectures and strong
multilateralism
A centralized architecture, such as that generated by strong commit-
ments to multilateral processes and institutions, is an agreement that
establishes goals, targets, or both which are generally binding, for par-
ticipating countries, within a specific time-frame, and establishes col-
lective processes for monitoring progress towards meeting those goals.
The Kyoto Protocol adopted targets and timetables for participating
Annex B countries, one realisation of strong multilateralism (Bodan-
sky, 2007). Other centralized approaches to international cooperation
could expand on targets-and-timetables by also specifying the mecha-
nism for implementation of the goals and / or targets of the agreement.
Such an approach could establish, for example, a global cap-and-trade
system or global carbon tax.
In the literature, targets-and-timetables have been coupled with spe-
cific notions of fairness, prospective conditions for political acceptance,
or both — to establish quantitative targets and timetables for all coun-
tries and all years in a potential international agreement (Agarwala,
2010; Frankel, 2010; Höhne etal., 2008; Bosetti and Frankel, 2011; Cao,
2010c; IPCC, 2007, Chapter 13).
13�4�1�2 Harmonized national policies
A less-centralized approach would be to structure international cooper-
ation around policies that would be harmonized, such as via collective
monitoring, but where relatively little centralized authority is estab-
lished or employed. In this class of approaches, aspects of national
policies are made similar or even equivalent to one another. Examples
include the G20 and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) agree-
ment in 2009 to phase out fossil fuel subsidies that encourage waste-
ful consumption (Barbier, 2010); the EU’s use of private certification
schemes for biofuels to link to its import policies for such fuels; efforts
to harmonize private carbon-accounting systems, such as in the Carbon
Disclosure Standards Board (Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011); hypothetical
national carbon taxes that would be harmonized internationally (Coo-
per, 2010); adjusting design details of cap-and-trade schemes that are
to be linked; and implementation of similar technology or performance
standards. Many of these involve — or would involve — relatively lim-
ited numbers of actors, compared to UNFCCC agreements, reflecting
the ‘minilateralism’ discussed in Section13.2.1.1.
The so-called ‘pledge and review’ approach, exemplified to some
degree by the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancún Agreements, is
an architecture in which a participating nation or region voluntarily
registers to abide by its stated domestic reduction targets or actions
(pledges). The degree of centralization generated by this approach
could vary considerably (see Figure 13.2), depending on the particular
arrangement. If a pledge and review system, such as that represented
by the Cancún Agreements, involved cooperation in forging an agree-
ment that provided some centralized administration or monitoring
(in addition to the voluntary announcement of pledges by individual
countries), it could be considered an example of strong multilateral-
ism, although perhaps with less centralized authority than the Kyoto
Protocol or of coordinated national policies.
13�4�1�3 Decentralized approaches and coordinated
policies
Finally, even more decentralized architectures may arise out of dif-
ferent regional, national, and sub-national policies, and subsequently
vary in the extent to which they are connected internationally (Victor
etal., 2005; Hoffmann, 2011). One form of decentralized architecture is
linked regional, national, or sub-national tradable permit systems (Jaffe
etal., 2009; Ranson and Stavins, 2012; Mehling and Haites, 2009). In
such a system, smaller-scale tradable permit systems can be linked
directly (e. g., through mutual recognition of the permits from other
systems) or indirectly (e. g., through mutual recognition of an emission
reduction credit system such as the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM). In practice,
such a system of linkage is already emerging. However, there remains
the challenge of harmonizing the design details of the various trading
systems, as discussed above (e. g., emissions reductions requirements,
proportions of target emissions that may be covered by offset credits,
use of ceiling or floor prices, and accounting units (Jaffe etal., 2009;
Bernstein etal., 2010).
Similarly, heterogeneous regional, national, or sub-national policies
could be linked either directly or indirectly (e. g., cap and trade in one
jurisdiction linked with a tax in another) (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012).
Linkage of heterogeneous policies can occur through trade mecha-
nisms (e. g., import allowance requirements or border adjustments)
or via access to a common emission reduction credit system (e. g., the
CDM, as with indirectly linked tradable permit systems).
13�4�1�4 Advantages and disadvantages of different
degrees of centralization
Some authors conclude, particularly post-Copenhagen, that attempts
to develop a comprehensive, integrated climate regime have failed,
due to resistance to costly policies in both developed and developing
countries and lack of political will (Michonski and Levi, 2010; Keo-
hane and Victor, 2011), or alternatively because of the complexity that
characterizes the problem (Hoffmann, 2011). Other analyses empha-
size the legitimacy of the UN, particularly citing its universal member-
ship (Hare etal., 2010; Winkler and Beaumont, 2010; Müller, 2010; La
Viña, 2010) and noting that fragmentation of the climate regime could
create opportunities for forum shopping, a loss of transparency, and
reduced ambition (Biermann etal., 2009; Hare etal., 2010; Biermann,
2010). Other studies have examined (1) the evolution of multilateral-
ism (Bodansky and Diringer, 2010) and possible transitional arrange-
ments from fragmentation to a comprehensive agreement (Winkler
and Vorster, 2007), and (2) how to manage fragmentation so that it
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may become synergistic rather than prone to conflict (Biermann etal.,
2009; Oberthür, 2009).
13�4�2 Current features, issues, and elements of
international cooperation
The policy architecture for climate change raises a number of specific
questions about the structure of international cooperation. Four spe-
cific elements are of particular contemporary relevance: legal binding-
ness; goals, actions, and metrics; flexibility mechanisms; and participa-
tion, equity, and effort-sharing methods. These four elements deal with
the key questions of how much an agreement insists on compliance
with its obligations, what obligations it establishes, how flexible the
implementation of the obligations may be, and how the obligations
may vary across actors and situations. The discussion below focuses on
mitigation of GHG emissions, but the four key elements apply as well
to adaptation, financing, and other potential topics of international
agreements on climate change. For example, UNFCCC Article 4(1)(b)
(UNFCCC, 1992) calls on “all parties” to formulate and implement
both “measures to mitigate climate change” by reducing net GHG
emissions, and “measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate
change.” Understanding what is meant by such obligations requires
examining these four key elements.
13�4�2�1 Legal bindingness
States choose whether to join an agreement, and can withdraw from
an agreement, so international agreements exist by consent of the
parties (Waltz, 1979; Thompson, 2006). Having said this, international
agreements among states (national governments) may be more or less
‘legally binding’ on their parties. The degree of ‘bindingness’ depends
on both the legal form of the agreement and the costs to the state of
noncompliance.
Among the indicators of legal bindingness in the agreement itself are
(1) legal type (e. g., treaty, protocol to a treaty, decision of the UNFCCC
Conference of the Parties, and political declaration); (2) mandatory
commitments, i. e., whether a commitment is ‘expressed in obliga-
tory language’ (e. g., ‘shall’ or ‘must,’ vs. ‘should’ or ‘aim’) (Werksman,
2010)(Werksman, 2010)(Werksman, 2010); (3) specificity, i. e., “…
whether [commitments] are expressed in sufficient detail to accu-
rately assess compliance”; and (4) the type of enforcement procedures,
mechanisms, and sanctions designed to implement an agreement by
monitoring, reviewing, and encouraging compliance with commit-
ments (Werksman, 2010).
International agreements may be labelled ‘hard law’ (such as trea-
ties, their protocols, and contracts) that are legally binding on the
Table 13�1 | Taxonomy of legal bindingness: examples of commitments in international agreements for climate change.
Legal character (noting
relevance of indicators 1 – 4
discussed in the text)
Description Example
Mandatory provision in a
legally binding agreement with
enforcement mechanisms. (1) – (4)
A legally binding commitment can be subject to a
compliance regime, with authority to sanction non-
compliant parties. Enforcement can also come in the
form of reciprocity for non-compliant actions.
The targets and timetables in the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998) and the Marrakech Accords
(UNFCCC, 2001), with specific quantitative emissions limits, a compliance system that sanctions non-
compliance, and flexibility mechanisms. (Outside the climate arena, the World Trade Organization is
the most prominent example of this type.)
Mandatory provision in a legally
binding agreement without
enforcement mechanism. (1) and
(2); possibly (3); but not (4)
‘Legally binding,’ but subject only to self-enforcement. Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC (1992), mandating, inter alia, national emissions inventories, measures to
mitigate, and measures to facilitate adaptation.
Non-mandatory provision in a
legally binding agreement. (1), but
not (2) – (4)
Such a provision does not demand compliance,
but carries somewhat more weight than a political
agreement.
Article 4.2 (a) and (b) of the UNFCCC (1992) commit developed countries to adopt policies and
measures to limit their net GHG emissions (a mandatory provision); 4.2(a) then ‘recognizes’ that
returning these emissions to earlier levels by the year 2000 would be desirable, and 4.2(b) provides
the ‘aim’ of returning to 1990 levels (both non-mandatory provisions).
Mandatory provision in a
non-legally binding (‘political’)
agreement. (2), possibly (3); but
not (1) or (4)
Such a provision may induce the party to act, through
norms, reputation, and reciprocity.
The pledges on targets and actions submitted by states pursuant to the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC,
2009a) and Cancún Agreements (UNFCCC, 2010). (Outside the climate arena, the moratorium on high
seas driftnet fishing is treated as binding by many states, even though United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) resolutions are not binding.)
Non-mandatory provision in a
non-legally binding (‘political’)
agreement.
None of (1) – (4)
An aim or aspiration, expressed in hortatory, non-
binding language. This type of provision typically
includes one or more statements of principles or norms.
Targets set in the Noordwijk Declaration (1989), at a ministerial conference on climate change held
prior to the 1992 Rio summit.
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parties, or ‘soft law’ (such as declarations, resolutions, and guide-
lines) that are not legally binding. But the reality is more complex
(Baxter, 1980; Abbott etal., 2000; Bodansky, 2010a; Guzman and
Meyer, 2010). Across types of agreements, commitments may be
more or less legally binding; for example, although treaties often
contain mandatory commitments, a treaty may also contain horta-
tory provisions, such as aims and pledges, which are understood to
be aspirational; while a political declaration may nonetheless con-
tain provisions that raise strong expectations and consequences for
failure (Raustiala, 2005). Some commitments may be specific and
subject to monitoring and accountability, while others are vague
and difficult to verify (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). Further, across types
of agreements, the enforcement mechanism may be weak or rigor-
ous, ranging from inaction to admonishments to trade sanctions to
military force.
The bindingness of an agreement depends on the costs to a state of
nonparticipation, noncompliance, or withdrawal — as well as to legal
form. These costs include, as discussed above (see Section 13.3.4),
not only the costs of sanctions imposed by the agreement’s enforce-
ment mechanism, but also the costs incurred from the state’s loss of
reputation and from the loss of mutual cooperation by other states.
Reputational costs and lost-cooperation costs can influence states to
adhere to (initially informal) norms; hence strong norms with high
costs of violation are sometimes called ‘binding’ (Hoffmann, 2005,
2011; MacLeod, 2010).
Table 13.1 provides a taxonomy of the bindingness of international
agreements (Bodansky, 2003, 2009). The usage of ‘mandatory’ in the
table refers to the specific wording of the commitment — not to a
state’s choice of whether to participate or not.
Research has not resolved whether or under what circumstances a
more binding agreement elicits more effective national policy. In gen-
eral, a more legally binding commitment is more subject to monitoring
and enforcement (both internationally and domestically), is more likely
to require ratification by domestic institutions, and signals a greater
seriousness by states (Bodansky, 2003; Rajamani, 2009). These factors
increase the costs of violation (through enforcement and sanctions
at international and domestic scales, the loss of mutual cooperation
by others, and the loss of reputation and credibility in future negotia-
tions).
On the other hand, there may be situations where there is a tradeoff
between legal bindingness and ambition (stringency of commitments).
Because greater legal bindingness implies greater costs of violation,
states may prefer more legally binding agreements to embody less
ambitious commitments, and may be willing to accept more ambi-
tious commitments when they are less legally binding. (Rajamani,
2009; Raustiala, 2005; Guzman and Meyer, 2010; Albin, 2001; Grasso
and Sacchi, 2011; Bodansky, 1999; Bernstein, 2005; See also Sections
13.2.2.5 and 13.3.3)
13�4�2�2 Goals and targets
Most agreements that advance international cooperation to address
climate change incorporate goals. ‘Goals’ are ‘long-term and systemic’
(as contrasted with absolute emissions-reduction ‘targets,’ which may
flow logically from the goals but which are ‘near-term and specific’)
(IPCC, 2007, Chapter 13). The goals of an international agreement
might include, for example, stabilization levels (or a reduction in a
previously agreed stabilization level) of atmospheric concentrations of
GHGs — or reductions in impacts of climate change.
Targets can be classified according to whether they require absolute
GHG cuts relative to a historical baseline, or reductions relative to
economic output, population growth, or business-as-usual projections
(intensity targets). In recent literature on targets´ metrics, there has
been a focus on whether or not intensity targets are superior to fixed
ones when there is uncertainty about the future (Jotzo and Pezzey,
2007; Marschinski and Edenhofer, 2010; Sue Wing etal., 2009; Conte
Grand, 2013). There are tradeoffs between reduced uncertainty about
the cost of abatement, associated with intensity targets, and reduced
uncertainty about environmental effectiveness, associated with abso-
lute targets (Ellerman and Wing, 2003; Herzog, Timothy etal., 2006).
In the UNFCCC climate negotiations, examples of fixed targets are
Kyoto Annex B country-emission reductions by 2008 – 2012 with
respect to 1990 levels, and Copenhagen pledges (Some of the devel-
oped countries propose emissions reductions by 2020 with respect to
some base year — 1990, 2000, or 2005 — while some of the develop-
ing economies suggest reductions by 2020 with respect to their busi-
ness-as-usual trends). On the other hand, intensity targets have been
proposed by China and India: their pledge is a reduction of carbon
intensity (i. e., emissions / gross domestic product (GDP)) between 40
and 45 % and 20 and 25 % respectively by 2020 with respect to 2005
(Steckel etal., 2011; Zhang, 2011; Yuan etal., 2012; Cao, 2010b; Gov-
ernment of India, 2012). Another carbon target linked to GDP was the
one planned by Argentina in 1999 (Barros and Conte Grand, 2002).
13�4�2�3 Flexible mechanisms
One focus of international negotiations has been enabling states to
have flexibility in meeting obligations. In principle, there are numerous
ways this could be achieved. For example, there could be provisions
for renegotiating targets. The most often-cited benefit of flexibility
is reduction in the costs associated with GHG-emissions reductions.
However, Hafner-Burton etal. (2012) explore whether increased flex-
ibility in designing obligations for states helps them align their inter-
national obligations more readily with domestic political constraints.
In existing interstate agreements, flexibility has been pursued princi-
pally through mechanisms that create markets. The rationale for these
is to lower the cost of reducing emissions, relative to traditional regula-
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tory regimes, as they direct investments in emissions reductions toward
lower-cost abatement opportunities available in various jurisdictions.
Such flexible mechanisms can involve trading emissions allowances
under a fixed overall cap, generating offset credits, or combinations of
the two. Generally, offset credits can be generated through project-based
mechanisms or crediting of policies and sectoral actions. The former have
been developed since the mid-1990s, with the CDM as by far the larg-
est programme (Michaelowa and Buen, 2012); the literature assessing
the CDM is reviewed in Section 13.13.1.1.) The latter are still being dis-
cussed with regards to post-2012 climate policies in the context of ‘new
market mechanisms’ related to mitigation policies in developing coun-
tries (Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)). Additionally,
inter-temporal flexibility may be added to an allowance-trading regime
through banking and borrowing of allowances, by which regulated enti-
ties may transfer current obligations to the future or vice versa. However,
the environmental effectiveness and distributional impact of carbon mar-
kets have also raised concerns (Lohmann, 2008; Böhm and Dabhi, 2009).
The Kyoto Protocol provides three flexible mechanisms: Joint Imple-
mentation (JI), the CDM, and international emissions trading (IET) (in
Articles 6, 12, and 17, respectively). Joint Implementation and CDM
both generate offset credits from projects that reduce GHG emissions,
and IET allows for government-to-government trading of Kyoto emis-
sions allowances. Most attention in the research on these mechanisms
has focused on the CDM, in part because of the volume of trading
compared to the others (on the relatively small volume in Kyoto emis-
sions trading, see Aldrich and Koerner, 2012).
The credits from JI and CDM may be used by Annex B countries to
meet their emissions-reduction obligations. In practice, the key
driver of investment in CDM projects has been the European Union
(EU) Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), which allows regulated entities
(companies or installations) to use credits from the CDM (referred to
as ‘Certified Emission Reductions’ (CERs) and from JI (referred to as
‘Emissions Reduction Units’ or ERUs) to meet a portion of their ETS
obligations (see Sections 13.6.1 and 14.4.2.1 for details). The EU ETS
has accounted for about 84 % of demand for CERs and ERUs from
2008 – 2012. The next largest source of demand for CERs and ERUs
comes from Japan, at 15 % of demand (Kossoy and Guigon, 2012).
Market-based flexibility mechanisms are evolving. Japan is pursu-
ing bilateral crediting approaches under its Joint Crediting Mecha-
nism / Bilateral Offset Crediting Mechanism (Ministry of the Envi-
ronment, Government of Japan, 2012). COP-17 in Durban in 2011
mandated two approaches be pursued in the UNFCCC negotiations
leading to a new international agreement in late 2015: (1) top-down,
operating under authority of the COP (‘new market-based mecha-
nism’), which, as noted, focuses in large part on sectoral crediting;
and (2) bottom-up, developed by countries ‘in accordance with their
national circumstances’ (‘framework for various approaches’), which
attempts to coordinate heterogeneous policies across countries.
COP-18 in Doha, Qatar, in 2012 reiterated and developed further
details regarding these two approaches (UNFCCC, 2013b).
13�4�2�4 Equitable methods for effort sharing
While universal participation might be desirable in principle, actors
participate in a context of heterogeneity in both economic capacity
and emissions levels. Variations in both wealth and emissions have
evolved over time; for example, many countries classified in the 1992
UNFCCC as developing (non-AnnexI) have since experienced increas-
ing incomes and increasing emissions (in some cases exceeding the
incomes and / or emissions of some countries classified in 1992 as
developed (AnnexI)). These variations and continued differences are
discussed further in Section4.1.2.2. As to participation in international
agreements, in general, a country is less likely to participate in an inter-
national agreement the more the country perceives the agreement to
be unfair to its own economic and environmental interests. Addressing
climate change equitably can thus be central to pursuing broad partici-
pation in climate agreements.
There is disagreement, however, about how to put equity principles
into practice in international agreements. The UNFCCC adopted the
principle of CBDRRC of parties (Article 3.1) (UNFCCC, 1992). Several
different approaches have been advanced for putting this principle into
practice. Deleiul (2012) argues that CBDRRC initially facilitated agree-
ment and participation in the UNFCCC, but has become more conten-
tious as national variations in income and emissions have evolved over
time (hence Deleiul sees promise in the Durban Platform, which calls
for mitigation contributions from all parties in a new treaty concluded
by 2015, to take effect by 2020).
Section 4.6.2 elaborates these different approaches in detail, and sug-
gests they can be broadly divided into those that start with the sta-
tus quo of emissions, that thus focus on the question of ‘effort-shar-
ing’ or ‘burden sharing,’ and those that start with a specific account
of ‘rights’ to GHG emissions (such as equal per capita or equal per
GDP emissions) and derive targets for countries from that formula
(known as ‘resource-sharing’). Rao (2011) refers to these as burden
sharing vs. resource-sharing equity principles. Burden sharing methods
are reviewed in (Jotzo and Pezzey, 2007; den Elzen and Höhne, 2008,
2010; Winkler etal., 2009; Chakravarty etal., 2009; Mearns and Nor-
ton, 2010; Frankel, 2010; Ekholm etal., 2010; Marschinski and Eden-
hofer, 2010; Cao, 2010c; Tavoni etal., 2013; den Elzen etal., 2013b;
Höhne et al., 2013). ‘Resource-sharing’ approaches are examined in
(Höhne etal., 2006; Chakravarty etal., 2009; Baer etal., 2009; Kanitkar
etal., 2010; Jayaraman etal., 2011; Rao, 2011; Kartha etal., 2012).
Section 6.3.6.6 elaborates a wide range of possible approaches and
quantifies them in terms of levels of emissions reductions for various
world regions. One recent example is Winkler etal. (2013), which eval-
uates several approaches for mitigation of and adaptation to climate
change, and suggests that these call for more mitigation in wealth-
ier countries. Recent research is also comparing various measures of
equity for climate policy within developing countries (Casillas and
Kammen, 2012). Section 13.13 assesses existing and proposed agree-
ments in light of these criteria.
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Table 13�2 | Description of recent proposals for climate change policy architectures.
Proposed Architecture (recent references) Description
Strong multilateralism
Indicator-linked national participation and commitments
(Baer etal., 2009; Chakravarty etal., 2009; Frankel, 2010; Bosetti and
Frankel, 2011; WBGU, 2009; Cao, 2010c; BASIC Project, 2007; Winkler
etal., 2011)
All countries adopt emissions targets and timetables, with time of participation and / or target levels based on one or more
indicators (per capita income, economic cost as percentage of national income, historical emissions). Targets can both be
reductions in emissions growth rates as well as absolute reductions.
Per capita commitments
(Agarwala, 2010)
Countries implement equal per capita emissions targets, resulting in significant emissions increases for many developing
countries, and significant decreases for industrialized countries.
Top-down burden sharing
(Baer etal., 2009; Kartha etal., 2012; Cao, 2010c; Kanitkar etal., 2010;
Jayaraman etal., 2011)
Emissions targets based on equal per capita emissions, mitigation burden proportional to cumulative emissions and ability
to pay, countries with similar economic circumstances have similar burdens, and poorest countries and individuals exempt
from obligations.
Sectoral approaches
(Sawa, 2010; Schmidt etal., 2008; Barrett, 2010; den Elzen etal., 2008)
Countries develop national emissions targets by sector, and governments make international commitments to implement
policies to achieve targets (Sawa, 2010) or based on staged sectoral approach (den Elzen etal., 2008); can be developed
in a portfolio of treaties (Barrett, 2010). Alternatively, developing countries pledge to meet voluntary sectoral targets;
reductions beyond targets can be sold to industrialized countries (Schmidt etal., 2008).
Portfolio system of treaties
(Barrett, 2010; Stewart etal., 2012)
Separate international treaties concluded for different sectors, different GHGs. Treaty obligations apply globally, and
developing countries offered financial assistance to aid compliance and induce participation. Trade restrictions used to
enforce agreements in trade-sensitive sectors.
Harmonized national policies
Global emissions permit trading system (Ellerman, 2010) The EU ETS serves as prototype for a global emissions trading system. Design informed by EU ETS experience, which has a
central coordinating institution (the European Commission), mechanisms to expand participation to new Member States,
and effective financial flows resulting from trading. Distributional impacts addressed by specific design features.
International carbon tax
(Cooper, 2010; Nordhaus, 2008; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009)
A common charge levied on all global GHG emissions, most practically upstream (at oil refineries, gas pipelines, mine
mouths, etc.). Each country collects and keeps its own revenues. Charges rise over time according to schedule to induce
cost-effective technological change. Distributional impacts addressed by allocation of revenues.
Hybrid market-based approaches (Fell etal., 2012) A tradable emissions permit system includes a price ceiling, a price floor, or a combination of the two (a price collar).
System functions like a hybrid of a tax and a tradable permit system. The price ceiling (often called a ‘safety valve’) can take
the form of unlimited allowances sold at a fixed price or a limited allowance reserve.
Decentralized architectures and coordinated national policies
Linked domestic cap-and-trade systems
(Jaffe and Stavins, 2010; Jaffe etal., 2009; Bernstein etal., 2010; Metcalf
and Weisbach, 2012; Ranson and Stavins, 2013)
Domestic and international emissions trading and emissions reduction credit systems linked, directly or indirectly, to
achieve cost savings. Direct linkages require more coordination, while indirect linkages (of cap-and-trade systems through
a common credit system, for example) require less. Linkage achieved independently (as a bottom-up architecture), as a
transition to a new top-down architecture, or as an element of a broader climate agreement.
Linked heterogeneous policy instruments
(Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012)
Domestic and international emissions trading systems linked with carbon tax systems, allowing emissions permits from
one country to be remitted as tax payments, and / or allowing payments in excess of the tax in one country to satisfy the
requirement to own a permit in another. Alternatively, fixed emissions standards (or even technology standards) linked with
taxes or tradable permit systems across countries or regions.
Technology-oriented agreements
(Newell, 2009, 2010a; de Coninck etal., 2008)
International climate change agreements to cover issues such as knowledge sharing and coordination, joint research and
development, technology transfer, and / or technology deployment mandates or incentives. Distributional impacts affected by
intellectual property sharing rules.
13�4�3 Recent proposals for future climate
change policy architecture
An extensive literature has examined what options could be pursued
‘post-2012’, after the end of the first commitment period (CP1) of the
Kyoto Protocol. The literature now contains several surveys of diverse
proposals (see summaries of pre-2007 literature in Höhne etal., 2008;
Moncel etal., 2011; Aldy and Stavins, 2010b; Rajamani, 2011b, 2012a;
IPCC, 2007, Chapter 13). Table 13.2 describes recent proposals for cli-
mate policy architectures. Qualitative and quantitative performance
assessments of these proposals, where available, are surveyed in Sec-
tion 13.13.
13�4�4 The special case of international
cooperation regarding carbon
dioxide removal and solar radiation
management
Since the publication of AR4, carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and solar
radiation management (SRM) have received increasing attention as a
means to address climate change, distinct from mitigation and adapta-
tion. These two approaches are often collectively referred to as ‘geoen-
gineering’ or ‘climate engineering’ (for more detail, see Working Group
(WG) I contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) Sec-
tion 6.9). Carbon dioxide removal refers to techniques to extract GHGs
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directly from the atmosphere and store them in sinks, or to directly
enhance such sinks. Solar radiation management aims to reduce the
amount of solar radiation absorbed by the Earth’s surface. Proposed
SRM projects can be atmospheric (e. g., cloud brightening or adding
reflective sulphate particles to the lower stratosphere), terrestrial (e. g.,
enhancing the albedo of the ground, or painting pavements and roof
materials white to reflect solar radiation) and space-based (e. g., plac-
ing mirrors in space). See WGI report, Section 7.7, for details of these.
Some SRM options (e. g., injecting sulphate particles into the lower
stratosphere) may be inexpensive enough for individual states (Bar-
rett, 2008a) and even non-state actors, such as wealthy individuals, to
undertake (Barrett, 2008a; Victor, 2008; Lin, 2009; Victor etal., 2009;
Bodansky, 2011b). CDR and other SRM approaches might need to be
implemented by numerous countries in order to be effective (Hum-
phreys, 2011). Some SRM options may also have specific regional
impacts (e. g., regional temperature and precipitation effects, leaf
albedo enhancement, or ocean circulation modification), providing
direct and perhaps excludable benefits to actors undertaking them
(Millard-Ball, 2012) and external costs to others (Ricke et al., 2010,
2013). See also WGII 19.5.4 for detailed discussion of the risks of SRM.
Smaller-scale actors that are particularly vulnerable to climate change
impacts may perceive advantages to be first-movers with SRM, in
order to ensure both global climate protection and a favourable dis-
tribution of regional impacts from their selected SRM projects (Ricke
et al., 2010; Millard-Ball, 2012). Hardly any cooperation might be
needed for SRM’s development and deployment — indeed, countries
facing severe impacts might rush to launch a preferred SRM project
(Millard-Ball, 2012). If the benefits of such an SRM project outweigh
the adverse side-effects, and its costs are indeed low, then such an
SRM project might be desirable. But such unilateral action could also
produce significant adverse side-effects and costs for other actors, if
the SRM option chosen is one that secures climate benefits for one
part of the world while creating climate or other damages in other
parts (Lin, 2009). Solar radiation management may also be ineffective
in mitigating some climate impacts, for example the acidification of
oceans from absorption of excessive CO
2
(Humphreys, 2011). Further,
SRM does not reduce concentrations of atmospheric GHGs, and inter-
rupting SRM after concentrations have risen significantly could allow
temperatures to rise rapidly (see also Smith and Rasch, 2012).
Solar radiation management poses the converse of the collective
action and governance challenges arising from emissions-reduction
efforts: rather than mobilizing hesitant action to limit emissions, SRM
governance involves restraining hasty unilateral action (Victor, 2008;
Victor etal., 2009; Virgoe, 2009; House of Commons Science and Tech-
nology Committee, 2010; Lloyd and Oppenheimer, 2014; Millard-Ball,
2012; Bodansky, 2011b). One of the main issues for international
cooperation will be to develop institutions and norms to address
potential negative consequences of SRM in other social or environ-
mental fields, or for parts of the world either not protected or nega-
tively affected by the SRM option chosen. Thus, some analysts have
recommended that international governance be organized for SRM
research and testing, to learn about the benefits and side-effects of
SRM options, to develop institutions to decide if and when to deploy
SRM, to learn how to maintain SRM capabilities, and to monitor and
evaluate this research and its use (Victor etal., 2009; Blackstock and
Long, 2010; Lin, 2009; Solar Radiation Management Governance ini-
tiative, 2011).
Some existing international agreements may be relevant to geoengi-
neering. The UNFCCC already includes a provision, Article 4.1(f), requir-
ing assessment of the adverse impacts of mitigation measures. The
UN Convention on Law of the Sea contains important provisions on
environmental protection (Redgwell, 2006), and may have increased
significance with regards to the governance of marine-based carbon
dioxide storage or geo-engineering options (Virgoe, 2009). Under the
London Convention and Protocol, the International Maritime Organi-
zation (IMO) held that, given the uncertainty surrounding negative
impacts, ocean fertilization other than ‘legitimate scientific research’
ought not be permitted (Reynolds, 2011; IMO resolution LC-LP.1, 2008
and LC-LP.2, 2010). Several multilateral fora have recently taken up
the issue of SRM. The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
adopted a decision calling for a moratorium on ‘geo-engineering
activities that may affect biodiversity’ (Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, 2010; Tollefson, 2010). Other existing multilateral treaties and
agreements that may relate to geo-engineering include: the 1977 UN
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use
of Environmental Modification Techniques (the ENMOD Convention)
(though it restricts only ‘hostile’ actions); the convention on Environ-
mental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (UNECE, 1991);
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty System (US Department of State, 2002); and
ongoing developments in human rights law and in environmental law
(Reynolds, 2011; Convention on Biological Diversity, 2012). Further,
the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (United Nations, 2002) may apply to the use of sun-
deflecting mirrors in space.
13.5 Multilateral and
bilateral agreements
and institutions across
different scales
This section builds on the description of the climate policy landscape
in Section 13.3.1 and plausible climate policy architectures in Section
13.4. It considers the experience and evolution of international and
transnational cooperation on climate change between states and non-
state actors since 2007 when the Fourth Assessment Report of the
IPCC was published.
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13�5�1 International cooperation among
governments
13�5�1�1 Climate agreements under the UNFCCC
The UNFCCC’s universal membership provides it with a high degree
of legitimacy among parties around the world (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen
and McGee, 2013). Steps taken under the Convention and its Kyoto
Protocol have led to more extensive action than under other forms of
international cooperation on climate change.
Evolution of the multilateral climate regime since AR4
At COP-13 in Bali in 2007, discussions on long-term cooperative action
under the Convention turned into negotiations under the Bali Action
Plan (UNFCCC, 2007a). Also in Bali, countries agreed to MRV of mitiga-
tion commitments or actions by developed countries and mitigation
actions by developing countries and support for those. Under the
Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009a) and Cancún Agreements
(UNFCCC, 2010), Forty-two developed countries (including the 27 EU
member states) submitted absolute reduction commitments against
various base years in the form of quantified economy-wide emissions
targets for 2020. Fifty-five developing countries and the African Union
submitted information on NAMAs to the UNFCCC (as of May 2013),
which are subject to domestic and international MRV. These 55 devel-
oping countries expressed their proposed goals in a variety of ways
(e. g., relative emission reductions, deviation below business-as-usual,
absolute reductions, and goals related to carbon neutrality); 16 pro-
posed economy-wide goals for mitigation of GHGs. Since 2010, no
major economy has significantly changed its emission reduction pro-
posal under the UNFCCC, though some countries have clarified their
assumptions and business-as-usual emission levels (UNEP, 2010, 2011,
2012, 2013b; den Elzen et al., 2013a; Sharma and Desgain, 2013;
UNFCCC, 2013c). Figure 13.3 displays the different categories of
actions and pledges taken by countries under the Cancún Agreements
and the Kyoto Protocol as of September 2013.
Figure 13�3 | Global map showing the different categories of reduction proposals or commitments for 2020 under the Cancún Agreements and Kyoto Protocol, based on UNEP
(2012, 2013b) with underlying data supported by UNFCCC (2011b, 2012d, 2013c).
Developing countries with Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, termed as policy-, sectoral-,
and project-level actions
Countries with no pledges
Developed countries with Quantified Emission Limitation or Reduction Commitments (QELROs)
under the Kyoto Protocol and Cancún agreements
Developed countries with Quantified Economy-Wide Emission Reduction Targets (QEERTs)
under Cancún agreements
Developing countries with Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions stating their impact on greenhouse gas emissions
(Reduction relative to BAU; Reduction in carbon intensity of GDP, compared to 2005 levels)
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COP-17 in Durban in 2011 produced the Durban Platform for
Enhanced Action (UNFCCC, 2011a), in which the delegates agreed
“to launch a process to develop a protocol, another legal instru-
ment or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention
applicable to all Parties” (UNFCCC, 2011a) and “complete its work
as early as possible but no later than 2015 in order to adopt this
protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal
force at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties and
for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020” (UNFCCC,
2011a).
Evolution of coalitions among UNFCCC parties
New and existing coalitions of countries have engaged in the
UNFCCC negotiations, each presenting coordinated positions. Several
distinct coalitions of developing countries have formed to negotiate
their divergent priorities. Examples include the G77 & China, which
represents 131 developing countries operating in the UNFCCC and
the UN system more broadly and which contains sub-groups such
as the African Group, the Least Developed Countries, and the Arab
Group; the Alliance of Independent Latin American and Caribbean
states; and a ‘like-minded developing country’ group that included
China, India, and Saudi Arabia (Grubb, 2013). Other coalitions orga-
nized to influence UNFCCC negotiations include the Alliance of Small
Island States (AOSIS), which has played a significant role in UNFCCC
negotiations since the early 1990s; various groupings of industrial-
ized countries, including the Umbrella Group; the Environmental
Integrity Group, which was the first coalition to include both indus-
trialized and developing countries; the BASIC countries (Brazil, South
Africa, India and China) (Olsson et al., 2010; Rong, 2010; Nhamo,
2010); the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, which has increased the
salience of forests in climate negotiations; and other active coalitions
not limited to the climate context, for example the Comision Cen-
troamericana de Ambiente y Desarollo and the Bolivarian Alliance for
the Americas.
Negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol
Negotiations on a second commitment period (CP2) of the Kyoto
Protocol were launched in Montréal in 2005. These negotiations
concluded in late 2012 at COP-18 in Doha, Qatar with a decision
and amendment establishing the second commitment period of the
Protocol for 2013 – 2020. However, a number of Annex I countries
(Belarus, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, the United States,
and Ukraine) decided not to participate in the second commitment
period. The other AnnexI countries (Australia, the EU and its member
states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Swit-
zerland, and Ukraine) adopted quantified emission reduction com-
mitments (Figure 13.3), covering 13 % of global GHG emissions at
2010 emission levels (UNFCCC, 2012d; JRC / PBL, 2013). At COP-18
in Doha in 2012, parties also agreed upon rules for transferring sur-
plus Kyoto emissions allowances from the first to the second period.
These rules are assessed in Section 13.13.1.1, and the evolution of
market-based flexibility mechanisms in the UNFCCC negotiations is
discussed in Section 13.4.2.3.
New institutions under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol have brought about a number
of new institutions focused on adaptation (funding and coordina-
tion), finance, and technology. The Adaptation Fund was established
to provide direct access to financing for developing countries and is
governed by a majority of developing countries. The Adaptation Com-
mittee was established to coordinate previously fragmented aspects
of adaptation policy under the Convention, with modalities and link-
ages to other institutions to be defined (UNFCCC, 2011c) (see Section
13.11.1.1). The GCF is accountable to the Conference of the Parties,
and, when it is fully operational, may be a major channel for the provi-
sion of climate finance (Brown etal., 2011). The Standing Committee
on Finance supports the parties in coordinating and providing account-
ability for the financial mechanism of the Convention. The Climate
Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), together with the Technology
Executive Committee (TEC), was established to exchange information
regarding technology development and transfer for adaptation and
mitigation (UNFCCC, 2011c).
13�5�1�2 Other UN climate-related forums
Acting on climate change may require functions other than negotiation
under the UNFCCC or other forms of high-level cooperation, such as
analytical support and implementation assistance for mitigation and
adaptation efforts. A diverse set of forums both within and outside the
UN system has taken up the issue of climate change since AR4, pos-
sibly contributing to broader institutional learning and effectiveness
(Depledge, 2006; Stewart etal., 2012).
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has had a natural
concern with climate change for many years, given its mission, and it
collaborates closely with the UNFCCC. Since AR4, UNEP has provided
increasingly significant analytical support to the international process,
in part through its emissions-gap reports (UNEP, 2010, 2012, 2013b;
Höhne etal., 2012b; Hof etal., 2013), but also through a wide range of
other analytical efforts and support for institution building.
United Nations forums beyond the UNFCCC are increasingly address-
ing funding for adaptation and mitigation. Fragmentation in the vari-
ous objectives, conditions, and eligibility requirements of the different
funds may make it difficult for developing countries to identify and
access appropriate funding (Czarnecki and Guilanpour, 2009). The lit-
erature examines the relationship between adaptation and develop-
ment finance, including concerns about measuring official develop-
ment assistance (ODA) and how much adaptation funding is ‘new and
additional’ (Stadelmann etal., 2010; Smith etal., 2011). A number of
developing countries have established “national funding entities to
coordinate domestic and international funding for adaptation with
development funding” (Smith etal., 2011).
Other UN agencies have also addressed the connections of climate
change with human development (UNDP, 2007; UNDESA, 2009), the
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CO
2
emissions gap (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2012; Höhne
et al., 2012b), finance (AGF, 2010), and human rights (see Section
13.5.2.2).
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Stratospheric
Ozone Layer (concluded in 1987 under UN auspices) — and the Pro-
tocol’s subsequent amendments, adjustments, and decisions — have
also contributed to reductions in GHGs. One notable proposed amend-
ment would accelerate the phaseout of substitutes of ozone depleting
substances that are also strong GHGs (Mauritius & Micronesia, 2009;
Velders etal., 2012).
13�5�1�3 Non-UN forums
Climate change is increasingly addressed in forums for international
cooperation outside of the UN. The AR4 (IPCC, 2007, Chapter 13)
assessed several partnerships focused on particular themes, technolo-
gies, or regions.
Some international partnerships have defined themselves as comple-
ments to the UNFCCC rather than as alternatives. For example, the
REDD+ Partnership helps coordinate measures for reducing emissions
from deforestation and degradation (REDD) in the UNFCCC process.
The Partnership focuses on conservation, sustainable forest man-
agement, and forest carbon stock enhancement. In 2010, more than
50 countries signed a non-binding agreement to pledge more than
4 billion USD to REDD+ (Bodansky and Diringer, 2010). Michaelowa
(2012a) and Stewart el al. (2009) describe multiple avenues for cli-
mate change financing to assist transitions to low-carbon technolo-
gies, such as through the International Renewable Energy Agency
(IRENA). Established in 2009, IRENA seeks to advance the develop-
ment and transfer of renewable energy technologies, with a focus on
financing renewable energy in its 163 member and signatory states
(plus the European Union) (Florini, 2011; International Renewable
Energy Agency, 2013).
The MEF, organized by the United States, provides a forum for informal
consultation. Its members — Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the Euro-
pean Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Repub-
lic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and
the United States — together account for about 70 % of global GHG
emissions (JRC / PBL, 2013). Its meetings are intended to advance dis-
cussion of international climate change agreements (MEF, 2009), and
it has generated a related Clean Energy Ministerial. MEF participants
recognize the group as a venue for discussion rather than a forum for
negotiating binding agreements. The MEF produces a chairs’ summary
instead of formally agreed text (Leal-Arcas, 2011). The existence of the
MEF may be evidence of an overall increase in the fragmentation of
global environmental governance (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008; Bier-
mann, 2010). Some may also be concerned about a small set of large
countries reaching even informal decisions that affect a much larger
set, and some may not be comfortable with a process chaired by a
single nation (Stavins, 2010).
The Group of Twenty (G20) finance ministers from industrialized
and developing economies could have the capacity to address cli-
mate finance, building on its core mission to discuss economic and
finance policy. The make-up of the G20 is similar to that of the MEF,
with the addition of Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Houser
(2010) finds that the G20 might help to accelerate the deployment of
clean energy technology, help vulnerable countries adapt to climate
change impacts, and help phase out inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies.
At its meeting in Pittsburgh in 2009 (G20, 2009), the G20 gave con-
siderable attention to climate change policy issues, in particular to
fossil-fuel subsidies. Likewise, since 2005, the smaller Group of Eight
(G8) heads of state and government have held a series of meetings
relating to climate change and recognized the broad scientific view
that the increase in global average temperature above pre-industrial
levels ought not exceed 2 °C (G8, 2009). Van de Graaf and Wsetphal
(2011) explore both opportunities for and constraints on the G20 and
G8 with regard to climate.
Two forums of growing importance, providing analytical support for
international cooperation on climate change, are the International
Energy Agency (IEA) and the OECD. While the IEA has limited its mem-
bership to industrialized oil-importing countries (Scott, 1994; Goldthau
and Witte, 2011), the OECD has granted membership to advanced
developing countries. Both institutions have received increasingly
strong mandates by their members to provide analytical support for
climate change mitigation decisions. The OECD has a unit for eco-
nomic analysis of climate policy and impacts, and already plays a role
in building knowledge (OECD, 2009). The IEA could play a key role to
reduce uncertainty about countries’ performance by collecting, analyz-
ing, and comparing energy and industry-related emissions data (Har-
vard Project on Climate Agreements, 2010). The IEA and OECD have
formed and jointly manage the Climate Change Expert Group, whose
explicit mission is to provide analytical support on technical issues to
the international negotiations.
The Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action includes around 30
industrialized and developing countries, which have met both dur-
ing and between formal sessions since 2009. The Dialogue is open to
countries working toward an ambitious, comprehensive, and legally
binding regime in the UNFCCC, and who are committed to domestic
policy to reduce emissions. The aim of the Dialogue is to openly dis-
cuss positions, to increase understanding, and to explore areas where
convergence and enhanced joint action could emerge (Oberthür,
2011).
In February 2012, a group of seven partners (Bangladesh, Canada,
Ghana, Mexico, Sweden, and the United States, together with the
UNEP) launched a new ‘Climate and Clean Air Coalition’ as a forum
for dialogue among state and non-state actors outside the UNFCCC
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process. The goal of the Coalition is to reduce levels of black carbon,
methane, and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) among its 34 state members
(including the European Commission) in collaboration with nine inter-
national organizations and 29 non-state partners (as of September
2013). The Coalition has received funding from a number of countries,
including Canada, Japan, and the United States to implement projects
(Blok etal., 2012; UNEP, 2013a).
New initiatives on international cooperation for adaptation and its
funding have also been created, such as the World Bank’s Pilot Pro-
gram on Climate Resilience, and the European Commission-established
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), which pledges regional and
country-specific finance.
13�5�2 Non-state international cooperation
13�5�2�1 Transnational cooperation among sub-national
public actors
A prominent development since AR4 is the emergence of a large
number of international agreements between non-state entities (den
Elzen etal., 2011a; Höhne etal., 2012b; Hare etal., 2012). These are
most commonly referred to as ‘transnational climate governance ini-
tiatives’ (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008; Pattberg and Stripple, 2008;
Andonova etal., 2009; Bulkeley etal., 2012). In the most compre-
hensive survey, (Bulkeley etal., 2012) document 60 of these initia-
tives, which can be grouped into four principal types: public-private
partnerships, private sector governance initiatives, non-governmental
organization (NGO) transnational initiatives, and sub-national trans-
national initiatives. The first two, involving private actors, are dis-
cussed in Section13.12.
NGO transnational initiatives attempt to influence the activities of
corporations directly through transnational partnerships, some of
which involve collaboration with the private sector. They have set up
certification schemes for carbon offset credits, such as the Gold Stan-
dard, which is limited to renewable energy and demand-side energy
efficiency projects, and the Community Carbon and Biodiversity Asso-
ciation standard, which aims to increase the quality of forestry credits
(Bayon etal., 2007; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). Certified offset cred-
its have commanded a price premium above other (‘standard’) credits
(Sterk and Wittneben, 2006; Ellis etal., 2007; Nussbaumer, 2009; New-
ell and Paterson, 2010). These certification schemes have been used
for the Voluntary Carbon Market as well as for the CDM (Conte and
Kotchen, 2010).
Sub-national transnational initiatives involve sub-national actors,
such as city-level governments, collaborating at an international
scale. One example of this form of cooperation is the International
Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) — Local Govern-
ments for Sustainability network. This organization has taken action
through its Cities for Climate Protection programme from 1993 and
more recently through a partnership the C40 Cities Climate Leader-
ship Group (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009; Román, 2010; Bulkeley etal.,
2012). A World Mayors Summit in November 2010 had participation
from 138 cities and agreed on a Global Cities Covenant on Climate,
otherwise known as the Mexico City Pact. A related initiative, the
‘carbonn’ Cities Climate Registry, is an effort of local governments to
regularly measure, report, and verify cities’ actions on climate change
mitigation and adaptation (Chavez and Ramaswami, 2011; Ibrahim
etal., 2012; Otto-Zimmermann and Balbo, 2012; Richardson, 2012).
Recognition of local governments as governmental stakeholders in
paragraph I.7 of the Cancún Agreements is a reflection of the grow-
ing role of sub-national transnational cooperation in the UNFCCC
processes.
Larger sub-national units have developed transnational collaborative
schemes. Most notable are the North American sub-federal cap-and-
trade schemes, including the Western Climate Initiative (WCI). The WCI
was originally envisaged to link state and provincial cap-and-trade
systems in seven western U. S. states and four Canadian provinces
beginning in 2012. The original aim of the initiative was reducing
GHG emissions by the member states and provinces to 15 % below
2005 levels by 2020 (Rabe, 2007; WCI, 2007; Selin and VanDeveer,
2009; Bernstein etal., 2010). While the U. S. state of California’s ETS
began operating in January 2013, the launch of the WCI system has
been delayed. The WCI currently includes only California and Québec,
although Ontario, British Columbia, and Manitoba are considering
accession.
13�5�2�2 Cooperation around human rights and rights of
nature
Human rights law could conceivably frame an approach to climate
change (Bodansky, 2010b; Bell, 2013; Gupta, 2014). Some recent lit-
erature argues that a human rights framing helps ‘to counteract gross
imbalances of power’ between states and individuals (Sinden, 2007;
Bratspies, 2011; Akin, 2012). The human rights approach to climate
change has been acknowledged by the UN Human Rights Council in
its Resolution 7 / 23 and the Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Human Rights (UNHRC, 2008; Limon, 2009; OHCHR,
2009). The literature discusses a variety of specific issues, including the
implications for climate adaptation; the impacts of climate change on
human rights to water, food, health, and development; obligations to
undertake mitigation actions; and whether human rights law implies
an obligation to receive climate refugees.
Refugees displaced from their homes due to climate change may strain
the capacity of existing institutions (Biermann and Boas, 2008). How-
ever, policies to address climate refugees face legal hurdles, includ-
ing the issue of causality: who is to be held responsible, who is the
rights-bearer, and the issue of standing (Limon, 2009). Proposals have
been made in the literature for a new protocol to the UNFCCC, a new
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convention, and funding mechanisms to address the issues associ-
ated with climate refugees (Biermann and Boas, 2008; Docherty and
Giannini, 2009). Such efforts could build on the 1951 Geneva Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees. In the absence of coordinated
efforts, the Special Procedures and the Universal Periodic Review of
the Human Rights Council are advancing the human rights and climate
change agenda (Cameron and Limon, 2012).
In 2010, the government of Bolivia convened government and non-
government representatives in the World People’s Conference on
Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, which culminated
in a People’s Agreement (WPCCC and RME, 2010). The participation
of social movements in international cooperation on climate change
may enhance recognition of ‘radical climate justice’ (Roberts, 2011)
and an approach to law that seeks to establish ‘rights of nature’
(Cullinan, 2002; Sandberg and Sandberg, 2010; Aguirre and Cooper,
2010).
13�5�3 Advantages and disadvantages of
different forums
The literature has considered the strengths and weaknesses of nego-
tiating climate policy across multiple forums and institutions. Some
studies suggest that, in addition to its own action, the UNFCCC effect
of catalyzing efforts by others and providing coherence to multiple ini-
tiatives may result in greater aggregate impact (Moncel and van Asselt,
2012). Other literature suggests that ‘regime complexes’ may emerge
from smaller ‘clubs’ and then expand (Keohane and Victor, 2011; Vic-
tor, 2011). Regimes need (external) incentives for participation and
(internal) incentives for compliance (Aldy and Stavins, 2010c). A key
advantage of smaller forums or ‘clubs’ may be greater efficiency in
the negotiation process, as emphasized in the general political science
literature on negotiations (for example, Oye, 1985). But the literature
also reflects key disadvantages, including that such clubs lack univer-
sality and hence legitimacy (Moncel etal., 2011), and that the envi-
ronmental effectiveness of clubs may be undercut by leakage of emis-
sions sources to other countries outside the club (Babiker, 2005). Some
have suggested clubs as a way forward outside the UNFCCC, while
others suggest they could contribute to the UNFCCC, for example by
assisting in catalyzing greater ambition (Weischer etal., 2012). Sev-
eral smaller ‘clubs’ that cut across categories (e. g., public / private) and
scales (from international to local) are assessed in Section 13.5.1.2.
Flexibility is another advantage cited for smaller clubs. Climate change
mitigation through ‘clubs’ is not necessarily superior (Keohane and Vic-
tor, 2011) and action through this form of cooperation has to date not
brought about high levels of participation and action. Smaller clubs
must address conflicts where the climate change regime intersects
with other major policy regimes (Michonski and Levi, 2010). Analysis of
existing clubs suggests they enable incremental change and suggests
that a set of incentives (related to trade, investment, labour mobility,
or access to finance) could turn these into ‘transformational clubs’
(Weischer etal., 2012).
In a fragmented world, linking multiple agreements into a coherent
whole is a major challenge. The aggregate effectiveness (in terms of
the criteria discussed in Section13.2) of the landscape of climate
agreements and related institutions (Figure 13.1) can be enhanced
by coordinated linkages among multiple elements. The actual forms
and effects of policy linkages, existing or future, must be evaluated in
each context. Policy linkages across the landscape of agreements on
climate change might take several forms, such as mandated action
and reporting by subsidiary bodies, agreed links between institutions
(e. g., memoranda of understanding), loose coordination, informa-
tion sharing, and delegation. The literature on transnational gover-
nance acknowledges a gap in that “interactions are understudied in
all areas of transnational governance” (Weischer etal., 2012). Some
characteristics of potential linkages may stimulate their formation,
for example, competition among public and private governance
regimes (Helfer and Austin, 2011), accountability (Bäckstrand, 2008;
Ballesteros et al., 2010), learning (Kolstad and Ulph, 2008), and
experimentation. Related literatures suggest that other important
characteristics of linkages across regime components may be reci-
procity (Saran, 2010), relationships of conflict or interpretation (ILC,
2006), collaboration (Young, 2011), the catalytic role of the UNFCCC
(UNFCCC, 2007a), NGOs as norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sik-
kink, 1998), evaluation of policy approaches (Stewart and Wiener,
2003; Greenstone, 2009), and delegation to other institutions (Green,
2008).
13.6 Linkages between
international and
regional cooperation
13�6�1 Linkages with the European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme
Due to the scale effects that occur when carbon markets are enlarged,
market-based mechanisms may be an important means of regional
policy integration. The largest carbon market is the EU ETS, which
began operating in 2005, and now includes all 28 European Union
member states and is linked with the Norwegian system. The EU ETS is
described and evaluated in detail in Section 14.4.2.1.
The EU ETS interacts with international carbon markets through the
project-based Kyoto mechanisms. Import of units through international
emissions trading is not allowed, but companies covered by the EU
ETS can import CDMs and JI credits. A relatively liberal import regime
for the pilot phase was established in a ‘Linking Directive’ approved
in 2004 (Flåm, 2009). Forestry credits were banned and additional
criteria for large hydropower projects were set. For the EU ETS’s sec-
ond phrase, which corresponded to the Kyoto Protocol’s first com-
mitment period, 2008 – 2012, countries proposed import thresholds;
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several proposals were adjusted downwards by the Commission. For
the third phase, 2013 – 2020, imports were limited to credits from CDM
projects registered before 2013 in the absence of an international cli-
mate change agreement. New (2013 inception or later) CDM projects
can only be used in the EU ETS if located in least developed countries
(LDCs) (Skjærseth, 2010; Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2010). However,
CDM credits from new projects in non-LDCs can be accepted after
2013 if the EU has concluded a bilateral agreement with the country in
question regulating their level of use.
The European Union could potentially link the EU ETS to other schemes,
and legislation for the period until 2020 allows negotiation of such
bilateral treaties. The EU and Australia have already agreed to a one-
way indirect link to commence on 1 July 2015, meaning that EU credits
will be allowed for compliance under the Australia system (European
Commission, 2012). This agreement will transition to a two-way direct
link by no later than 1 July 2018, provided that the Australian system
goes forward.
13�6�2 Linkages with other regional policies
The Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate,
which was time-limited and has now concluded, involved about
50 % of the world population, GHG emissions, and world economic
output (Kelly, 2007). The partnership included countries that had
not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and while it was ‘soft’ in terms of
legal bindingness, it may have had a modest impact on governance
(Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and van Asselt, 2009; McGee and Taplin, 2009)
and encouraged voluntary action (Heggelund and Buan, 2009). After
the end of the Partnership, the Global Superior Energy Performance
Partnership (GSEP) Clean Energy Ministerial took over some of the
Partnership’s activities.
In addition to coordination by international organizations, such as
ICLEI — Local Governments for Sustainability, voluntary mitigation
action of cities is taking a regional / global character (Kern and Bulke-
ley, 2009). In Europe, the Climate Alliance has about 1700 member
cities from a number of countries. The Climate Alliance has supported
rainforest conservation projects in the Amazon region (Climate Alli-
ance, 2013).
13.7 Linkages between
international and
national policies
As the landscape of multilateral and other international agreements
on climate has become more complex, the interactions between inter-
national and national levels have become more varied.
13�7�1 Influence of international climate
policies on domestic action
International policy may trigger more ambitious national policies. Trea-
ties provide greater certainty that others will act, thus addressing key
concerns that countries will free ride. International climate policy can
shape domestic climate discourse, even if it may not be the main inspi-
ration for proactive action (Tompkins and Amundsen, 2008).
National policies also affect the effectiveness of international poli-
cies. The implementation of international policy is affected by national
political structure. Examples of studies on how varying domestic
political structures affect the implementation of international policies
include studies in: Italy (Massetti etal., 2007), France (Mathy, 2007),
Canada (Harrison, 2008), China (Teng and Gu, 2007), the UK (Barry
and Paterson, 2004; Compston and Bailey, 2008) and the Netherlands
(Gupta etal., 2007). National and sub-national settings, where actions
may be less risky or more politically feasible, may also provide useful
‘laboratories’ to test policy instruments before implementation at the
international level (Michaelowa etal., 2005; Moncel etal., 2011; Zelli,
2011).
13�7�2 Linkages between the Kyoto
mechanisms and national policies
Linking national policies with international policies may provide flex-
ibility by allowing a group of parties to meet obligations in the aggre-
gate. The Kyoto Protocol (Article 4) provides for such inter-regional
flexibility, and the European Union has taken advantage of the Proto-
col’s provision through its internal burden sharing decision. This deci-
sion allowed the EU’s Kyoto commitment of an 8 % emissions reduc-
tion below 1990 for the 2008 – 2012 period to be redistributed among
EU-15 member states; commitments of these states range from – 28 %
(Luxembourg) to +27 % (Portugal) (Michaelowa and Betz, 2001;
Hunter etal., 2011).
Use of the CDM and JI Kyoto mechanisms has been driven by national
mitigation policies to achieve developed countries’ emissions commit-
ments. While governments of some developed countries buy emissions
credits directly, others introduce instruments with emissions commit-
ments for private companies, like the EU ETS; some countries, such as
Denmark, have done both. These companies can then use emissions
credits generated under the Kyoto Protocol to satisfy part of their com-
mitments (Michaelowa and Buen, 2012). Another example is Japan’s
Industry Voluntary Action Plan that includes diverse sectors, each of
which has its own target set either in absolute terms, in emissions´
intensity, or in terms of energy consumption (Mitsutsune, 2012).
Many industrialized countries limit imports of credits generated by the
Kyoto mechanisms for various reasons; two have been posited in the
literature: (1) to keep the domestic carbon price high to induce techno-
logical diffusion and possibly innovation; and (2) to avoid diminishing
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environmental effectiveness by allowing required emissions-reduction
to occur in other jurisdictions because of concerns about the quality
of credits (‘additionality’). For example, the European Union has pro-
hibited the import of Assigned Amount Units (AAU) into the EU-ETS to
prevent the use of surplus units from countries in transition, colloqui-
ally called ‘hot air’ (Michaelowa and Buen, 2012). Japanese companies
have used AAUs from Green Investment Schemes for meeting their
targets (Tuerk etal., 2010). In 2011, credits from certain CDM project
types were banned for use in the EU-ETS from 2013 onwards (Schnei-
der, 2011). The ban includes CERs generated from projects involving
destruction of trifluoromethane (HFC-23) and nitrous oxide (N
2
O) from
adipic acid production.
The Kyoto mechanisms also interact with the national policies of coun-
tries in which projects are implemented. However, the CDM Execu-
tive Board decided that the effects of new policies implemented in
host countries that reduce emissions should not be considered when
assessing the additionality of new projects to avoid perverse incentives
not to adopt mitigation policies (Winkler, 2004; Michaelowa, 2010).
Instead, countries may subsidize renewable energy while generating
CDM credits. There are indications that the availability of CDM credits
has accelerated the introduction of feed-in tariffs in China (Schroeder,
2009). Freeing emission units for sale under international emissions
trading requires national mitigation policies unless there is a surplus
of units in a business-as-usual situation, as in countries in transition
(Böhringer etal., 2007).
Investment law, defined through private international law and more
than 3000 multilateral and bilateral investment treaties (UNCTAD,
2013), applies to the CDM and emissions trading contracts. Proposed
standardized contracts link the CDM to investment law by covering the
choice of language and the process and forum for dispute resolution.
These contracts could expose contractors to the costs associated with
international arbitration (Gupta, 2008; Klijn etal., 2009).
13�7�3 International linkage among regional,
national, and sub-national policies
International linkages can be established among regional, national, or
sub-national policies. These can be direct or indirect. Under direct
linkage, the same units are valid throughout the linked systems.
Under indirect linkage, a unit in a certified emission reduction credit
system is accepted by multiple systems. Figure 13.4 shows sub-
national, national, and regional GHG cap-and-trade schemes and
existing and planned linkages between them. The only formal direct
linkage between two trading schemes is that arranged between the
Australian ETS and the EU ETS, which was officially announced in
August 2012. A strong indirect linkage between carbon markets
exists through the CDM, whose credits are accepted under the EU-
ETS, the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism, and the New Zealand
ETS. Nazifi (2010) finds that EU demand has driven the price for CDM
credits.
Review of unilateral and bilateral direct linkages demonstrates that
bilateral direct linkage reduces mitigation costs, increases credibility
of the price signal, and expands market size and liquidity (Anger, 2008;
Flachsland etal., 2009; Jaffe etal., 2009; Dellink etal., 2010; Cason
and Gangadharan, 2011; Lanzi etal., 2012). However, direct linkage
also raises a variety of concerns (Jaffe et al., 2009), including that
linking can lead to a dilution of mitigation achieved through trading
schemes, as linked systems are only as environmentally effective as the
weakest among them (e. g., the one that allows imports of offsets with
the lowest standards). Grubb (2009) also warns that countries may be
unwilling to accept an increase of carbon prices that would result from
linking with a more ambitious system.Tuerk etal. (2009) see the big-
gest challenges to linking in differential stringencies of targets in each
system, varying degrees of enforcement, differences in eligible project-
based credits, and the existence of cost-containment measures, such as
price ceilings. Haites and Mehling (2009) highlight that only bilateral
links (or reciprocal unilateral links) yield the full benefits of linkage.
Bilateral links often face lengthy adoption procedures as well as legal
and procedural constraints, whereas reciprocal unilateral links, possibly
framed by an informal agreement, are often easier to implement and
provide more flexibility for almost the same benefits.
Also attractive are indirect linkages among regional, national, or sub-
national cap-and-trade systems, an approach that maintains the ben-
efits of linkage without much of the downside. Such indirect linkages
achieve cost savings and avoid risk diversification without the need
for deliberative harmonization of emerging and existing cap-and-
trade systems. Indirect linkage is attractive because de facto linkages
limit potential distributional concerns and preserve a high degree of
national control over allowance markets (Jaffe etal., 2009).
In addition, both direct and indirect linkages can occur among het-
erogeneous regional, national, and sub-national policy instruments
(Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012). Some such linking would be relatively
straightforward, such as forming a link between a cap-and-trade sys-
tem and a carbon tax. Other links would be more challenging, such
as between a cap-and-trade system and a quantity standard. Others
would be even more difficult, such as between a cap-and-trade sys-
tem and a technology mandate, and some linkages between hetero-
geneous policy instruments would simply not be possible (Metcalf and
Weisbach, 2012).
13.8 Interactions between
climate change mitigation
policy and trade
Research on interactions between climate change mitigation policy
and trade indicates a diversity of compatibilities, synergies, conflicts,
and cooperative arrangements (Brewer, 2003, 2004, 2010; Cosbey,
Figure 13�4 | Cap-and-trade schemes with existing and planned linkages. Linkage through proposed acceptance of offsets and Joint Implementation projects not displayed. In
some cases, countries otherwise eligible to host CDM projects must first establish a Designated National Authority. Accurate as of March 2014.
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2007; ICTSD, 2008; Cottier etal., 2009; Epps and Green, 2010; Rao,
2012; Leal-Arcas, 2013). Consideration of these and other issues and
options needs to take into account the context of the provisions of
the principal existing multilateral climate change framework (Yamin
and Depledge, 2004) and multilateral trade framework (Hoekman
and Kostecki, 2009). Negotiators acknowledged the opportuni-
ties for international cooperation on interactions between climate
change and trade in both the UNFCCC (1992) and in a Ministerial
Decision at the time of the negotiations of the Marrakech Agreement
establishing the WTO (1994). But there is also a potential for con-
flict between climate and trade issues. According to Article 3.5 of the
UNFCCC, “Measures taken to combat climate change, including uni-
lateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”.
The Kyoto Protocol notes in Article2.3 that AnnexI Parties “shall
strive to implement policies and measures under this Article in such
a way as to minimize adverse effects, including … effects on inter-
national trade.”
Trade and climate policy interact at many levels (Copeland and Taylor,
2005; Tamiotti etal., 2009; UNEP, 2009; UNCTAD, 2010; World Bank,
2010). For instance, on the one hand, according to Peters and Hertwich
(2008), “almost one-quarter of carbon dioxide released to the atmo-
sphere is emitted in the production of internationally traded goods
and services” (see also Peters etal., 2011). Transportation associated
with trade is another related issue (Conca, 2000). On the other hand,
various climate change policies currently in place affect the relative
prices of goods and services, which thereby affect trade flows and the
total volume of traded goods (Whalley, 2011). Moreover, trade barri-
ers and obligations regarding intellectual property (IP) rights of ‘green
technology’ as well as many other WTO obligations impinge on climate
policy (Thomas, 2004; Khor, 2010a; Johnson and Brewster, 2013). Victor
(1995) suggested that lessons from the trade regime could be used in
the development of the climate regime, but comparative governance
studies of the trade and climate regimes have not been thoroughly uti-
lized to gain insights into how the two regimes might address trade-
climate interactions (Bell etal., 2012 an exception).
environmental effectiveness by allowing required emissions-reduction
to occur in other jurisdictions because of concerns about the quality
of credits (‘additionality’). For example, the European Union has pro-
hibited the import of Assigned Amount Units (AAU) into the EU-ETS to
prevent the use of surplus units from countries in transition, colloqui-
ally called ‘hot air’ (Michaelowa and Buen, 2012). Japanese companies
have used AAUs from Green Investment Schemes for meeting their
targets (Tuerk etal., 2010). In 2011, credits from certain CDM project
types were banned for use in the EU-ETS from 2013 onwards (Schnei-
der, 2011). The ban includes CERs generated from projects involving
destruction of trifluoromethane (HFC-23) and nitrous oxide (N
2
O) from
adipic acid production.
The Kyoto mechanisms also interact with the national policies of coun-
tries in which projects are implemented. However, the CDM Execu-
tive Board decided that the effects of new policies implemented in
host countries that reduce emissions should not be considered when
assessing the additionality of new projects to avoid perverse incentives
not to adopt mitigation policies (Winkler, 2004; Michaelowa, 2010).
Instead, countries may subsidize renewable energy while generating
CDM credits. There are indications that the availability of CDM credits
has accelerated the introduction of feed-in tariffs in China (Schroeder,
2009). Freeing emission units for sale under international emissions
trading requires national mitigation policies unless there is a surplus
of units in a business-as-usual situation, as in countries in transition
(Böhringer etal., 2007).
Investment law, defined through private international law and more
than 3000 multilateral and bilateral investment treaties (UNCTAD,
2013), applies to the CDM and emissions trading contracts. Proposed
standardized contracts link the CDM to investment law by covering the
choice of language and the process and forum for dispute resolution.
These contracts could expose contractors to the costs associated with
international arbitration (Gupta, 2008; Klijn etal., 2009).
13�7�3 International linkage among regional,
national, and sub-national policies
International linkages can be established among regional, national, or
sub-national policies. These can be direct or indirect. Under direct
linkage, the same units are valid throughout the linked systems.
Under indirect linkage, a unit in a certified emission reduction credit
system is accepted by multiple systems. Figure 13.4 shows sub-
national, national, and regional GHG cap-and-trade schemes and
existing and planned linkages between them. The only formal direct
linkage between two trading schemes is that arranged between the
Australian ETS and the EU ETS, which was officially announced in
August 2012. A strong indirect linkage between carbon markets
exists through the CDM, whose credits are accepted under the EU-
ETS, the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism, and the New Zealand
ETS. Nazifi (2010) finds that EU demand has driven the price for CDM
credits.
Figure 13�4 | Cap-and-trade schemes with existing and planned linkages. Linkage through proposed acceptance of offsets and Joint Implementation projects not displayed. In
some cases, countries otherwise eligible to host CDM projects must first establish a Designated National Authority. Accurate as of March 2014.
Not Party to the Kyoto Protocol (KP);
withdrew from KP; KP Annex B Parties
without commitments in 2nd CP.
No CDM projects.
KP Annex B Parties with commitments
in 2nd CP, and Annex I countries that
are non-Annex B. No CDM projects.
Eligible for CDM projects, Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) under the
Japanese Bilateral Mechanism.
CDM projects accepted in the EU, MOU
under the Japanese Bilateral Mechanism.
Eligible for CDM projects.
CDM projects accepted in the EU.
NZ ETS
Korea
2015
Tokyo
Australia
ETS 2014
Kazakh
ETS
EU ETS
Québec
RGGI
California
National ETS with Implementation Scheduled
Sub-National ETS Implementation Scheduled
Regional/National ETS in Operation
Sub-National ETS in Operation
Domestic Offsets
Accepts CDM Credits
Proposed Links
Beginning 2014
Planned 2015
Guangdong and Hubei
Provinces; Beijing, Shanghai,
Shenzhen and Tianjin
Chongqing
Swiss
ETS
China
pilot ETSs
LDC CDM
Credits Only
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The production of internationally traded goods gives rise to a ‘label-
ling’ issue, a problem for accounting purposes and also for possible
policy intervention. The issue arises because a proportion of a country’s
GHG emissions resulting from the production of goods and services in
one country may be ‘embedded’ in traded products that are consumed
in other countries. At issue is whether to attribute the emissions to the
producing (exporting) country or consuming (importing) country (Kai-
numa etal., 2000; Peters and Hertwich, 2008) (see also Sections 5.4.1
and 14.3.4.2). There is an ethical and equity issue about how to define
climate responsibility and allocate climate mitigation costs (discussed
in detail in Sections 3.3, 4.1, and 4.2). There is also a political and
economic issue whether climate policy instruments ought to address
production- or consumption-induced GHGs (Droege, 2011a, b; see also
Section 14.3.4). Finally, there is a technical issue as territorial measure-
ment is the current GHG accounting practice under the UNFCCC, and
switching to consumption-induced measurement may be technically
more difficult (Droege, 2011a; b; Peters etal., 2011; Caldeira and Davis,
2011).
There are significant differences among researchers and policymakers
in their perspectives on the relationship between climate change and
trade. These differences include fundamental empirical assumptions
and policy preferences concerning the roles of markets and govern-
ments (Bhagwati, 2009), specifically concerning whether government
measures are required to address market failures that produce cli-
mate change (Stern, 2007), or government regulations tend to create
inefficiencies and distort trade (Krugman, 1979; Rodrik, 2011). Trade
measures (e. g., trade sanctions, trade enticements, and trade-rele-
vant domestic product standards; see Section 13.8.1 below) could be
used to address free-rider problems of international agreements, spe-
cifically participation and / or compliance problems (Victor, 2010), and
some (e. g., Victor, 2011) suggest these may be useful in achieving an
effective climate agreement. However, there are also some who con-
clude that trade measures are an inappropriate tool to pursue climate
change policy objectives, pointing to the possibility of ‘green protec-
tionism’ (Khor, 2010a; Johnson and Brewster, 2013). The potential use
of trade measures to enhance participation and / or compliance poses
major institutional design questions (see Section 13.4).
13�8�1 WTO-related issues
A central issue for WTO members is whether policies are consistent
with principles of non-discrimination. Most Favoured Nation Treatment
prohibits favourable treatment of the goods, services, or corporations
of any one member as compared with other members, while National
Treatment prohibits less favourable treatment of foreign relative to
domestic goods, services or corporations. Of the more than 60 WTO
agreements that apply these principles, many are pertinent to climate
change, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement
on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the Agreement on Trade Related
Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing (DSU), as well as agreements on subsidies, government procure-
ment, and agriculture (Brewer, 2003, 2004, 2010; Cottier etal., 2009;
Hufbauer etal., 2009; Epps and Green, 2010). Studies have suggested
that ETSs can be designed to be compatible with WTO obligations
(Werksman, 1999; Petsonk, 1999).
Trade issues concerning CDM projects have received special attention
(Werksman etal., 2001; Rechsteiner et al., 2009; Werksman, 2009).
Although no trade or investment disputes have arisen yet in connec-
tion with CDM projects, there is the possibility that they will in the
future as the number and economic significance of CDM projects con-
tinues to increase. Significant attention has also been given to product
labelling and standards issues that can arise in relation to the WTO
Agreement on TBT (Appleton, 2009), which could be pertinent to the
use of labels concerning ‘food miles’ (ICTSD, 2007; World Bank, 2010).
Although long-distance air transport of agricultural products itself is
GHG-intensive, the agricultural practices of many exporting countries
are less GHG-intensive than those of the importing countries, and
determining the relative GHG emissions levels of imported versus
domestic products thus requires complete lifecycle analyses of individ-
ual products and specific pairs of exporting-importing countries.
Government procurement policies that entail buy-local practices con-
cerning climate-friendly goods and services have emerged as an issue
under the principle of non-discrimination in the context of national
economic stimulus programmes. The applicability of the WTO Agree-
ment on Government Procurement to such trade issues is limited
because many countries have not agreed to it; among those that have,
there are many government agencies whose programmes are not cov-
ered (van Asselt etal., 2006; Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009; Malumfashi,
2009; van Calster, 2009).
Government subsidies for renewable energy and energy-efficiency
goods and services have also become issues in relation to the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, as well as the
TRIMs agreement. Such issues have prompted WTO dispute cases,
including one involving subsidies for producers of wind turbines (WTO,
2010) and another involving feed-in tariffs (WTO, 2011). The applica-
tion of WTO subsidy rules could slow the development and diffusion
of climate-friendly technologies, but it is not yet clear whether this
has or will have an effect (see Bigdeli, 2009; Howse and Eliason, 2009;
Howse, 2010 on subsidy issues).
There are WTO-related issues related to tariffs and non-tariff barriers
resulting from climate change policy. In general, non-tariff barriers
tend to be more important barriers than tariffs at the climate-trade
interface, but tariffs are still high in some industries and countries
(Steenblik, 2006; World Bank, 2008a). Countries may seek to limit
competitive disadvantage introduced by domestic climate policy by
raising tariffs and introducing non-tariff barriers that restrict imports,
or by other BAMs. One example of a BAM would be a country that
has imposed a domestic carbon tax also (1) imposing the carbon tax
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on imported goods and services at a rate proportional to the emis-
sions associated with their production and (2) offering reimburse-
ment to domestic exporters who sell a good or service outside of
the jurisdiction of the carbon tax (Wooders etal., 2009; Elliott etal.,
2010; Monjon and Quirion, 2011). Barriers to transfers of technolo-
gies identified by IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources
and Climate Change Mitigation (IPCC, 2011) as potential contribu-
tors to climate change mitigation have been issues in the on-going
WTO Doha Round negotiations (Tamiotti etal., 2009). Domestic sub-
sidies such as those for biofuels have also been at issue in the Doha
Round.
Border adjustment measures to offset international differences in
costs — and thus possible international leakage (see Section 5.4.1)
arising from international differences in mitigation policy — have
become one of the most contentious and researched points of inter-
action (Babiker, 2005; de Cendra, 2006; Cosbey and Tarasofsky, 2007;
Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007; Genasci, 2008; Frankel, 2008; Tamiotti and
Kulacoglu, 2009; O’Brien, 2009; van Asselt and Brewer, 2010; Tamiotti,
2011; Zhang, 2012). This issue draws particular attention to differences
between production-based and consumption-based emissions in both
developed and developing countries (Figure 1.5 in Chapter 1). BAMs
include policy options ranging from: (1) tariffs on imports or subsidies
on exports based on the amount of GHGs released in their produc-
tion to (2) ‘compensatory measures,’ as for instance the free-allocation
emission permits in the EU ETS or export rebates to energy-intensive
sectors. Theoretical arguments in favour of BAMs can be grouped into
three classes, each discussed below: the reduction of economic inef-
ficiencies in the context of an externality, the reduction of carbon leak-
age, and increasing participation and compliance in a climate agree-
ment.
The economic research on BAMs stresses that the inclusion of more
countries in climate policy, e. g., by linking permit trading schemes and
including more sectors and countries, reduces economic inefficiencies
relative to unilateral BAMs. While, BAMs can enhance the competitive-
ness of GHG- and trade-intensive industries within a given climate
regime (Kuik and Hofkes, 2010; Böhringer etal., 2012a; Balistreri and
Rutherford, 2012; Lanzi etal., 2012), welfare effects may be negative
for consumers and countries facing BAMs on their exports. Overall
welfare effects accounting for externalities are mainly perceived to be
positive at an abstract theoretical level (Gros and Egenhofer, 2011);
the evidence is more blurred at an empirical level and is sensitive to
assumptions (The Carbon Trust, 2010; Fischer and Fox, 2012; Lanzi
etal., 2012). Export rebates, the exclusion of energy and CO
2
-intensive
industries from regulation, or the free-allocation of permits to these
industries are recognized as causing efficiency losses (Lanzi et al.,
2012). Most empirical studies also do not confirm a need at the macro-
economic level for BAMs in the first place: they tend to find that cli-
mate policy is not a significant trade issue at the macro-economic level
of national economies, though there are competitiveness and leakage
issues for a few industries which are both GHG-intensive and trade-
intensive. They hold that the main channel of impact of climate policies
is through world energy prices and not through manufactured goods
(Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006; Houser etal., 2008; Aldy and Pizer, 2009;
The Carbon Trust, 2010).
The economic modelling literature on the effectiveness of BAMs to
reduce carbon leakage finds that carbon leakage rates tend to decline
by 2 – 12 % following the introduction of a border adjustment tax
(Böhringer etal., 2012a). The political literature on the appropriateness
of using BAMs to address carbon leakage, on the other hand, tends to
be divided into two perspectives. Developed countries and / or countries
with some form of mitigation policy either already in place or consider-
ing this for the future argue that BAMs are necessary to avoid carbon
controls driving production abroad. Arguments along this line have
emerged in the European Union and the United States for instance (see
Veel, 2009; The Carbon Trust, 2010; Fischer and Fox, 2012). Developing
countries tend to oppose BAMs, as many are concerned about nega-
tive welfare effects for their countries and what they see as a violation
of the principle of CBDRRC as agreed under the UNFCCC (Khor, 2010a;
Droege, 2011a; Scott and Rajamani, 2012). Nevertheless, the technical
difficulties of measuring production-induced or consumption-induced
GHG emissions are significant (Droege, 2011a)
, and addressing them
may be associated with high administrative costs, possibly outweigh-
ing the potential benefits (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2009).
Participation and compliance in climate agreements might be
enhanced by BAMs. However, conceptual thinking on the question
does not reveal a consensus, and direct evidence on the point is insuf-
ficient to reach definitive conclusions (see Barrett, 2003, 2009, 2010;
Victor, 2010, 2011). Because BAMs affect the distribution of abatment
costs across countires, enacting a BAM could result in welfare loss,
particularly for exporting developing countries, and even retaliatory
countermeasures (de Cendra, 2006; Mattoo et al., 2009; Böhringer
etal., 2012b; Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012). For more discussion on
the topic, see Section 13.3.3 on participation and Section 13.3.4 on
compliance.
From the research on legal issues related to BAMs, four major con-
clusions emerge. First, BAMs may clash with WTO obligations, a point
which is emphasized by many observers (Wooders etal., 2009; Con-
don, 2009; ICTSD, 2009; Holzer, 2010, 2011; Tamiotti, 2011; Du, 2011).
Second, it is possible to design BAMs to be compatible with these obli-
gations, according to other observers (Condon, 2009; Droege, 2011a;
b), particularly when BAMs are targeted to countries based on their
production technology efficiency (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007). Third,
WTO obligations and their legal interpretation have evolved over time,
allowing for the possibility to bring trade and climate policy goals
more in line in the future (Kelemen, 2001; Neumayer, 2004). Finally, the
use of BAMs for climate change purposes may be politically controver-
sial (Khor, 2010a).
A final WTO-related issue concerns the distinction between prod-
ucts and ‘process and production methods’ (PPMs). The legal notion
of PPMs, as applied in the WTO, can be based on several aspects of
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production processes and can have a variety of effects on climate
change-related policies. (For extensive discussions of the technical
legal issues and their relevance to climate change issues see Cottier
etal., 2009).
13�8�2 Other international venues
Two GHG-emitting industries that are centrally involved in interna-
tional trade as modes of transportation are covered by separate inter-
national agreements outside the WTO system (see also Chapter 8).
International aviation issues are covered by the Chicago Convention
and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), while inter-
national maritime shipping issues have been addressed by the IMO
(see Section 13.13.1.4 for performance assessments of the ICAO and
IMO).
There has been increasing interest in recent years in both ICAO and
IMO in industry practices concerning GHG emissions, with some efforts
at international cooperation to address them. However, there has been
international conflict about the European Union’s inclusion of inter-
national aviation within the EU ETS. The Kyoto Protocol in Article 2.2
recognized ICAO as the venue for negotiations on matters concerning
international aviation emissions, but in the absence of what was seen
in the EU as adequate progress in the ICAO, the EU decided to include
aviation in the EU ETS. This unilateral decision prompted strong reac-
tions (Mueller, 2012; Scott and Rajamani, 2012), and flights in and out
of the EU were temporarily exempted in April 2013 through the ICAO
General Assembly scheduled for September-October 2013. Among
the concerns expressed about the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS
has been the assertion that it represents a violation of the principle
of CBDRRC of the UNFCCC (Scott and Rajamani, 2012; Ireland, 2012),
though this concern only applies to developing countries. There are also
legal issues about the relationship of the EU ETS to the Chicago Con-
vention, which has traditionally been the international legal basis for
aviation policies. Though studies indicate that the economic impacts of
the EU ETS provisions are small relative to other airline expenses and
ticket prices and that much of the cost can be passed on to consumers
(Scheelhaase and Grimme, 2007; Anger and Köhler, 2010), political and
legal issues have nevertheless made international cooperation difficult.
The IMO (2009) concluded that a significant potential for CO
2
reduc-
tion exists through technical and operational measures, many of which
appear to be cost-effective; the IMO adopted an energy efficiency
design index (International Maritime Organization (IMO), 2011). A link
of carbon controls of aviation and shipping to the EU ETS and / or a pos-
sible U. S. ETS is suggested by Haites (2009) with the view that carbon
offsets under the CDM could also be used.
There are other international institutional contexts within which cli-
mate change-trade interaction issues have been addressed, namely,
the World Bank, G8, G20, IEA, MEF, and OECD (Section 13.5).
13�8�3 Implications for policy options
In terms of WTO and / or UNFCCC involvement, there are logically four
possible sets of options for institutional architectures at the multi-
lateral level for addressing climate change-trade interactions: WTO-
based, UNFCCC-based, joint UNFCCC-WTO, and stand-alone. In addi-
tion, there could be hybrid arrangements involving combinations of
these four types. For instance, proposals for Sustainable Energy Trade
Agreements (SETAs) could be addressed in a variety of venues (ICTSD,
2011).
Of the four options, WTO-based architectures have received the most
attention in the literature. Alternatives include making revisions in
existing WTO arrangements or undertaking new arrangements (Epps
and Green, 2010). Possible changes in existing WTO arrangements
include a ‘peace clause’ (Hufbauer etal., 2009) or waiver agreement
(Howse and Eliason, 2009; Howse, 2010), whereby WTO members
would agree — within some limits — not to challenge on WTO grounds,
respectively, climate policies in general or climate-related subsidies in
particular. An extensive list of other possible changes to existing WTO
arrangements has been discussed by Epps and Green (2010), whose
suggestions include: change GATT Article XX (which allows exceptions
to members’ obligations, including measures for the ‘conservation of
exhaustible natural resources’) so that climate measures are explic-
itly identified as qualifying for exceptional treatment; add a similar
provision to the Subsidies Agreement; change the burden of proof or
standard of review for the scientific evidence presented in climate
change cases to Dispute Settlement panels; change Dispute Appellate
Body rules to take into account the scientific uncertainties in climate
change cases; establish a notification process for members to inform
other members of the adoption of climate policies with trade implica-
tions; and establish a Climate Change Committee, which could facili-
tate conflict resolution without resorting to the Dispute Resolution
process.
Many possibilities for a new Climate Change Agreement at the WTO
have also been discussed by (Epps and Green, 2010). The elements of
such an agreement could include: establishment of a Climate Change
Committee (as above); establishment of a notification procedure for
climate change measures (as above); establishment of climate change
mitigation as a legitimate objective; development of a ‘non-aggression
clause’ that would prohibit unilateral actions, such as BAMs; adoption
of transparency requirements for national climate change policymaking
processes to determine their legitimacy in relation to climate change
concerns and protect against disguised trade protectionism; adoption
of environmental rationales for subsidies; reviews of members’ trade-
related climate measures to insure that they are substantive responses
to climate issues; and clarification of the potential application of PPMs
questions to climate change disputes. Although these ideas have been
mentioned in the literature, they have not been formulated as specific
proposals to the WTO.
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UNFCCC-based options have been discussed in the literature (Werks-
man etal., 2009) relating to the possible creation of a ‘level’ playing
field, such as through border charges on imports, or border rebates for
exports, though views differ greatly, as indicated above in the discus-
sion of BAMs.
A potential joint UNFCCC-WTO agreement has not yet received much
attention in the published literature (Epps and Green, 2010). However,
there are already in effect arrangements whereby the UNFCCC sec-
retariat is an observer in meetings of the WTO Committee on Trade
and Environment (CTE) and is invited on an ad hoc basis to meet-
ings of the Committee overseeing the specific trade and environment
negotiations (CTESS) (Cossey and Marceau, 2009). In addition, WTO
Secretariat staff members attend the annual UNFCCC COP meetings.
Finally, a stand-alone arrangement could be developed (Epps and
Green, 2010), a possibility that has not yet been analyzed in the pub-
lished literature.
There are numerous and diverse unexplored opportunities for greater
international cooperation in trade-climate policy interactions. While
mutually destructive conflicts between the two systems have thus far
been largely avoided, pre-emptive cooperation could protect against
such developments in the future. Whether such cooperative arrange-
ments can be most effectively devised within the existing institutional
architectures for trade and for climate change or through new archi-
tectures is an unsettled issue (Section 13.4).
13.9 Mechanisms for
technology and
knowledge development,
transfer, and diffusion
Technology-related policies could conceivably play a significant role in
an international climate regime (de Coninck etal., 2008). These poli-
cies have the potential to lower the cost of climate change mitigation
and increase the likelihood that countries will commit to reducing
their GHG emissions. By lowering the relative cost of more environ-
mentally sound technologies, technology policy can increase incen-
tives for countries to comply with international climate obligations
and could therefore play an important role in increasing the robust-
ness of long-run international frameworks (Barrett, 2003). Such poli-
cies might generate incentives for participation in international cli-
mate agreements by facilitating access to climate-change-mitigating
technologies or funding to cover the additional costs of such tech-
nologies.
The role of international cooperation in facilitating technological
change, including access to, facilitation of, and transfer of technol-
ogy, is explicitly recognized in Article 4(1)(c) and (h), 4(5), 4(7), 4(8),
and 4(9) of the UNFCCC. Article 4.5 states that “The developed coun-
try Parties and other developed Parties included in AnnexII shall take
all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate,
the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and
know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties….”
The performance of international institutional arrangements and the
adequacy of financing are subject to a variety of interpretations. (See
Section 14.3.6.2 for a discussion of the UNFCCC CTCN, and see Section
15.12 for a discussion of financial issues.)
Although international technology transfer issues for climate change
mitigation or adaptation have become concerns in numerous coun-
tries, these concerns have been especially acute in developing coun-
tries. Concerns over technology transfer in developing countries are
frequently embedded in broader capacity building, sustainable devel-
opment, and other equity issues (for discussions of the broader issues
of CBDRRC and equity, see respectively Sections 13.2.1.2 and 13.4.2.4,
and also Chapter 3 and Sections 4.1 and 4.2) (Brewer, 2008; GEA,
2012; Ockwell and Mallett, 2012).
Technology-oriented agreements could include activities across the
technology life cycle for knowledge sharing, coordinated or joint
research and development of climate-change-mitigating technolo-
gies, technology transfer, and technology deployment policies (such
as technology or performance standards and incentives for technol-
ogy development or adoption). International technology policy may
play an important role in improving the efficiency of existing research
and development (R&D) activities by increasing the international
exchange of scientific and technical knowledge and by reducing
duplicated R&D effort that could be shared across nations. (Newell,
2010a).
13�9�1 Modes of international incentive
schemes to encourage technology-
investment flows
Absent additional market failures, underinvestment in innovative activ-
ity relative to socially optimal levels can occur due to several well-
understood general properties of innovation (see Section 15.6). At a
global level, international carbon markets and the flexibility mecha-
nisms they may employ, such as international linkage of domestic
emission programmes, offsets, and the CDM, may be used to finance
emission reductions in developing countries and transferring technol-
ogy between nations and regions (see Section 13.13 and Haščič and
Johnstone, 2011). Clear rules for these markets and their associated
flexibility mechanisms may be established under international agree-
ments and domestic policies to aid the removal of unnecessary barriers
to technology transfer and to facilitate investment flows.
Because private-sector investments constitute more than 85 % of
global financial flows (UNFCCC, 2007b), international trade and for-
eign direct investment are the primary means by which new knowl-
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Chapter 13
edge and technology are transferred between countries (World Bank,
2008b). While domestic actions can improve the conditions to enable
technology transfer investments (e. g., through regulatory flexibility,
transparency, and stability), international actions can also contribute.
In particular, the literature has identified tariffs and non-tariff trade
barriers as impediments to energy technology transfer (World Bank,
2008b). An existing example is OECD regulation of export credits, with
specific conditions to foster technology transfer for climate change
mitigation (OECD, 2013).
In summary, national and supra-national policies that provide incen-
tives for climate change mitigation will likely play an essential role in
stimulating public investment, financial incentives, and regulations to
promote innovation in the necessary new technologies for mitigation
goals. Reducing fossil-fuel subsidies may have a similar effect (UNEP,
2008).
13�9�2 Intellectual property rights and
technology development and transfer
The strength of IP right protection, together with other conditions
related to the rule of law, regulatory transparency, and market open-
ness affect technology transfer rates (Newell, 2010a) (see also Sections
3.11 and 16.8).
The goal of IP protection is to foster both the development of new
technologies (innovation), and the diffusion of new technologies
across countries (technology transfer) and within countries (tech-
nology adoption). In theory, such protection achieves these ends by
increasing and / or maintaining the private economic incentive to create
and transfer technology. At the same time, protection of IP also works
to slow the diffusion of new technologies, because it raises their cost
and potentially limits their availability. To the extent that IP protection
raises the cost and limits the availability around the world of mitiga-
tion technologies, the potential for new technologies to reduce the
cost of mitigation will be hampered. Concern by developing countries
that IP protection for low-carbon technology will make climate action
excessively costly has been a contentious issue in the climate negotia-
tions (Government of India, 2013). On the other hand, IP protection
may encourage firms to innovate more than they otherwise would,
thus potentially increasing the supply and reducing the cost of new
technology.
In order to balance the possible incentive effects of IP protection
against the adverse impact of such protection on costs and availabil-
ity, it is important to assess the empirical significance of the incentive
effects, both with respect to innovation and technology diffusion. The
empirical evidence regarding the effect of IP policy on innovation is
discussed in Section 15.6.2.1.
Even if stronger IP protection does not foster creation and develop-
ment of new technologies, it may be beneficial for mitigation if it fos-
ters transfer of technologies from developed to less developed coun-
tries. Theoretically, strong IP protection in developing countries may
be necessary to limit the risk for foreign firms that transfer of their
technology will lead to imitation and resulting profit erosion. Look-
ing at technology transfer in general, empirical literature finds a role
for strong IP protection in receiving countries in facilitating technol-
ogy transfer from advanced countries through exports, foreign direct
investment (FDI), and licensing for transfers from the OECD (Maskus
and Penubarti, 1995); FDI to 16 countries originating in the United
States, Germany and Japan (Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Mansfield,
2000); and transfers from the United State (Smith, 1999). Regard-
ing recipients, Awokuse and Yin (2010) find evidence for transfers to
China, and Javorcik (2004) for FDI to 24 Eastern European transition
economies. Branstetter etal. (2006) assessed FDI to 16 middle-income
countries after those countries strengthened their IP protection and
found indicators for United States technology transfer increasing sub-
sequently.
The empirical evidence suggests that the effects of IP strength on tech-
nology licensing parallel those for FDI. The Branstetter et al. (2006)
results discussed above included royalty payments among the mea-
sures of technology transfer that increased after IP strengthening.
Smith (2001) finds that the association between strong IP and licenses
is stronger than the relationship between IP and exports. In general,
the evidence indicates a systematic impact of IP protection on technol-
ogy transfer through exports, FDI, and technology licensing for middle-
income countries for which the risk of imitation in the absence of such
protection is relatively high. It is unclear whether or not these effects
extend to the least developed countries whose absorptive capacity
and ability to appropriate foreign technology in the absence of strong
IP protections is less (Hall and Helmers, 2010). It is also important to
note that IP rules are but one of many factors affecting FDI decisions.
Others, particularly more general aspects of the legal and institutional
environment that affect the riskiness of investments, may be more sig-
nificant (Fosfuri, 2004).
Literature on the role of IP rights in the development of low-carbon
technologies remains limited (Reichman et al., 2008). For example,
Barton (2007) analyzes existing solar, wind, and biofuel technologies,
and Lewis (2007, 2011) and Pueuo etal. (2011) find that IP protection
has induced innovation in wind technologies without compromising
technology transfer. However, problems could arise if new, very broad
patents were granted that impede the development of future, more
efficient technologies (though even then, IP rights may provide flex-
ibility). Compulsory licensing has been proposed as a mechanism to
encourage technology transfer. Such an action would compensate a
patent holder while overcoming market power inhibitions on voluntary
licensing (Reichman and Hasenzahl, 2003). Despite short-run technol-
ogy transfer benefits, compulsory licensing of mitigation technologies
may not be desirable in the long-run, and current international law
may limit the circumstances under which compulsory licensing can be
used to achieve climate change mitigation objectives (Fair, 2009; Mai-
tra, 2010).
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In summary, there is inadequate evidence in the literature regarding
the impact of IP policy on transfer of GHG-mitigating technologies to
draw robust conclusions. If the experience from other technology sec-
tors is indicative, maintenance of effective protection of IP may be a
factor in determining the transfer of mitigation technology to middle-
income countries, although other aspects of the legal and institutional
environments are likely to be at least as important. There is little empir-
ical evidence that protection of IP rights is a major factor affecting
technology transfer to the least developed countries.
13�9�3 International collaboration to encourage
knowledge development
International cooperation on climate change mitigation has been linked
to technology transfer policy, as transferring knowledge and equip-
ment internationally, and ensuring that technologies are deployed in
appropriate national contexts, may require additional international
action (Newell, 2010a). International cooperation on climate-relevant
technology policy can include efforts to share technological knowl-
edge, collaborate or coordinate R&D, and directly facilitate and finance
technology transfer.
13�9�3�1 Knowledge sharing, R&D coordination, and joint
collaboration
International cooperation on knowledge-sharing and R&D coordina-
tion can include information exchange, coordinated or harmonized
research agendas, measurement and technology standards, and coor-
dinated or cooperative R&D (IEA, 2008; de Coninck etal., 2008; GEA,
2012). Examples of such existing forms of cooperation include the Car-
bon Sequestration Leadership Forum, the former Asia Pacific Partner-
ship on Clean Development and Climate, the U. S.-China Clean Energy
Research Center, and the International Partnership for a Hydrogen
Economy. Empirically, a higher degree of collaboration has been more
frequently observed in research areas of more fundamental science
without larger commercial interests (for example, the ITER fusion reac-
tor and the CERN supercollider) (de Coninck etal., 2008). In addition
to enhancing the cross-border flow of scientific and technical informa-
tion, joint R&D can increase the cost-effectiveness of R&D through
complementary expertise and reduced duplication of effort (Newell,
2010a).
The IEA has coordinated the development of more than 40 Imple-
menting Agreements. Under these agreements, IEA member countries
may engage either in task-sharing programmes pursued within par-
ticipating countries and funded by individual country contributions, or
in cost-sharing programmes funded by countries but performed by a
single contractor. All existing Implementing Agreements incorporate
some degree of task sharing while about half incorporate cost sharing
(Newell, 2010a).
13�9�3�2 International cooperation on domestic climate
technology R&D funding
Public sector investment in energy- and climate-related R&D has
decreased since the early 1980s, although there has been a relative
increase in recent years (Newell, 2010a, 2011). Newell (2010a), using
the precedent of European Union cooperation on setting R&D spending
goals, has proposed an international agreement that would increase
domestic R&D funding for climate technologies (either in absolute
terms, percentage increases from historic levels, or relative to GDP) in
an analogous fashion to internationally agreed emission targets. Also,
at a G8 meeting, in the context of a consideration of how to address
climate change, there was agreement to seek to double public invest-
ment in R&D between 2009 and 2015 (G8, 2009).See Torvanger and
Meadowcroft (2011) and Fischer etal. (2012) on issues in the design
and support of climate friendly technologies. International coordina-
tion of R&D portfolios may reduce the duplication of R&D effort, cover
a broader technological base, and enhance the exchange of informa-
tion gained through national-level R&D processes. This coordination
could cover the allocation of effort by government scientists and engi-
neers, the targeting of extramural research funding to specific projects,
and public-private partnerships. Engaging developing economies in
developing and deploying new technologies may require further tech-
nology development to meet the needs of domestic institutions and
norms.
Bringing newly developed technologies to full commercialization often
presents challenges, and for some technologies, such as carbon dioxide
capture and storage (CCS) (de Coninck etal., 2009), the private sector
may not have sufficient incentives to commercialize new technologies
in the absence of international cooperation. Since some of the eco-
nomic risk the private sector faces reflects uncertainty about the incen-
tives that future climate policies would create, governments may have
a role in financing technology demonstration projects (Newell, 2007).
The case for such demonstration projects may be stronger in develop-
ing and emerging economies, where incomplete capital markets may
undermine investment in commercializing these technologies.
13.10 Capacity building
Several articles in the UNFCCC (4.1(i), 4.5, 6 and 9.2(d)) and the Kyoto
Protocol (Article 10(e)) acknowledge the role of capacity building in
promoting collective action on climate change. While the texts give
special attention to building capacity in developing countries, they also
recognize a general need for all countries to improve policy, planning,
and education on climate issues.
A variety of public, private, and NGO initiatives have undertaken
capacity building efforts both within and outside of the UNFCCC,
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focusing primarily on three issues: (1) adaptation policy and planning;
(2) mitigation policy and planning; and (3) measurement, reporting,
and verification of mitigation actions. Capacity building efforts with
respect to technology transfer are addressed in Section 13.9. Section
4.6.1 considers adaptive capacity and mitigative capacity jointly as
dimensions of ‘response capacity’ and Section 15.10 considers capacity
building in a national context.
Capacity building for adaptation includes (i) risk management
approaches to address adverse effects of climate change, (ii) main-
tenance and revision of a database on local coping strategies, and
(iii) maintenance and revision of the adaptation practices interface
(Yohe, 2001; UNFCCC, 2009b). The process of preparing the National
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) for and by LDCs identifies
their most ‘urgent’ adaptation needs. However, capacity building for
adaptation is likely insufficient because the costs in such regards are
rarely estimated (Smith etal., 2011; see also WGII, 3.6.4). At the com-
munity level, adaptation projects require time and patience and can be
successful if they raise awareness, develop and use partnerships, com-
bine reactive and anticipatory approaches, and are in line with local
culture and context (Engels, 2008; Dumaru, 2010).
Capacity building for mitigation includes technical assistance and
policy planning support. In CDM, capacity building has focused
on the establishment of Designated National Authorities (DNAs),
the training of private and public personnel, and project support
(Michaelowa, 2005; Winkler et al., 2007; Okubo and Michaelowa,
2010). Efforts aimed at capacity building for NAMAs and REDD-plus
are expected (Bosetti and Rose, 2011). NAMAs are a potentially
important means of action by developing countries that emerged in
the negotiations under the Bali Roadmap (UNFCCC, 2007); and have
been assessed in the literature (Wang-Helmreich, etal., 2011; Upad-
hyaya,, 2012; Tyler etal., 2013). NAMAs are discussed in detail in
Section15.2.
Monitoring and evaluation activities are important to ensure effective
implementation of a capacity-building framework, helping to under-
stand gaps and needs in capacity building, share best practices, and
promote resource efficiency (UNFCCC, 2009c). There are few empirical
assessments of current capacity building approaches in relation to cli-
mate change (Virji etal., 2012).
13.11 Investment and finance
Since AR4, international cooperation on climate policy has increas-
ingly focused on mobilizing public and private investment and
finance for mitigation and adaptation activities. Such coopera-
tion has included the setup of market mechanisms to generate
private investment as well as public transfers through dedicated
institutions (Michaelowa, 2012b). The Copenhagen Accord of 2009
included a provision to jointly mobilize 100 billion USD per year by
2020 to address the needs of developing countries, in the context of
meaningful mitigation actions and transparency of implementation
(UNFCCC, 2009a). In order to reach this goal, the High-level Advisory
Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF) (AGF, 2010) identified four
potential sources of finance: public sources (funds mobilized under
the UNFCCC), development bank instruments, carbon market finance,
and private capital.
In the follow-up to the Copenhagen conference, the term ‘climate
finance’ has been coined for financial flows to developing countries,
but there exists no internationally agreed definition (Buchner etal.,
2011). Stadelmann etal. (2011b) provide a discussion of what could
be counted and how the baseline for international climate finance
could be set to provide ‘new and additional’ funds. See Section 16.2.2
for a description of the potential financing need and Section 16.5 for
a description of possible public funding sources.
13�11�1 Public finance flows
13�11�1�1 Public funding vehicles under the UNFCCC
The largest share of UNFCCC-organized climate finance goes to miti-
gation: Abadie etal. (2013) provide reasons for this, such as the dif-
ferences between mitigation and adaptation regarding public good
characteristics and the lack of information regarding context-specific
climate impacts. The UNFCCC mobilizes financial flows to developing
countries and countries in transition through four primary vehicles: (1)
the GEF, which focuses on mitigation (GEF, 2011); (2) the LDCF and
SCCF, which focus on adaptation; (3) the Adaptation Fund, which also
focuses on adaptation; and (4) the GCF, which will focus on both miti-
gation and adaptation when it becomes operational. The GEF is the
secretariat for all funds other than the GCF. This section reviews the
literature on these four mechanisms (see also Section 16.5; UNFCCC,
2012a).
The Adaptation Fund is financed through a 2 % in-kind levy on emis-
sions credits generated by CDM projects, though parties to the Kyoto
Protocol have contributed additional funding (Liverman and Billett,
2010; Horstmann, 2011; Ratajczak-Juszko, 2012). All other UNFCCC
funding vehicles are based on voluntary government contributions
that can be counted as official development assistance. Ayers and
Huq (2009) maintain that the Adaptation Fund’s governance struc-
ture avoids many of the issues of ownership and accountability faced
by other funds. Harmeling and Kaloga (2011) examine the influence
of competing interests on funding decisions by the Adaptation Fund
Board. Under the Fund, Multilateral Implementing Entities (MIEs) have
had the most success in securing funding, followed by National Imple-
menting Entities (NIEs), but none by Regional Implementing Entities
(RIEs). This disparity has led to calls for transparency in project assess-
ment (Harmeling and Kaloga, 2011). Grasso and Sacchi (2011) discuss
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issues of justice in Adaptation Fund financing decisions to date. Further
research into the distribution of adaptation finance across countries,
sectors, and communities is required to assess the equity, efficiency,
effectiveness, and environmental impacts of the operation of the Adap-
tation Fund (Persson, 2011).
The Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC has decision-making
power regarding the representation of country groups on the govern-
ing boards of the UNFCCC’s funding vehicles, voting rules, the choice of
secretariat and the choice of trustee (e. g., who oversees the finances
and ensures funds go where they are supposed to go). Due to its com-
plex structure, the GEF faces challenges coordinating with UNFCCC
decisions (COWI and IIED, 2009; Ayers and Huq, 2009). Recipient coun-
tries have a majority on the board of the Adaptation Fund, while the
decision-making bodies for the other UNFCCC financing institutions
have equal representation for developing and industrialized countries.
The Adaptation Fund has allowed the possibility of ‘direct access’ by
host country institutions, which has been used sparingly to date (Rata-
jczak-Juszko, 2012). The GEF is also starting to experiment with this
approach (GEF, 2011).
Funding per country eligible under the Adaptation Fund is limited to 10
million USD, essentially leading to a situation where each country gets
financing for a single project. Stadelmann etal. (2013) show that this
does not lead to projects ranking high on equity and efficiency criteria.
The GEF operates funding floors and caps for each country (currently 2
million USD and 11 % of the total volume available, respectively) (GEF,
2010). Between these thresholds, a complex allocation formula is used
whose variables consist of GDP, project portfolio performance, country
environmental policy and institutional performance, GHG-emissions
level, development of carbon intensity, forestry emissions, and changes
in deforestation.
A step change with regards to the international coordination of pub-
lic finance flows was the collective commitment by industrialized
countries in the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 to provide resources
approaching 30 billion USD as ‘Fast Start Finance’ (FSF) during the
period 2010 – 2012 for mitigation and adaptation in developing coun-
tries (UNFCCC, 2009a). Fast Start Finance was to provide ‘new and
additional’ resources, flowing through existing multilateral, regional,
and bilateral channels. Although few countries disclose details of their
FSF, studies show that FSF ranges from small grants to large loans
for infrastructure development (Fransen et al., 2012; Nakhooda and
Fransen, 2012; Kuramochi etal., 2012). While the FSF commitment for
2010 – 2012 has been exceeded, transparency regarding allocation cri-
teria and actual disbursement is low (Ciplet etal., 2013). Official devel-
opment assistance (ODA) made up a large share of total funding (Ball-
esteros etal., 2010) and several studies argue that the use of ODA as
a substitute for new climate finance mechanisms could divert funding
away from other important imperatives (Michaelowa and Michaelowa,
2007; Ayers and Huq, 2009; Gupta and van der Grijp, 2010). See also
Section16.2.1.1.
13�11�1�2 Multilateral development banks
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) have played a significant role
in mobilizing, coordinating, and overseeing the growth of climate-
related financial flows. The World Bank provides services as trustee or
interim trustee for all the UNFCCC-related funds noted above. A group
of MDBs manages and governs the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs),
which were set up in 2008, are not supervised by the UNFCCC, and are
financed through voluntary government contributions. The Clean Tech-
nology Fund supports investments in low-carbon technologies, and the
Strategic Climate Fund is an umbrella for improving resilience against
climate change, reducing deforestation and renewable energy support
for low-income countries.
Tirpak and Adams (2008) see increases in MDBs’ funding and shifts to
low-GHG technologies being fragile owing to variability and low lev-
els of funding. Bowen (2011) proposes expansion of the capital base
of multilateral financial institutions in order to increase concessional
financing (finance made available at lower than market costs) of miti-
gation and adaptation activities.
Over the last two decades, recipients have gained more decision-
making power in the institutions under the UNFCCC, while multi-
lateral financial institutions have not followed this trend. Financing
is typically not given directly to the project recipients but provided
through implementing agencies, mostly multilateral financial institu-
tions or UN agencies that fulfil predefined fiduciary standards. Direct
access, as implemented by the Adaptation Fund, is seen by some as
the most appropriate model for climate finance (UNDP, 2011). How-
ever, peer-reviewed literature comparing the effectiveness of the
two approaches is lacking. At the same time, national development
banks (e. g., China Development Bank, Brazilian Development Bank
(BNDES)), Bilateral Finance Institutions, and a planned multilateral
fund of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) coun-
tries have also provided or may provide substantial funding (Höhne
etal., 2012a; Robles, 2012)
13�11�2 Mobilizing private investment and
financial flows
Another emerging focus of international climate cooperation is on
mobilizing private investment to finance mitigation and adaptation.
As discussed in Sections 13.4.1.4 and 13.13.1.1, carbon credits from
market mechanisms generate revenues for private sector players, thus
leveraging potentially large investments in mitigation. Such leverage
is seen as important by Urpelainen (2012), who presents a game-
theoretical model where capacity building leverages private mitiga-
tion investment. A number of international initiatives have supported
capacity building for market mechanisms (Okubo and Michaelowa,
2010). Also, the multilateral financing institutions discussed in Sec-
tion13.11.1 will ‘leverage’ private finance to complement their public
funding.
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The potential for leveraging to lead to double- and multiple-counting
has led to suggestions that internationally agreed methodologies to
account for leveraging are needed (Clapp etal., 2012), which would
be of help in consistent reporting of finance against the goal agreed
under the UNFCCC. Stadelmann etal. (2011a) find that the leverage
factors, that is the ratio between mobilized private funding and mobi-
lized public finance, for the Climate Technology Fund under the CIFs
and the GEF reach self-reported levels of 8.4 and 6.2, respectively.
However, an analysis of over 200 CDM and close to 400 GEF projects,
Stadelmann etal. (2011a) find a leverage ratio of just 3.0 – 4.5. More-
over, high-leverage factors may mean that the underlying project is not
additional, i. e., not contributing to mitigation. Finally, instead of lever-
aging in the private sector through capacity building, the World Bank
engagement in the Kyoto mechanisms has at least partially crowded
out private sector activities, as shown empirically by Michaelowa and
Michaelowa (2011).
Besides market mechanisms, other instruments such as grants, loans
at concessional rates, provision of equity through financial institutions,
or guarantees can mobilize private funds. This can happen directly on
the company level or be channelled through national governments
(Neuhoff etal., 2010). While they can be implemented on any level
of aggregation, the level of incentive provided could be coordinated
internationally, e. g., by basing it on a previously agreed ‘social cost of
carbon’ (Hourcade etal., 2012). The success of the Multilateral Invest-
ment Guarantee Agency shows that costs of guarantees are likely to be
low if multilateral and bilateral financial institutions with strong finan-
cial ratings provide them (Brown etal., 2011; Buchner etal., 2011).
13.12 The role of public and
private sectors and public-
private partnerships
International responses to climate change ultimately depend on pri-
vate sector action. Large multinational corporations produce about
half of the global world product and global GHG emissions (Morgera,
2004). Hence, private companies will need to generate investment and
innovation necessary to pursue a low-carbon economy (Forsyth, 2005).
Given that damages from climate change are a (negative) externality,
a gap remains between the need for GHG reduction and the commit-
ments of the largest international companies (Knox-Hayes and Levy,
2011). While some business sectors may have an interest advancing
policy to mitigate climate change (Pulver, 2007; Falkner, 2008; Pinkse
and Kolk, 2009; Meckling, 2011), in practice the public sector typically
guides, supports, and motivates private sectors to contribute to a low-
carbon economy. These types of public sector interactions with the
private sector can operate through government regulations (whether
market-based or conventional), but may also be facilitated through
public-private partnerships, the focus of this section.
13�12�1 Public-private partnerships
One channel for such guidance is through public-private partnerships
focused on climate change, which have multiplied and grown in recent
years (Bäckstrand, 2008; Pattberg, 2010; Andonova, 2010; Kolk etal.,
2010). Public-private partnerships involve governments, businesses,
and sometimes NGOs. Examples include the Renewable Energy and
Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) (Parthan etal., 2010); the Meth-
ane to Markets initiative (now renamed the Global Methane Initia-
tive) (de Coninck etal., 2008); the former Asia Pacific Partnership on
Climate and Energy (which was largely organized through sector-spe-
cific partnerships) (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and van Asselt, 2009; McGee
and Taplin, 2009; Okazaki and Yamaguchi, 2011); the Global Superior
Energy Performance Partnership (taking sector-specific activities from
the regional scale to the global scale) (Fujiwara, 2012; Okazaki etal.,
2012; see also Section 14.3.3); the CDM (where some projects can
take the character of public-private partnerships) (Streck, 2004; Green,
2008; Newell, 2009); the World Bank Prototype Carbon Fund (Lecocq,
2003; Andonova, 2010); the UN Fund for International Partnerships
(39 % of whose environmental partnerships are in energy- or climate
change-related projects) (Andonova, 2010); the UN Global Compact’s
‘Caring for Climate’ initiative (Abbott, 2011); the Green Power Mar-
ket Development Group (Andonova, 2009); and the Munich Climate
Insurance Initiative (Pinkse and Kolk, 2011). These partnerships can
facilitate development and commercial deployment of low-carbon
technologies as governments remove barriers to the entry and pro-
vide stakeholders with new business frameworks. Industries also dem-
onstrate leadership through active involvement with regards to their
technologies, investments, and know-how (IEA, 2010).
Some international public-private partnerships concentrate on the
development of specific technologies. Others focus on rural renew-
able energy or low-carbon energy development in general. Others
center their attention on carbon market development. Few focus
on adaptation, although the insurance sector is involved in such
initiatives (Pinkse and Kolk, 2011). Effective partnerships are insti-
tutionalized with representatives of major stakeholders, a perma-
nent secretariat, resources and a dedicated mission (Pattberg etal.,
2012). Company willingness to engage in adaptation depends on
their capacity, their past exposure to disasters, and the link between
their business planning horizons and climate impact uncertainty
(Agrawala et al., 2011). Some also need to ensure that they are
able to adapt to changing climatic circumstances (Linnenluecke and
Griffiths, 2010; Vine, 2012).
13�12�2 Private sector-led governance initiatives
Private sector actors have also engaged in direct attempts to govern
aspects of climate change transnationally. First, some institutional
investors now ask companies to report on their GHG emissions, strate-
gies to reduce them, and more broadly on climate risk exposures (Kolk
etal., 2008; Newell and Paterson, 2010; Harmes, 2011; MacLeod and
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Park, 2011). The most important example of this is the Carbon Disclo-
sure Project, whose signatories controlled 70 trillion USD in assets in
2011 (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2011). The private sector is playing a
role in developing systems for carbon accounting (Lovell and MacKen-
zie, 2011).
Second, like NGOs (see Section 13.5.2), private-sector actors have
developed initiatives to govern voluntary carbon markets, either
through certification standards for offset markets or by developing
trading exchanges, registries, and protocols for reporting GHGs (Green,
2010, 2013; Hoffmann, 2011). Many of the certification schemes
are either developed by private-sector actors (such as the Voluntary
Carbon Standard, developed by the International Emissions Trading
Association, the Climate Group, and the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development) or by such actors in collaboration with envi-
ronmental NGOs (such as the Social Carbon standard).
13�12�3 Motivations for public-private sector
collaboration and private sector
governance
For private sector actors, partnerships with governments or NGOs on
climate may create direct economic benefits through financial support,
learning opportunities, risk sharing, or market access (Pinkse, 2007;
Perusse et al., 2009). Since direct regulation of firms at the interna-
tional level is unavailable, states have incentives to pursue partner-
ships to affect transnational private sector activities. International
organizations pursue partnerships for similar reasons (Andonova,
2010). Partnerships or private governance may create club goods for
participants (Andonova, 2009). Sometimes, firms are motivated more
by concerns for public relations (Pinkse and Kolk, 2009). Private sec-
tor finance can be stimulated by a five-step approach: strategic goal
setting and policy alignment, an enabling process and incentives for
low-carbon and climate-resilient (LCR) investment, financial policies
and instruments, harnessing resources and building capacity for a LCR
economy, and promoting green business and consumer behaviour
(Corfee-Morlot etal., 2012).
13.13 Performance assessment
on policies and
institutions including
market mechanisms
This section surveys and synthesizes quantitative and qualitative
assessments of existing and proposed forms of international coop-
eration to address climate change mitigation that have appeared in
the literature since AR4. Adaptation is not treated here, as there have
been few international cooperative initiatives focused on adaptation,
although these are now starting to emerge (Section 13.5.1.1).
Existing cooperation is considered in Section 13.13.1 with reference
to the UNFCCC, its Kyoto Protocol, the CDM, agreements under the
UNFCCC pertaining to the post-2012 period, and agreements and
other forms of international cooperation outside of the UNFCCC. Sec-
tion 13.13.2 considers the literature that assesses various proposed
forms of future international cooperation described in Section 13.4.3.
Throughout, we synthesize assessments in terms of the four criteria
discussed in Section 13.2: environmental effectiveness, aggregate eco-
nomic performance, distributional impacts, and institutional feasibility.
Table 13.3 summarizes the key findings of this section’s performance
assessment.
In applying the evaluation criteria to evaluate existing and proposed
forms of international cooperation, five general caveats apply. First,
an ex-ante evaluation of a policy may overestimate the costs and / or
the benefits of that policy for several reasons, such as overestimating
the extent of its implementation (Harrington etal., 2000; Harrington,
2006), failing to account for over-reporting by regulated parties (Bai-
ley etal., 2002), and underestimating learning related to technologi-
cal development (Norman et al, 2008). Second, ex-ante evaluation may
over- or under-estimate the effectiveness of proposed cooperation,
because interactions between proposed policies and other existing
policies may be difficult to predict. These interactions can be coun-
terproductive, inconsequential, or beneficial (Fankhauser etal., 2010;
Goulder and Stavins, 2011; Levinson, 2012). Third, while evaluation
of proposed policies can be informed by lessons learned from regime
complexes in other contexts (see Section 13.5), such lessons may come
with extrapolation bias, since it may not be appropriate to generalize
to climate change findings from other contexts. Fourth, in comparing
existing policies using these criteria, it can be helpful to keep in mind
that as institutions evolve, the performance of particular policies may
also change. Fifth and finally, the overall performance of the inter-
national regime depends also on national and regional policies (see
Chapters 14 and 15, in particular Sections 14.4.2 and 15.5).
13�13�1 Performance assessment of existing
cooperation
13�13�1�1 Assessment of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol,
and its flexible mechanisms
The UNFCCC established a framework and a set of principles and goals
for the international response to climate change. Under Article 2, the
parties agreed to the objective of “prevent[ing] dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system,” an objective which was
not quantified and was subject to several caveats. Under Article 4(2)
(a), the AnnexI parties committed to adopt measures (which could be
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Table 13�3 | Summary of performance assessments of existing cooperation of proposed cooperation on climate change.
Mode of International
Cooperation
Assessment Criteria
Environmental
Effectiveness
Aggregate Economic
Performance
Distributional Impacts Institutional Feasibility
Existing
Cooperation
[13�13�1]
UNFCCC Aggregate GHG emissions in
AnnexI countries declined by
6.0 to 9.2 % below 1990 levels
by 2000, a larger reduction
than the apparent ‘aim’ of
returning to 1990 levels by
2000.
Authorized joint fulfilment
of commitments, multi-gas
approach, sources and sinks,
and domestic policy choice.
Cost and benefit estimates
depend on baseline, discount
rate, participation, leakage, co-
benefits, adverse side-effects,
and other factors.
Commitments distinguish
between AnnexI (developed)
and non-AnnexI countries.
Principle of ‘common but
differentiated responsibility.’
Commitment to ‘equitable and
appropriate contributions by
each [party].’
Ratified (or equivalent) by 195
countries and regional organi-
zations. Compliance depends
on national communications.
The Kyoto Protocol (KP)
Aggregate GHG emissions in
AnnexI countries were reduced
by 8.5 to 13.6 % below 1990
levels by 2011, more than the
first commitment period (CP1)
collective reduction target of
5.2 %. Reductions occurred
mainly in EITs; emissions
increased in some others.
Incomplete participation in CP1
(even lower in CP2).
Cost-effectiveness improved
by flexible mechanisms (Joint
Implementation (JI), CDM,
International Emissions
Trading (IET)) and domestic
policy choice. Cost and benefit
estimates depend on baseline,
discount rate, participation,
leakage, co-benefits, adverse
side-effects, and other factors.
Commitments distinguish
between developed and devel-
oping countries, but dichoto-
mous distinction correlates
only partly (and decreasingly)
with historical emissions trends
and with changing economic
circumstances. Intertemporal
equity affected by short-term
actions.
Ratified (or equivalent) by
192 countries and regional
organizations, but took 7
years to enter into force.
Compliance depends on
national communications, plus
KP compliance system. Later
added approaches to enhance
measurement, reporting, and
verification (MRV).
The Kyoto Mechanisms About 1.4 billion tCO
2
eq credits
under the CDM, 0.8 billion
under JI, and 0.2 billion under
IET (through October 2013).
Additionality of CDM projects
remains an issue but regulatory
reform underway.
CDM mobilized low-cost
options, particularly industrial
gases, reducing costs. Under-
performance of some project
types. Some evidence that
technology is transferred to
non-AnnexI countries.
Limited direct investment from
AnnexI countries. Domestic
investment dominates, leading
to concentration of CDM
projects in few countries.
Limited contributions to local
sustainable development.
Helped enable political
feasibility of Kyoto Protocol.
Has multi-layered governance.
Largest carbon markets to date.
Has built institutional capacity
in developing countries.
Further Agreements under the
UNFCCC
Pledges to limit GHG emissions
made by all major emitters
under Cancún Agreements.
Unlikely sufficient to limit
temperature change to 2°C
cost-effectively. Depends on
treatment of measures beyond
current pledges for mitigation
and finance. Durban Platform
calls for new agreement by
2015, to take effect in 2020,
engaging all parties.
Efficiency not assessed.
Cost-effectiveness might be
improved by market-based
policy instruments, inclusion of
forestry sector, commitments
by more nations than AnnexI
countries (as envisioned in
Durban Platform).
Depends on sources of financ-
ing, particularly for actions of
developing countries.
Cancún Conference of the
Parties (COP) decision; 97
countries made pledges of
emission reduction targets or
actions for 2020.
Agreements
outside the
UNFCCC
G8, G20,
Major
Economies
Forum on
Energy and
Climate (MEF)
G8 and MEF have recom-
mended GHG emissions
reductions by all major emitters.
G20 may spur GHG emissions
reductions by phasing out of
fossil fuel subsidies.
Action by all major emitters
may reduce leakage and
improve cost-effectiveness,
if implemented using flex-
ible mechanisms. Potential
efficiency gains through
subsidy removal. Too early to
assess economic performance
empirically.
Has not mobilized climate
finance. Removing fuel
subsidies would be progressive
but have negative effects on
oil-exporting countries and on
those with very low incomes
unless other help for the poor-
est is provided.
Lower participation of countries
than UNFCCC, yet covers 70 %
of global emissions. Opens
possibility for forum-shopping,
based on issue preferences.
Montreal
Protocol on
Ozone-
Depleting
Substances
(ODS)
Spurred GHG emissions reduc-
tions through ODS phaseouts
approximately 5 times the mag-
nitude of Kyoto CP1 targets.
Contribution may be negated
by high-GWP substitutes,
though efforts to phase out
HFCs are growing.
Cost-effectiveness supported
by multi-gas approach. Some
countries used market-based
mechanisms to implement
domestically.
Later compliance period for
phaseouts by developing coun-
tries. Montreal Protocol Fund
provided finance to developing
countries.
Universal participation. but the
timing of required actions vary
for developed and developing
countries.
Voluntary
Carbon
Market
Covers 0.13 billion tCO
2
eq, but
certification remains an issue.
Credit prices are heteroge-
neous, indicating market
inefficiencies.
[No literature cited.] Fragmented and non-transpar-
ent market.
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Chapter 13
implemented jointly) to limit net emissions (covering both sources and
sinks of all GHGs not controlled by the Montreal Protocol), “recogniz-
ing that the return by the end of the present decade [the year 2000]
to earlier levels” would contribute to modifying long-term trends con-
sistent with the treaty’s objective. Under Article 4(2)(b), AnnexI parties
committed to periodically communicate information on their emissions,
“with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels.”
According to UN data, aggregate GHG emissions in Annex I coun-
tries declined by 9.2 % from 1990 – 2000 (if land use and forestry are
included; or by 6.0 % if they are not; the base year for some coun-
tries is in the mid- or late 1980s) (UNFCCC, 2013c, Profile for AnnexI
Parties). This is a larger reduction than the apparent two-step ‘aim’
implied in Article 4(2)(a) and (b) of the UNFCCC to return emissions
to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Much of this reduction, however,
was due to factors other than measures adopted under the UNFCCC,
such as the economic downturn in AnnexI ‘economies in transition’
(EITs) — Russia, former Soviet Republics, and Eastern Europe — during
the 1990s.
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol adopted the first binding, quantitative miti-
gation commitments for developed countries. The 38 countries listed
in its Annex B (industrialized countries, EITs, and the European Union
separately from its member states) made aggregate commitments to
collectively reduce their GHG emissions by 4.2 % relative to 1990 lev-
els (5.2 % relative to the country-specific base years used for establish-
ing national committments) by the Protocol’s first commitment period,
2008 – 2012 (UNFCCC, 1998, 2012b). Other parties to the Kyoto Proto-
col are not constrained (but can participate in other ways; in particular,
see discussion of CDM in Section 13.13.1.2). The Protocol also con-
tained a number of new mechanisms, including IET, JI, and the CDM,
that aimed to help reduce GHG emissions cost-effectively.
The aggregate emissions by Annex I countries have been reduced
below the Kyoto Protocol’s collective 5.2 % reduction target, but, as
with the UNFCCC, much of the reduction was due to factors other than
Kyoto Protocol. (The list of countries in the Protocol’s Annex B is nearly
identical to the list of countries in the Convention’s AnnexI during the
historical periods referenced in this section, and the difference in aggre-
gate emissions between the two does not affect the analysis here.)
According to UNFCCC GHG inventories, aggregate GHG emissions
from all AnnexI countries were reduced by 13.6 % from 1990 – 2011
(if land use and forestry-sector changes are taken into account, and
8.5 % if they are not). Not counting the United States — because it was
not a party to the Kyoto Protocol — the reduction from 1990 – 2011 in
the remaining AnnexI aggregate GHG emissions was 22.9 % if land
use and forestry sectors changes are taken into account and 16.6 % if
they are not. Not counting the EITs, the remaining AnnexI countries’
aggregate GHG emissions increased by 2.1 % and 3.2 % from 1990 to
2011 (with and without land use and forestry, respectively) (UNFCCC,
2012b).
Although emissions have decreased among Annex B parties, the envi-
ronmental effectiveness of the Protocol’s first commitment period has
been less than it could have been, for several reasons. First, not all
Annex B parties have participated. The United States, until recently
the country with the largest share of global emissions (Gregg etal.,
2008), did not ratify the Protocol (see also Section 13.3.1). Therefore,
its target emissions reduction of 7 %, which would have amounted
to over 40 % of the difference in total Annex B committed emissions
commitments and base year emissions levels (UNFCCC, 2012b),
was not binding. In addition, Canada withdrew from the Protocol in
December 2011 (effective December 2012). Russia, Japan, and New
Zealand opted not to participate in the second commitment period
(2013 – 2020).
Mode of International
Cooperation
Assessment Criteria
Environmental
Effectiveness
Aggregate Economic
Performance
Distributional Impacts Institutional Feasibility
Proposed
Cooperation
[13�13�2]
Proposed
architectures
Strong multi-
lateralism
Tradeoff between ambition
(deep) and participation
(broad).
More cost-effective with
greater reliance on market
mechanisms.
Multilateralism facilitates
integrating distributional
impacts into negotiations and
may apply equity-based criteria
as outlined in Ch. 4
Depends on number of parties;
degree of ambition.
Harmonized
national
policies
Depends on net aggregate
change in ambition across
countries resulting from
harmonization.
More cost-effective with
greater reliance on market
mechanisms.
Depends on specific national
policies.
Depends on similarity of
national policies; more similar
may support harmonization but
domestic circumstances may
vary. National enforcement.
Decentralized
architectures,
coordinated
national
policies
Effectiveness depends on
quality of standards and credits
across countries.
Often (though not necessarily)
refers to linkage of national
cap-and-trade systems, in
which case cost-effective.
Depends on specific national
policies.
Depends on similarity of
national policies. National
enforcement.
Effort (burden) sharing
arrangements
Refer to Sections 4.6.2 for discussion of the principles on which effort (burden) sharing arrangements may be based, and Section 6.3.6.6
for quantitative evaluation.
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Second, the Annex B EITs were credited for emissions reductions that
would have occurred without the Protocol due to their significant
economic contraction during the 1990s. These loose targets may
have been necessary to engage them as parties (Stewart and Wie-
ner, 2003). In principle, these countries were allowed to sell resultant
surplus emissions-reduction credits to other Annex B parties, which
might have further reduced environmental effectiveness. However,
in practice, other parties bought few AAUs relative to the stock
available from EITs during the first commitment period (perhaps
because the United States decision not to ratify reduced demand
for such allowances), and thus environmental effectiveness was
not affected as much as it could have been (Brandt and Svendsen,
2002; Böhringer, 2003; IPCC, 2007, p. 778; Crowley, 2007; Aldrich
and Koerner, 2012).
Current model projections imply that emission reductions achieved by
Annex B parties during the first and second commitment periods of
the Kyoto Protocol are not likely to be sufficient to achieve environ-
mental performance that limits global average temperature increases
to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels (Rogelj etal., 2011; Höhne etal.,
2012b) (see also Section 6.4 for a discussion of scenarios that relate
short-term environmental performance to long-term GHG stabiliza-
tion and tempterature change goals). A key reason is that, since 1990,
the Annex B countries’ share of global GHG emissions has declined
significantly, from approximately 56 % of global emissions in 1990
to approximately 39 % in 2010. Simultaneously, overall global GHG
emissions have risen significantly; global emissions in 2010 were
approximately 31 % higher than in 1990 (JRC / PBL, 2013) (see Section
5.2).
The criterion of economic performance encompasses both efficiency
and cost-effectiveness (see Sections 3.7.1 and 13.2.) Assessments of
the efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol depend on respective estimates
of the costs and benefits of mitigation and assumptions regarding
the appropriate discount rate (see Sections 2.4.3.2 and 3.6.2 on dis-
counting). Contrasting assumptions regarding these values are the key
determinants in explaining the differences between assessments that
have found the Protocol inefficient (e. g., Nordhaus, 2007), and those
that find it cost-effective, but insufficient (e. g., Stern, 2007; Weitzman,
2007). These latter researchers also tend to emphasize the non-zero
probability of catastrophic climate outcomes. The Kyoto Protocol also
fostered monitoring and reporting of emissions, and capacity build-
ing in developing countries, which may facilitate further cost-effective
action in the future (Hare etal., 2010).
With respect to cost-effectiveness, the Kyoto Protocol’s three market-
based instruments (the CDM, JI, and IET) intended to lower the cost
of the global regime (see Section13.4.2.3 for a description of these
mechanisms). Most research on the Kyoto mechanisms has focused on
the CDM, primarily because transaction volumes of CDM credits have
been so much greater than JI credits or AAUs. Performance assessment
of the CDM is discussed separately in Section 13.13.1.2.
International Emissions Trading could, in theory, reduce abate-
ment costs by as much as 50 % if trades took place among Annex
B countries (Blanford etal., 2010; Bosetti etal., 2010; Jacoby etal.,
2010). However, in practice, trading under this mechanism has been
limited, partly due to the surplus problem discussed above (Aldrich
and Koerner, 2012) and the absence of the United States. As of July
2013, 0.2 billion tCO
2
eq have been traded through IET (Point Carbon,
2013). The few trades that were made generally required reinvest-
ment of the revenues into projects that reduce GHG emissions, under
so-called ‘Green Investment Schemes.’ The economic performance of
IET also depends on what type of actor is doing the trading. Early
expectations were that the main traders would be states (national
governments), and that states would not operate as efficient trad-
ers, because they are not cost-minimizers (e. g., Hahn and Stavins,
1999). In practice, increasing shares of trades have been made by
private sector firms, which may increase cost-effectiveness (Aldrich
and Koerner, 2012).
Joint Implementation also has the potential to improve the cost-effec-
tiveness of Annex B countries’ activities under the Protocol (Böhringer,
2003; Vlachou and Konstantinidis, 2010). A large majority of JI projects
have been in the transition economies, especially Russia and Ukraine,
given the low cost of emissions reductions there relative to other
Annex B countries (Korppoo and Moe, 2008). From 2008 through July
2013, JI had led to the issuance of over 0.8 billion emission reduction
unit (ERU) credits (UNFCCC, 2013d), each equivalent to one tCO
2
eq of
reported emission abatement. Over half of this volume was issued by
Ukraine and Russia, especially in 2012 in response to the limitation
on carrying over surplus AAUs to the second commitment period. The
actual distribution of JI projects is not consistent with the theoretical
potential, as some countries, such as Ukraine, proactively supported JI,
while in others, including Russia, JI lacked political support, and effi-
cient frameworks took several years to establish. In Western Europe,
a number of companies in the chemical industry generated emission
credits for their own use in the EU ETS, demonstrating the cost-reduc-
tion potential (Shishlov etal., 2012). Countries without a surplus of
emission units usually applied strict rules to capture part of the emis-
sion reductions achieved by JI projects (Michaelowa and O’brien, 2006;
Shishlov etal., 2012).
In addition to the three Kyoto flexibility mechanisms, the Protocol
provides flexibility with regard to how Annex B parties may achieve
their targets; they may employ domestic or regional policies of their
own choice. One result has been the development of domestic emis-
sions trading programmes in several countries and regions (Paterson
etal., 2014). Regional and national emissions trading programmes
include those in the EU (the EU ETS), Australia, and New Zealand,
as well as subnational trading programmes in the United States
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and California / WCI)
and in China (seven regional pilot programmes launched in 2013).
See Figure 13.4 above and Sections 14.4.2 and 15.5; (Convery and
Redmond, 2007; Ellerman and Buchner, 2007; Ellerman and Joskow,
10451045
International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
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Chapter 13
2008; Ellerman, 2010; Ellerman etal., 2010; Olmstead and Stavins,
2012; Newell etal., 2013).
Distributional impacts of the Kyoto Protocol have been examined
both cross-sectionally (mainly geographically) and temporally. Income
patterns and trends as well as distribution of GHG emissions have
changed significantly since the 1990s, when the UNFCCC and Kyoto
Protocol listed Annex I / Annex B countries; some countries outside
these lists have become wealthier and larger emitters than some
countries on these lists (U. S. Department of Energy, 2012; WRI, 2012;
Aldy and Stavins, 2012). For example, in 1990, China’s total CO
2
emis-
sions were about half of United States emissions, but by 2010, China
emitted more than 50 % more CO
2
than the United States. Over this
same time period, China’s per capita CO
2
emissions experienced an
almost three-fold increase, rising to nearly equal the level in the EU,
but still about 36 % of the United States level (IEA, 2012; PBL, 2012,
see AnnexII.9; Olivier etal., 2012; JRC / PBL, 2013). Non-AnnexI coun-
tries as a group have a share in the cumulative global greenhouse
emissions for the period 1850 to 2010 close to 50 %, a share that is
increasing (den Elzen etal., 2013b) (see Section 5.2.1 for more detail
on historical emissions).
Meanwhile, income inequality and variations in capacity remain sub-
stantial both within and across countries. While GDP per capita in
some non-AnnexI countries has increased and some have joined the
OECD, incomes of G8 countries remain higher than those of major
emerging economies such as the BASIC countries (World Bank, 2013).
Poverty is much more extensive and income at lower absolute levels
in the latter, compared to the former (Milanovic, 2012). Inequality in
income remains related to inequalities in emissions (Padilla and Ser-
rano, 2006; Chakravarty etal., 2009).
More broadly, although the Kyoto Protocol’s quantitative mitigation
requirements are limited to Annex B countries, the economic impacts of
these requirements may spill over to non-Annex B countries (Böhringer
and Rutherford, 2004). In terms of intertemporal distributional equity,
some have noted that climate change mitigation that requires emis-
sions reductions in the short term for uncertain long-term benefits,
also involves inter-generational distributional impacts (Schelling, 1997;
Leach, 2009).
Among Annex B countries, the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions-target allo-
cation is generally progressive, one common measure of distributional
equity, exhibiting positive correlation between gross domestic prod-
uct per capita and the degree of targeted emissions reduction below
business-as-usual levels. For a 10 % increase in per capita GDP, Annex
B countries’ emissions reduction targets are, on average, about 1.4 %
more stringent (Frankel, 1999, 2005).
In terms of institutional feasibility, it is notable that the Kyoto Proto-
col has been ratified (or the equivalent) by 191 countries (plus the EU
separately) (Falkner etal., 2010). As noted above, participation among
AnnexI countries in emissions-reduction commitments dropped signif-
icantly from the first (2008 – 2012) to the second (2013 – 2020) commit-
ment periods, though the stringency of the emission-reduction com-
mitments of those countries still participating increased for the second
period. More broadly, the high rate of ratification is likely due in part
to the lack of emissions-reduction commitments asked of non-Annex B
countries (Lutter, 2000).
Allowing Annex B countries the flexibility to choose policies to meet
their national emissions commitments may have contributed to insti-
tutional feasibility. However, compromises made during the negotia-
tion of the Protocol that enabled its institutional and political viability
may have reduced its environmental effectiveness (Victor, 2004; Helm,
2010; Falkner etal., 2010). This serves as an example of the tradeoff
across ambition, participation, and compliance discussed in Section
13.2.2.5.
Additionally, obstacles for enforcement have hurt the Protocol’s insti-
tutional feasibility. Despite the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance system
(Oberthür and Ott, 1999; Hare etal., 2010; Brunnée etal., 2012), it
is difficult in practice to enforce the Kyoto Protocol’s targets because
of the lack of a legal authority with enforcement powers, and the
weakness of possible sanctions relative to the costs of compliance.
This is, of course, true of most international agreements (van Kooten,
2003; Böhringer, 2003; Barrett, 2008b) (see also Sections 13.3.2 and
13.4.2.1.).
13�13�1�2 Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism
The CDM aims to reduce mitigation costs for Annex B countries and
contribute to sustainable development in non-Annex B countries
(UNFCCC, 1998) (Article 12). This mechanism led to the issuance of
nearly 1.4 billion emission credits from over 7300 registered projects
by October 2013 (see Section 13.7.2; UNFCCC, 2014). This performance
was surprising, given that the CDM suffered from many disadvantages
relative to the other flexibility mechanisms (Woerdman, 2000).
The environmental effectiveness of the CDM depends on three key
factors: whether a credited project actually reduces more emissions
than would have been reduced in its absence (which may depend
on whether the project developers are indeed motivated primarily by
expected revenue from the sale of the emission credits) (‘additional-
ity’); the validity of the baseline from which emission reductions are
calculated; and indirect emissions impacts (‘leakage’) caused by the
projects.
The issue of additionality (IPCC, 2007, pp. 779 – 780) continues to gen-
erate controversy, despite an increasing elaboration of additionality
tests by CDM regulators (Michaelowa etal., 2009). On the one hand,
(Schneider, 2009) found that key assumptions regarding additionality
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International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
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Chapter 13
were often not substantiated with credible, documented evidence, in
a sample of 93 projects. On the other hand, (Lewis, 2010) finds a clear
contribution of the CDM to the rapid upswing of the renewable energy
sector in China.
Clean Development Mechanism projects in energy efficiency, trans-
port and buildings have faced challenges in baseline determination,
monitoring, and transaction costs (Sirohi and Michaelowa, 2008;
Michaelowa etal., 2009; Millard-Ball and Ortolano, 2010). Kollmuss
etal. (2010) suggest that it may be possible to prevent baseline gam-
ing through a clear regulatory framework. Heeding this advice, CDM
regulators have increased the conservativeness of approved method-
ologies, after rejecting a significant share of baseline methodology
proposals (Michaelowa etal., 2009; Millard-Ball and Ortolano, 2010).
Recent attempts by CDM regulators to standardize baselines have trig-
gered a debate regarding their impacts on environmental effectiveness
and transaction costs. Making the choice between standardized and
project-specific baselines voluntary (Spalding-Fecher and Michaelowa,
2013), as well as “simple, highly aggregated performance standards”
(Hayashi and Michaelowa, 2013) could reduce environmental effec-
tiveness.
With regard to leakage, (Vöhringer etal., 2006) argue that emission
leakage due to market price effects is unavoidable (as it is for mitiga-
tion within Annex B countries), while Kallbekken etal. (2007) stress
that regardless of the baseline used, the CDM will reduce carbon
leakage through the reduction in the difference in marginal mitiga-
tion costs between countries. Schneider (2011) shows that for HFC-23
reduction projects, baseline gaming enabled production of the under-
lying commodity to shift from industrialized to developing countries
(Wara, 2008).
With regard to cost-effectiveness, the CDM offers the potential for cost
savings where abatement costs are lower in developing countries. The
large volume of credits and projects in the CDM indicates its cost-sav-
ing potential. Still, Castro (2012) found that many low-cost opportuni-
ties had not been taken up by CDM projects.
The long-term contribution of the CDM to cost-effectiveness depends
in part on its ability to promote technological change in develop-
ing countries either through technology transfer from industrialized
to developing countries (see Section 16.8 for an overview of the
technology transfer component of CDM), or by stimulating innova-
tion within developing countries (Reichman et al. 2008). Roughly
a third of CDM projects involve technology transfer (Haites et al.,
2006). Dechezleprêtre etal. (2008) find that the likelihood of technol-
ogy transfer is higher for CDM projects operated by subsidiaries of
companies from industrialized countries. Seres etal. (2009) find that
36 % of 3296 registered and proposed projects accounting for 59 %
of the annual emission reductions claim to involve technology trans-
fer, confirming Dechezleprêtre etal.’s (2008) results. But all of these
technology transfer studies limit themselves to assessment of project
documents, which are not subject to rigorous and independent verifi-
cation. Project developers have an incentive to overstate technology
transfer. Wang (2010) is an exception, and underpins his analyses of
many project documents with background interviews and assesses
government policies. He finds that in all but one of the industrial gas
projects in China, technology transfer occurred, but only in about a
quarter of wind and coal mine methane projects. Okazaki and Yama-
guchi (2011) fear that transactions costs, imposed by additionality cri-
teria and Executive Board delays, can discourage technology transfer
through the CDM.
Distributional impacts of the CDM relate to contributions to sustain-
able development, as well as the distribution of rents generated by
the sale of emission credits. Olsen (2007) provides a summary of the
early literature that did not find significant support for sustainable
development induced by CDM projects. Several researchers (Sutter
and Parreño, 2007; Gupta etal., 2008; Headon, 2009; Boyd etal.,
2009; Alexeew etal., 2010) see the process of host country respon-
sibility for sustainable development and competition between host
countries for CDM investment as a reason for the lack of sustain-
ability benefits of CDM projects in some countries, as Designated
National Authorities (national CDM-management bodies) may not
adequately scrutinize the environmental or social benefits of proj-
ects. Parnphhumeesup and Kerr (2011) find that experts and the local
population weight sustainability criteria differently in the context of
biopower projects in Thailand. Ellis etal. (2007) found wide varia-
tion in the contribution to local sustainable development by project
type, with greater contributions in small-scale renewable energy and
energy efficiency than in large-scale industrial CDM projects. Using
a sample of 39 projects, Nussbaumer (2009) finds that CDM projects
certified by ‘The Gold Standard’ — referring both to the organization
and the certification scheme by that name — slightly outperform
other CDM projects with respect to sustainable-development ben-
efits. A similar result is found by Drupp (2011) for a sample of 18
Gold Standard projects compared with 30 projects certified through
other means. Torvanger etal. (2013) propose dividing the CDM into
two tracks, one for GHG offsets and one for sustainable develop-
ment (though investors in the second track would need some new
incentive).
The distribution of CDM projects has been concentrated in a rela-
tively small number of developing countries (Yamada and Fujimori,
2012; see also Section 14.3.6.4). Given that companies in developing
countries finance CDM projects out of their own resources and even-
tually sell the credits as a new export product, with the CDM consul-
tant receiving a share (Michaelowa, 2007), a substantial amount of
the rents remain in the host country. At the same time, the demand
for CERs is evidence that it reduces costs compared to domestic
reductions by developed countries. The fear, even if unfounded, of
losing this export revenue may be a deterrent against taking up
national emissions commitments (Castro, 2012), although in practice
many such countries are developing policies aimed at emissions limi-
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International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
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tations. Therefore, it has been proposed to discount CDM credits to
provide an incentive for taking up stricter national targets (Schneider,
2009).
In terms of institutional feasibility, baselines, additionality, and emis-
sions-reductions are subject to third-party audit. However, due to the
inadequate quality of many audits, regulators have been forced to
introduce multi-layered procedures that have led to high transaction
costs. Flues etal. (2010) show econometrically that regulatory deci-
sions about project registration and baseline methodology approval
have been influenced by political economy considerations.
There is ongoing debate in the literature about the efficacy of CDM
governance (Green, 2008; Lund, 2010; Michaelowa, 2011; Okazaki and
Yamaguchi, 2011; Böhm and Dhabi, 2011; Newell, 2012). The UNFCCC
commissioned an evaluation of the CDM in the CDM Policy Dialogue,
which issued a report in September 2012 recommending several
reforms of CDM governance (CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012). Michaelowa
(2009) and Schneider (2009) propose a shift from the current 1:1 off-
setting system to a system that only credits part of the reductions.
This would improve additionality on the aggregate level and provide
an incentive for advanced developing countries to accept their own
emission reduction commitments. Giving preferential treatment in pro-
cedures and methodology to certain project categories, certain sectors,
notably forestry (Thomas etal., 2010; CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012), or
certain regions (Nguyen etal., 2010; Bakker etal., 2011) might expand
the reach of CDM.
The price of CDM credits has declined, due largely to decreased
demand from the EU ETS and others, following the 2008 recession, as
well as changes in EU ETS rules regarding the use of CDM credits (see
Section 13.6.1). In response, the CDM Policy Dialogue (2012) proposed
creation of a central bank for carbon markets to bolster credit prices,
as well as further standardization of baseline and additionality deter-
mination to reduce transaction costs. The benefits of these two recom-
mendations are disputed in the literature (Hayashi and Michaelowa,
2013; Spalding-Fecher and Michaelowa, 2013).
13�13�1�3 Assessment of further agreements under the
UNFCCC
As discussed in 13.5.1.1, since AR4, negotiations under the UNFCCC
have produced the system of pledges in the Copenhagen Accord and
the Cancún Agreements, as well as the development of the GCF and
an agreement to negotiate a new agreement by 2015. In terms of
Figure 13�5 | Blue box plots show historic global GHG emissions and emissions in 2020 from business-as-usual projections and projections including Cancún pledges. Four cases
are considered which combine assumptions about pledges (unconditional or conditional) and rules for complying with pledges (lenient or strict)*. The ranges of 2020 emissions
(20th percentile, median, and 80th percentile) are taken directly from the UNEP Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2012) and represent findings from various modelling groups consider-
ing scenarios that begin mitigation immediately. The arrows indicate the difference between the median emissions projection in each case and the median emission level projected
to maintain temperature change below 2 °C with a greater than 66 % probability. The ranges (20th to 80th percentiles) of 2020 emissions that maintain temperature change below
2 °C can be compared to those from cost-effective immediate mitigation scenarios from the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database: greater than 66 % probability: 36 – 47 GtCO
2
eq / yr;
50 – 66 % probability: 43 – 47 GtCO
2
eq / yr (see Chapter 6 and AnnexII.10 for details, including MAGICC calculations). Differences in these ranges depend, for example, on assump-
tions about the availability of negative emissions technologies (see, e.g, Figure 6.31). Note that the analysis reconciles pledges for all countries against a business-as-usual counter-
factual based on what has been described in the literature, even though developed country pledges for 2020 are absolute (against a historical base year) and developing country
pledges relative (with rare exceptions; see Section 13.5.1).
38
45
49
49
48
60
59
56
56
56
54
55
53
52
49
46
44
37
36
54
52
50
52
47
44
38
55
54
2010 2020
Business-
as-Usual
(2)
2020
Unilateral,
Strict Rules
(3)
2020
Conditional,
Lenient Rules
(4)
2020
Conditional,
Strict Rules
(1)
2020
Unilateral,
Lenient Rules
20051990
≥66% Probability
50-66% Probability
Range of Emissions (20
th
Percentile, Median, 80
th
Percentile) in Cost-Effective
Immediate Mitigation Scenarios that Maintain Temperature Change Below 2°C
with Different Probabilities
80
th
percentile
Median
20
th
percentile
30
40
50
60
Global Emissions, Including LULUCF Emissions [GtCO
2
eq/yr]
8GtCO
2
eq
10GtCO
2
eq
11GtCO
2
eq
12GtCO
2
eq
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environmental performance, these agreements acknowledged that
deep reductions in GHG emissions would be required to limit global
average temperature increases to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, and
recognized the possibility strengthening this target to 1.5 °C (UNFCCC,
2010). Different goals will imply different reductions in climate change
impacts (see WGII AR5) and different mitigation costs (see Section 6.3).
There is broad agreement in the literature that global emissions
reductions through 2020 implied by the Cancún pledges are incon-
sistent with cost-effective mitigation scenarios, which are based on
the immediate onset of mitigation that maintain temperature change
below 2 °C with a greater than 50 % probability (see Section 6.4 for
detail on these scenarios). The difference between the emissions in
2020 in immediate mitigation scenarios and the Cancún pledges has
been referred to as the ‘2
o
C emissions gap’ (Rogelj etal., 2010; Dellink
etal., 2011; den Elzen etal., 2011b; Höhne etal., 2012b). However,
there are a number of delayed mitigation scenarios that delay mitiga-
tion and still meet this temperature goal and have emissions in the
range of the Cancún pledges in 2020 (see Section 6.4). Analyses that
have quantified the Cancún pledges exhibit substantial differences in
results, owing in part to uncertainties in current and projected emis-
sions estimates and interpretations of reduction proposals, and in part
to different methodologies (UNEP, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013b; Höhne
etal., 2012b) (Figure 13.5). For example, one source of differences in
analyses is due to changing rules: At COP-17 in Durban in 2011, parties
agreed to new rules for using land use credits for the Kyoto Protocol’s
Second Commitment Period (UNFCCC, 2012c; Grassi etal., 2012), and
at COP-18 in Doha in 2012, for surplus Kyoto allowances (Chen etal.,
2013; UNFCCC, 2012d).
Studies suggest that the emissions gap between current Cancún
pledges and a an immediate mitigation trajectory consistent with
maintaining temperature change below 2
o
C with a 50 % or greater
chance could be narrowed by implementing more stringent pledges,
applying stricter accounting rules for credits from forests (Grassi etal.,
2012) and surplus emission units (den Elzen et al., 2012), avoiding
double-counting of offsets for both developed-country commitments
and developing countries’ Cancún pledges (UNEP, 2013b), increas-
ing support for action in developing countries (Winkler etal., 2009),
and implementing measures beyond current pledges (den Elzen etal.,
2011b; Blok etal., 2012; Weischer etal., 2012; UNEP, 2013b).
In terms of aggregate economic performance, some analyses have esti-
mated the direct costs of the Cancún pledges (den Elzen etal., 2011a),
as well as broader economic effects (Mckibbin et al., 2011; Dellink
etal., 2011; Peterson etal., 2011). For example, Dellink etal. (2011)
estimate costs of action at around 0.3 % of GDP for both AnnexI and
non-AnnexI countries and 0.5 – 0.6 % of global real income. However,
there have been no published comparisons of the benefits and costs
of the Cancún pledges, and thus no quantitative assessments of eco-
nomic efficiency.
In terms of cost-effectiveness, the Cancún Agreements endorsed an
on-going role for domestic and international market-based mecha-
nisms, among various approaches, to improve cost-effectiveness. They
also made a potential step forward on the cost-effectiveness criterion
by emphasizing the role of mitigation actions in the forestry sector
(UNFCCC, 2010; Grassi etal., 2012), which could be integrated with
other actions through market mechanisms. Including forestry in mar-
ket mechanisms could reduce global mitigation costs by taking advan-
tage of low-cost mitigation opportunities in that sector (Eliasch, 2008;
Busch etal., 2009; Bosetti etal., 2011; UNEP, 2013b) (see also Section
13.5.1.1).
Assessing distributional impacts accurately depends both on the
mitigation costs for developing-country emission reductions and the
sources of financing for such reductions. The distributional equity
of recent emission-reduction pledges could be increased through
financing of reductions in non-AnnexI countries. By one study’s esti-
mate, between 2.1 – 3.3 GtCO
2
eq could be reduced in non-AnnexI
countries with 50 billion USD in financing, half of the financing
agreed to under the Copenhagen Accord (Carraro and Massetti,
2012). Studies of the climate change mitigation ‘financing gap’ have
suggested potential approaches to providing financial resources
(Ballesteros etal., 2010; AGF, 2010; Haites, 2011) (see also Sections
16.2 and 13.11).
Assessments of climate agreements following the Copenhagen, Can-
cún, and Durban UN climate conferences reflect differing interpreta-
tions of recent negotiations with regard to institutional feasibility
(Dubash, 2009; Rajamani, 2010, 2012a; Werksman and Herbertson,
2010; Müller, 2010). Copenhagen (2009) was assessed as a failure
by those who expected a new climate treaty and a second commit-
ment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Others saw the political agreement
reached among a small group of world leaders (eventually espoused
by more than fifty) as a major step forward, even though not legally
binding, especially because it moved toward a future agreement on
emissions reductions by all major emitting countries, rather than
continuing to divide developed from developing countries (Ladislaw,
2010). Others noted more specific effects, such as the change in the
organization of carbon markets (Bernstein etal., 2010). The literature
suggests that views diverge on the Cancún Agreements: some see
them as a step forward in the multilateral process (Grubb, 2011)
potentially towards a subsequent legal agreement (Bodansky and Dir-
inger, 2010), while others suggest that the move to a voluntary pledge
system has weakened the multilateral climate regime (Khor, 2010b).
The participation of 97 countries in the form of emission reduction
pledges (42 countries) or mitigation actions (55 countries) speaks to
the institutional feasibility of the Cancún Agreements (see Section
13.5.1.1). The Durban Platform in 2011 further de-emphasized the
distinction between developing and developed countries, with regard
to mitigation commitments, and mandated a new treaty by 2015, to
take effect by 2020, mobilizing emissions reductions by all countries
(UNFCCC, 2011a).
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13�13�1�4 Assessment of envisioned international
cooperation outside of the UNFCCC
A wide variety of international institutions outside of the UNFCCC
have some role in international climate change policy. These are
described in Section 13.5 and depicted graphically in Figure 13.1,
above. They include activities at the international, regional, national,
subnational, and local scales, and they include public, private and civil
society actors. Here, we discuss those institutions for which there exist
published assessments of performance for at least one of the criteria
from Section 13.2.2.
The breadth of group membership poses a potential tradeoff between
global participation and other aspects of institutional feasibility (see
Sections 13.2.2.4, 13.3.3, and 13.5.1). To the extent that a group’s
membership includes only a subset of countries, this may facilitate
negotiations and implementation, thereby improvinginstitutional
feasibility (Houser, 2010), but this may reduce environmental and
economic performance due to incomplete global coverage — omit-
ting others’ emissions, yielding leakage, and forgoing low-cost oppor-
tunities for abatement (Wiener, 1999; see also Sections 13.13.1 and
13.5.1.2). Moreover, bringing climate discussions into smaller interna-
tional forums has been criticized by some as attempts to circumvent
the UNFCCC and reduce its legitimacy (Hurrell and Sengupta, 2012).
Because the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol provides for emissions com-
mitments only by Annex B countries (which account for a declining
share of global emissions, with increased risk of leakage), some of the
smaller groups discussed in this subsection have tried to engage major
developing countries as well, to reduce leakage and increase environ-
mental effectiveness.
The G8
The G8 includes eight major industrialized countries (United States,
United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia),
plus the European Union. At the 2007 G8 summit, member countries
agreed (though without a binding commitment) to set a goal of a 50 %
reduction in GHG emissions below 1990 levels by 2050, conditional
on major developing countries making significant reductions. A com-
parison of four models of global emission pathways (including the G8
plus China, India, and other major developing countries, a group which
resembles the MEF or G20 more than the G8), to achieve concentra-
tion levels of 550, 450, or 400 ppm by 2100, found that aggregate
global costs through 2100 would be below 0.8 % of global GDP to
achieve 550 ppm and about 2.5 % for 400 ppm (but highly sensitive to
the availability of CCS and biofuels) (Edenhofer etal., 2010); see also
Section 6.3.2.1.
Analysts have examined the economic impacts of achieving reduc-
tions approximating the G8 pledge on individual countries, such as the
United Kingdom (Dagoumas and Barker, 2010) and the United States
(Paltsev et al., 2008).The former finds no simple tradeoff between
emission reductions and economic growth in the United Kingdom. Of
the more aggressive reductions modelled for the United States, Palt-
sev etal. (2008) finds carbon prices rising to between 120 and 210
USD by 2050, a level of cost that “would not seriously affect US GDP
growth but would imply large-scale changes in its energy system.”
Paltsev etal. (2009) found somewhat higher costs, noting moreover
that the details of policy design and incomplete sectoral coverage
could raise these costs further. Meanwhile, actions by the G8 countries
alone (excluding major developing countries) would address a declin-
ing share of global emissions and would be subject to leakage to non-
G8 members.
The Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate
The MEF, described in Section 13.5.1.3, is a forum for the discussion of
policy options and international collaboration with regard to climate
and energy, not a forum for negotiation. There are no published assess-
ments of the MEF’s effectiveness. Massetti (2011) considers a scheme
that achieves the MEF’s informal, aspirational objective of “reducing
global emissions by 50 % in 2050” (similar to the G8 goal, described
above) through hypothetical 80 % reductions by high-income MEF
countries and 25 – 30 % reductions by low-income countries, and finds
costs would exceed 1.5 % of GDP.
The G20
The G20, described in Section 13.5.1.3, came to a political agree-
ment at its 2009 Pittsburgh meeting to “phase out and rationalize
over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies while providing
targeted support for the poorest” (G20, 2009). This was not followed
by a legally binding agreement. In terms of environmental effective-
ness, this effort could significantly affect GHG emissions, if countries
in fact implemented it; by one modelled estimate, complete phaseout
of such subsidies by 2020, could reduce CO
2
emissions by 4.7 % (IEA,
2011). Analysis suggests that, of the economies identified by the IEA
as having fossil-fuel consumption subsidies, almost half had either
implemented fossil-fuel subsidy reforms or announced related plans by
2011 (IEA etal., 2011). However, other analysts suggest that progress
towards this goal can be attributed to changes in reporting and sub-
sidy estimation, and that no fossil fuel subsidies have been eliminated
under this pledge (Koplow, 2012).
Studies have confirmed that countries reforming fossil fuel consumer
subsidies would realize positive economic benefits (IEA etal., 2011).
However, “these economic benefits would be offset by trade impacts
if other countries also removed their subsidies and thus reduced their
demand for fossil-fuel imports” (IEA etal., 2011). The G20 initiative on
fossil fuel subsidies could have positive distributional impacts within
some countries, however. Since fossil fuel subsidies tend to benefit high-
income households more than the poor in developing countries, their
removal would be progressive in such nations (World Bank, 2008c).
Some note that the creation of the G20 and its elevation to a pre-
mier global international economic forum during the financial crisis in
2008 (Houser, 2010) has led to more open and dynamic negotiations
between industrialized and developing countries (Hurrell and Sen-
gupta, 2012), suggesting a potentially positive route forward.
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The Montreal Protocol
The Montreal Protocol is one agreement outside of the UNFCCC
that has achieved nearly universal participation and has made a sig-
nificant contribution to reducing GHG emissions (Molina etal., 2009;
Velders et al., 2007). (The UNFCCC does not address GHGs already
controlled by the Montreal Protocol.) In its effort to reduce emissions
of ozone-depleting substances (ODS), the Montreal Protocol initially
phased down chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which harm the ozone
layer and also have very high global warming potential (GWP), and in
2007 decided to accelerate the phase-down schedule for HCFCs — an
interim replacement for CFCs with a somewhat lower, but still very
significant, GWP. The latter decision was affected by climate consid-
erations (Bodansky, 2011a). Even before the HCFC decision, one esti-
mate suggested that the Montreal Protocol’s overall net contribution
to climate change mitigation had been approximately 5 times what
the Kyoto Protocol would achieve under its first commitment period
(Velders etal., 2007, 2012). However, this comparison may be unfair
because the progress in reducing ozone depleting gases relative to
GHGs may be due to the major ozone depleting gases being less cen-
tral to economic activities than the major GHGs. In addition, the time-
periods in which the two agreements have been operating makes
comparison difficult.
Hydrofluorocarbons are being widely adopted as a longer-term substi-
tute for CFCs. Many of these have extremely high GWP, and their use
will partially negate climate gains otherwise achieved by the Montreal
Protocol (Moncel and van Asselt, 2012). Zaelke etal. (2012) suggest
that a combination of reductions of HFCs and significant cuts in CO
2
,
the largest contributor to climate change, can significantly increase the
chances of remaining below the 2 °C limit. Proposals have been made
in the Montreal Protocol process to phase down HFCs (even though
these gases are not ozone-depleting substances), but as of mid-2013,
parties to the Montreal Protocol had not agreed to an HFC phasedown.
However, in June 2013 the presidents of the United States and China
announced a joint initiative to phase down HFCs.
In terms of distributional equity, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, which
placed no restrictions on developing country emissions, the Mon-
treal Protocol applied equally-stringent emission requirements on
all countries. However, the Montreal Protocol allowed for a 10-year
‘grace period’ for countries with low per capita CFC consumption to
meet their implementation requirements, consistent with the principle
of CBDRRC. The Montreal Protocol also established mechanisms for
financing and provided technical support to assist developing coun-
tries in reducing their ODS emissions; the most notable mechanism is
the Multilateral Fund, which has transferred more than 3billion USD to
assist developing country ODS mitigation (Molina etal., 2009).
The International Maritime Organisation and the International
Civil Aviation Organisation
Under the Kyoto Protocol’s Article 2.2, AnnexI parties agreed to pursue
GHG limitations from maritime and air transport through the IMO and
ICAO.
Approximately 3.3 % of global CO
2
emissions in 2007 were attribut-
able to shipping (IMO, 2009). In 2011, the IMO adopted the first man-
datory standards for a sector relating to GHG emissions, instituting a
performance-based energy-efficiency regulation for large ships “for
which the building contract is placed on or after January 1, 2013”
(Bodansky, 2011c). This regulation applies uniformly to all countries,
extending participation in GHG emissions regulation. These standards
were adopted by majority vote (over some objections), and include a
provision to promote technical cooperation and assistance, especially
for developing countries (Bodansky, 2011c), to address equity con-
cerns, enhancing institutional feasibility.
The ICAO adopted a resolution on climate change in 2010. In contrast to
the IMO, the ICAO’s climate change goals are ‘voluntary and aspirational.’
Perceived inadequate progress by the ICAO toward aviation emissions
reduction goals may have prompted the inclusion of aviation emissions
in the EU-ETS in January 2012 (Bodansky, 2011c) (see Section 13.8.2).
Agreements among non-state actors and agreements among
sub-national actors
It is unclear whether agreements among non-state (NGOs, private
sector) or sub-national actors (transnational city networks) have been
effective in reducing emissions. Partly this is because of their nov-
elty and partly because the units of measurement for such effective-
ness are considerably more complex than for interstate agreements
(Pinkse and Kolk, 2009). For subnational efforts, the question of attri-
bution requires better disaggregation, to understand whether reduc-
tions are additional to national effort, or only contribute to delivering
national pledges. While these sub-national efforts may make a small
contribution to climate action, they may be valuable in influencing
nation states or helping them meet commitments (Osofsky, 2012).
Other measures of impacts do exist. In private sector initiatives, the
Carbon Disclosure Project has high rates of reporting, with about 91 %
of Global 500 companies surveyed in 2011 disclosing GHG emissions
(Carbon Disclosure Project, 2011). There is little evidence of substan-
tial changes in investor behaviour, with disagreement as to the poten-
tial for such changes in the future (Kolk et al., 2008; Harmes, 2011;
MacLeod and Park, 2011). Some assessments have focused on how
transnational city initiatives promote technology uptake within cities
(Hoffmann, 2011) or on how they create a combination of competition
and learning among member cities.
The voluntary carbon market (VCM) (see Section13.5.2) had grown to
131 million tCO
2
eq (about one-tenth of the size of the CDM), with a
value of 424 million USD, by 2010 (Peters-Stanley etal., 2011). In 2004,
virtually no VCM projects underwent third-party verified certification,
but by 2010, this figure had reached 90 % and the VCM has created a
varied landscape of emission-offset providers, registries, and standards
(Peters-Stanley etal., 2011).
For some, the VCM is complementary to the CDM, and provides for
learning about new ways of developing emissions reduction projects
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(Benessaiah, 2012). However, Dhanda and Hartman (2011) find that
the voluntary market is not transparent and suffers from large swings
of demand for specific project types. Offset prices for the same project
type differs by up to two orders of magnitude. As noted, competing
registries and standard providers proliferate, and additionality of a sig-
nificant share of projects is doubtful. Some regard voluntary certifica-
tion systems as primarily public relations exercises (Bumpus and Liver-
man, 2008). An earlier assessment by Corbera etal. (2009) concluded
that the voluntary market does not perform better than the CDM. How-
ever, performance in the VCM seems to improve with the increased use
of third-party certification systems (Hamilton etal., 2008; Capoor and
Ambrosi, 2009; Newell and Paterson, 2010).
There is evidence that the importance of partnerships between the
private sector and government depends on their relationship to more
traditional state-led governance. Partnerships may work once govern-
ment regulations send strong signals to investors (Pfeifer and Sullivan,
2008). Rules developed in private sector agreements may then become
incorporated in government regulations (Knox-Hayes and Levy, 2011),
and private carbon market offset standards may be introduced into
regulated carbon markets (Hoffmann, 2011).
13�13�2 Performance assessment of proposed
international climate policy
architectures
This section describes proposed global climate policy architectures (sur-
veyed in Section 13.4), focusing on those that have been described for
the first time since AR4, and older proposals for which new research on
anticipated performance is available. Earlier proposals are listed in Table
13.2 of Gupta etal. (2007). The performance assessment of proposed
architectures is difficult because it depends on both the architecture
and the specific design elements of its regulatory targets and mecha-
nisms.
For analytical purposes, this chapter classifies proposals using the
taxonomy developed in Section 13.4.3 and Table 13.2: (a) strong mul-
tilateralism, (b) harmonized national policies, and (c) decentralized
architectures and coordinated national policies. Combinations of these
categories have also been proposed and assessed. For example, strong
multilateralism can be advanced by ‘clubs’ of selected ambitious coun-
tries (Weischer etal., 2012)or by non-state actors (Blok etal., 2012).
13�13�2�1 Strong multilateralism
The anticipated performance of various proposals for strong multi-
lateralism has been assessed in the literature. In addition, another
body of research has examined the ends (but not the policy architec-
ture) associated with various aggregate goals in terms of country-
or region-level emission targets based on specific notions of distri-
butional equity, so-called ‘burden sharing approaches’ (see Section
13.2, as well as Sections 4.6.2 and 6.3.6.6 for quantitative assess-
ments).
Comprehensive proposals for strong multilateralism have in some
cases been closely related to the targets-and-timetables approach of
the Kyoto Protocol. This approach aims to be based on the UNFCCC
principle of CBDRRC while introducing a more nuanced differentia-
tion and broader base of participation, along with some details of the
means of implementation. This is well reflected in the literature on
reduction proposals with national emission targets and emissions trad-
ing (see Table 13.2 in Gupta etal. (2007) for literature prior to AR4).
Since AR4, this literature has studied gradually-increasing emission-
reduction commitments linked to indicators such as per capita income
(Cao, 2010a; Frankel, 2010; Bosetti and Frankel, 2011), differentiating
groups of countries (den Elzen etal., 2007; Rajamani, 2013), common
but differentiated convergence (Luderer etal., 2012), and per capita
targets (Agarwala, 2010).
Distributional impacts vary significantly with underlying criteria for
effort sharing. For example, proposals that use ‘responsibility and
capability’ as a criterion for allocating effort would result in relatively
more stringent implied actions for ‘early’ emitters, assigning them
lower allocations. Proposals based on the criterion of ‘mitigation
potential’ would be less stringent for ‘early’ emitters, capturing the
mitigation potential in developing countries, assumed to be relatively
low-cost (Höhne et al., 2013). Especially for low-stabilization levels,
the approaches differ in the extent to which they rely on contributions
from all countries, from emissions reductions within their borders, and
on international assistance between countries. Section 4.6.2 details
many more possible criteria for effort sharing, and Section 6.3.6.6
quantifies the implications of these various effort sharing criteria in
terms of regional emission allocations and costs.
Sectoral approaches are generally not anticipated to perform optimally
in terms of environmental effectiveness or economic performance
when compared with economy-wide approaches; therefore, sectoral
approaches can be thought of as second-best policies (Bradley etal.,
2007; Schmidt etal., 2008; den Elzen etal., 2008; Meckling and Chung,
2009). Sectors that are homogenous and already globally integrated,
such as aviation, may lend themselves better to international coopera-
tion than those that are heterogeneous. Omitting some sectors makes
it more difficult to achieve emissions or stabilization goals and also
reduces cost-effectiveness, relative to economy-wide approaches, as
required emissions reductions must be made within-sector, failing to
take advantage of the lower of heterogeneous marginal abatement
costs across sectors. Transaction costs may also be higher with sectoral
approaches, including, for example, greater challenges to negotiation
(Bradley etal., 2007).
However, these approaches could potentially help mitigate leak-
age within particular industries (Bradley etal., 2007; Sawa, 2010). In
terms of institutional feasibility, sectoral approaches may encourage
the participation of a wider range of countries than economy-wide
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approaches, because sectoral agreements can be more politically
manageable in domestic policy processes (Bradley etal., 2007; Sawa,
2010). Developing countries may also be more likely to participate
meaningfully in sectoral processes than economy-wide agreements
limiting emissions (Meckling and Chung, 2009).
Several researchers have suggested that a ‘regime complex’ is emerg-
ing (see Sections 13.3 and 13.5), with the strong implication that com-
ponent regimes may display a range of architectures — from strong
multilateralism through more decentralized systems (Carraro et al.,
2007; Biermann etal., 2009; Barrett, 2010; Keohane and Victor, 2011).
The portfolio of treaties approach is similar in some ways to the sec-
toral approaches described above. However, the approach described in
(Barrett, 2010) includes much more significant enforcement possibili-
ties, potentially increasing environmental effectiveness, while poten-
tially reducing institutional feasibility.
13�13�2�2 Harmonized national policies
In principle, a wide variety of national climate policies can be harmo-
nized across countries. This holds for cap-and-trade systems (e. g., a
global emissions permit trading system (Ellerman, 2010)), as we dis-
cuss in the context of linkage below, as well as for national carbon or
other GHG taxes. The most-studied approach in terms of performance
assessments has been harmonized carbon taxes. Their environmental
performance would depend upon the level of the tax, but relative to
non-market-based approaches, this approach would be cost-effective.
The impact of a carbon tax on economic efficiency will depend, in part,
on how tax revenues are used (Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994; Parry,
1995; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; Cooper, 2010).
Estimates in the recent literature of the environmental effectiveness
and economic performance of proposed carbon taxes vary dramati-
cally depending upon assumptions (Edmonds etal., 2008; Clarke etal.,
2009; van Vuuren etal., 2009; Bosetti etal., 2010; Luderer etal., 2012).
The distributional impacts of a carbon tax include negative impacts
on the fossil fuel industry as a whole, with stronger impacts for fuels
with higher carbon emissions per unit of energy. For example, impacts
on coal would be much greater than on natural gas (Cooper, 2010).
Impacts of national carbon taxes on consumers would likely be some-
what regressive in high-income countries but progressive in low-
income countries (see Section 15.5 for detail). Tax revenues could be
used by individual countries to address these domestic distributional
concerns (See e. g.,Winkler and Marquard, 2011; Alton etal., 2012).
Under a harmonized national carbon tax regime, fossil-fuel-exporting
countries might experience negative impacts, and net importers could
experience decreasing prices due to reduced demand, while some
regions could experience increased bio-energy exports (Persson et al.,
2006; OECD, 2008; Cooper, 2010; Leimbach etal., 2010). International
transfers drawing on revenues of such a tax could, in theory, be used
to address these concerns or to encourage participation by developing
countries (Nordhaus, 2006). As with emissions trading (Frankel, 2010),
the extent of developing country participation in an international carbon
tax scheme could be based upon income thresholds (Nordhaus, 2006).
The institutional feasibility of a global carbon tax has not been thor-
oughly considered in the literature. The relatively large number of stud-
ies on a global carbon tax is at least partly due to the fact that eco-
nomic modellers often model a global carbon tax as a proxy for other
mitigation policy instruments that would impose shadow prices on the
carbon content of fossil fuels and / or CO
2
emissions.
Many hybrid market-based approaches to mitigation, combining trad-
able emissions permits with some characteristics of a carbon tax, have
been proposed and examined in the recent literature (Pizer, 2002;
Murray etal., 2009; FELL etal., 2010; Webster etal., 2010; Grüll and
Taschini, 2011). In principle, these hybrid approaches can provide bet-
ter aggregate economic performance, lowering compliance costs and
reducing price volatility, at the potential expense of environmental
effectiveness in the form of uncertain changes in aggregate emissions
(Grüll and Taschini, 2011). However, recent research suggests that ‘soft’
price collars, which provide a modest reserve of additional emission
allowances at the price ceiling, may achieve most of the expected com-
pliance cost savings provided by ‘hard’ collars (unlimited supplies of
additional allowances), while maintaining a more predictable cap on
emissions (Fell et al., 2012). In terms of distributional equity, hybrid
systems may reduce expected compliance costs for regulated firms,
though they may increase regulatory costs (Grüll and Taschini, 2011).
This characteristic may also increase political feasibility.
13�13�2�3 Decentralized architectures and coordinated
national policies
In principle, many types of national climate policies could be linked to
each other. In the literature to date, most discussion is of linked carbon
markets. The recent literature on these suggests that economic perfor-
mance of existing GHG allowance trading systems could be enhanced
through linkage, which would reduce abatement costs and improve
market liquidity (Haites and Mehling, 2009; Mehling and Haites, 2009;
Sterk and Kruger, 2009; Anger etal., 2009; Jaffe etal., 2009; Jaffe and
Stavins, 2010; Grüll and Taschini, 2011; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012;
Ranson and Stavins, 2013).
In terms of environmental performance, linkage can increase or reduce
emissions leakage, depending on the stringency of caps, and the qual-
ity of offset credits within linked systems.
Linkages among cap-and-trade systems as well as linkages with and
among emission-reduction-credit systems would create winners and
losers, generating distributional impacts relative to un-linked systems,
depending upon impacts on allowance prices and whether partici-
pating entities are net buyers or net sellers of emissions (Jaffe and
Stavins, 2010). While it does preserve the ability of countries to meet
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their commitments through means of their own choice, consistent
with the Kyoto Protocol, linkage also poses some challenges for insti-
tutional feasibility, since it reduces domestic control over prices, emis-
sions, and other aspects of policy design and impact (Buchner and
Carraro, 2007; Jaffe etal., 2009; Jaffe and Stavins, 2010; Ranson and
Stavins, 2013). Linking may not benefit all participating countries due
to potential market distortions and the rebalancing of production and
consumption patterns in multiple markets (i. e., general equilibrium
effects) (Marschinski etal., 2012). In one analysis that modelled the
heterogeneous costs and benefits of participation in a climate coali-
tion using a game-theoretic framework, incentives to deviate from
cooperation could not be compensated by transfers (Bosetti et al.,
2013).
Institutional-feasibility challenges may be more significant for linked
heterogeneous policy instruments (such as taxes and emissions permit
systems, or taxes and technology standards) relative to linked regimes
that use similar instruments (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012). For exam-
ple, unrestricted linkage would effectively turn a permit trading system
into a tax, pegging the permit price to the other country’s tax rate, and
allowing aggregate emissions above the permit system’s established
cap (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012).
Climate policy architectures that can be characterized as technology-
oriented agreements may seek to share and coordinate knowledge and
enhance technology research, development, demonstration, and transfer.
Some literature suggests that such agreements may increase the effi-
ciency and environmental effectiveness of international climate coopera-
tion, but will have limited environmental effectiveness operating alone
(de Coninck etal., 2008). Though technology-oriented policies can pro-
mote the development of new technologies, environmental effectiveness
hinges on the need for other policies to provide incentives for adoption
(Fischer, 2008; Newell, 2010b). For example, (Bosetti etal., 2009b) show
that R&D alone is insufficient to stabilize CO
2
levels without an accom-
panying carbon tax or functionally equivalent policy instrument. See Sec-
tion13.9.3 for details of international cooperation on technology.
13.14 Gaps in knowledge
and data
Current understanding of agreements and instruments for interna-
tional cooperation continues to evolve. At the time of this publication,
there are a number of gaps in the scholarly literature of international
cooperation for climate change mitigation, as identified below:
• There exist few comparisons of proposals in terms of any or all
of the four criteria used in this report. Research that would be
particularly useful would be comparisons of aggregate cost, or
disaggregated regional- or country-level costs per year, with incor-
poration of uncertainty.
• There exist few assessments of the emerging range of new inter-
governmental and transnational arrangements, including ‘hybrid’
approaches and approaches that interact across the landscape of
climate agreements, which might enable better assessment of the
sum of efforts.
• Current understanding of the complementarities and tradeoffs
between policies affecting mitigation and adaptation is incomplete.
• Current understanding of how international cooperation on cli-
mate change can help achieve co-benefits and development goals
of countries and what policies and practices work and do not work
in capacity building projects is incomplete.
• Current understanding of the factors that affect national decisions
to join and form international agreements and how international
cooperation can directly influence achievement of various perfor-
mance criteria is incomplete.
13.15 Frequently Asked
Questions
FAQ 13�1 Given that GHG emissions abatement
must ultimately be carried out by
individuals and firms within countries,
why is international cooperation
necessary?
International cooperation is important to achieve significant emis-
sions reductions for a number of reasons. First, climate protection is a
public good that requires collective action, because firms and individ-
uals will not otherwise bear the private costs needed to achieve the
global benefits of abatement (see Section 13.2.1.1). Second, because
GHGs mix globally in the atmosphere, anthropogenic climate change
is a global commons problem. Third, international cooperation helps
to give every country an opportunity to ascertain how responsibilities
are to be divided among them, based on principles adopted in inter-
national agreements (see Section 13.3). This is important because
individual countries are the entities with jurisdiction over individuals
and firms, whose actions ultimately determine if emissions are abated.
Fourth, international cooperation allows for linkages across policies
at different scale, notably through harmonizing national and regional
policies, as well as linkages across issues, and through enhanced
cooperation may reduce mitigation costs, create opportunities for
sharing the benefits of adaptation, increase credibility of price signals,
and expand market size and liquidity. Fifth, international cooperation
may help bring together international science and knowledge, which
may improve the performance of cooperatively-developed policy
instruments.
10541054
International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
13
Chapter 13
FAQ 13�2 What are the advantages and
disadvantages of including all countries
in international cooperation on climate
change (an ‘inclusive’ approach) and
limiting participation (an ‘exclusive’
approach)?
The literature suggests that there are tradeoffs between ‘inclusive’
approaches to negotiation and agreement (i. e., approaches with
broad participation, as in the UNFCCC) and ‘exclusive’ approaches
(i. e., limiting participation according to chosen criteria — for exam-
ple, including only the largest emitters, or groups focused on specific
issues). Regarding an ‘inclusive’ approach, the universal membership
of the UNFCCC is an indicator of its high degree of legitimacy among
states as a central institution to develop international climate policy.
However, the scholarly literature offers differing views over whether
or not the outcomes of recent negotiations strengthen or weaken the
multilateral climate regime (Section 13.13.1.3). A number of other
multilateral forums have emerged as potentially valuable in advanc-
ing the international process through an ‘exclusive’ approach. These
smaller groups can advance the overall process through informal con-
sultations, technical analysis and information sharing, and implemen-
tation of UNFCCC decisions or guidance (e. g., with regard to climate
finance). They might also be more effective in advancing agreement
among the largest emitters, but so far have not been able to do so.
Examples include the MEF, the G20 and G8, and the city-level C-40
Climate Leadership Group. Section 13.5 goes into more detail, and Fig-
ure 13.1 illustrates the overall landscape of climate change-relevant
agreements and institutions.
FAQ 13�3 What are the options for designing
policies to make progress on
international cooperation on climate
change mitigation?
There are a number of potential structures for formalized international
cooperation on climate change mitigation, referred to in the text as pol-
icy ‘architectures’ (see Section 13.4). Architectures vary by the degree
to which their authority is centralized and can be roughly categorized
into three groups: strong multilateralism, harmonized national policies,
and decentralized architectures (see Section 13.4.1). An example of
strong multilateralism is a targets-and-timetables approach, which sets
aggregate quantitative emissions-reduction targets over a fixed period
of time and allocates responsibility for this reduction among countries,
based on principles jointly accepted. The UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol is
an example of a strong multilateral approach. The second architecture
is harmonized national policies. An example in principle (though not
put into practice) might be multilaterally harmonized domestic carbon
taxes. An example of the third architecture, decentralized approaches
and coordinated national policies, would be linkage among domestic
cap-and-trade systems, driven not through a multilateral agreement
but largely by bilateral arrangements. The literature suggests that each
of the various proposed policy architectures for global climate change
has advantages and disadvantages with regard to four evaluation cri-
teria: environmental effectiveness, aggregate economic performance,
distributional equity, and institutional feasibility. Section 13.4.1.4 goes
into more detail.
10551055
International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
13
Chapter 13
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